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Abstract 
Intuitively,  an agent  who  does harm behaves differently from an agent who  allows harm to 
happen. This thesis examines the distinction between doing harm and merely allowing it  to 
occur. I argue that this distinction is morally relevant, and doing harm is harder to justify than 
allowing harm, but that there is not always a fact of the matter how the distinction ought to be  
drawn. 
In  Chapters  1  and  2,  I  survey  the  main  alternative  accounts  for  explaining  the  difference  
between “doing” and “allowing”. I compare causal  approaches, which distinguish doing and 
allowing on the basis of how an agent caused an outcome, with “norm-based” accounts, which 
explain  the  distinction  appealing  to  independent  moral  features.  I  conclude  that  a  “mixed” 
causal account, such as Hitchcock's self-contained network model, is the most promising for 
tracking doing/allowing classifications.
I then examine whether this distinction is morally relevant. I outline two theoretical hypotheses, 
the “positive” and the “negative” theses. The former argues that there is a fact of the matter 
whether an action is “doing” or “allowing”, and this classification is morally significant; the 
latter that there might or might not be such a fact of the matter, but in any case this distinction is  
not morally relevant. In Chapter 3, I critique an influential strategy for settling this issue, that is, 
comparing “fully-equalized cases”. In Chapter 4, I consider the import of “framing effects”.  
Despite attempts to use fully-equalized cases or evidence of framing in support of either thesis, 
these strategies are not compelling.
In Chapters 5 and 6, I present my alternative thesis, which relies on the self-contained network  
model. I define “doings” as instances where an outcome counterfactually depends on the agent, 
within a “self-contained” network, and “allowings” as instances where the outcome depends on 
the agent, within a “non-self-contained” network. This classification captures whether an agent 
is causally relevant to an outcome in a specific way; nonetheless, the identification of “self-
contained” networks incorporates agents' empirical and normative expectations. The distinction 
is  thus  morally  relevant,  as  it  (also)  captures  moral  considerations,  but  may  be  ultimately 
ambiguous, as there may not always be a fact of the matter as to how the distinction should be 
drawn.
3
List of Contents
Acknowledgments............................................................................................................. 7
Introduction......................................................................................................................8
1. Analysis of Doing vs Allowing: Causal Accounts.................................................... 13
1.1 Doing as Causing.................................................................................................. 13
1.2 Difference-making accounts................................................................................. 14
1.2.1 Preemption.................................................................................................... 15
1.2.2 Distinguishing acts and omissions ............................................................... 17
1.3 Process Theories .................................................................................................. 19
1.4 Distinguishing acts and omissions: the counterfactual approach.........................22
1.4.1 Not all omissions are allowings.................................................................... 25
1.5 “Sequence” Theories ............................................................................................28
2. Analysis of Doing vs Allowing: “Norm-based” and “Mixed” Accounts................33
2.1 Norm-based accounts ...........................................................................................33
2.2 Rights-based accounts ..........................................................................................34
2.3 Kagan's norm-violation account .......................................................................... 37
2.4 Hitchcock's “self-contained network” model ......................................................39
2.4.1 Remaining difficulties: preemption...............................................................46
2.4.2 Deviant, default, and norms ......................................................................... 48
3. The strategy of “fully-equalized cases”....................................................................52
3.1 The question of moral relevance...........................................................................52
3.2 Discussing fully-equalized cases.......................................................................... 55
3.2.1 Candidate fully-equalized cases.................................................................... 56
3.2.2 Responses to the fully-equalized cases......................................................... 60
3.3 Problems with the strategy....................................................................................61
3.3.1 Controlling for consequences........................................................................62
3.3.2 Can we really control for intentions?............................................................ 63
3.3.3 Testing intuitions in fully-equalized cases.................................................... 67
3.4 Conclusion............................................................................................................ 70
4. Moral Framing...........................................................................................................71
4.1 Framing effects..................................................................................................... 71
4
4.1.1 Framing doings and allowings...................................................................... 73
4.1.2 Framing and the reliability of moral intuitions.............................................76
4.2 The “Asian flu” case............................................................................................. 79
4.3 The deflationist hypothesis................................................................................... 82
4.4 Non-deflationist hypothesis: Kamm's proposal.................................................... 84
4.5 The third path........................................................................................................ 88
4.6 Conclusion............................................................................................................ 92
5. The alternative thesis ................................................................................................94
5.1 The positive, the negative, and the alternative theses........................................... 95
5.2 Defending the alternative thesis............................................................................97
5.2.1 The alternative thesis in the “space” of positions.........................................99
5.2.2 The alternative thesis, reductionist proposals, and three desiderata...........101
5.3 The self-contained network account and the alternative thesis...........................105
5.3.1 Incorporating framing effects......................................................................106
5.3.2 Framing: empirical and normative expectations......................................... 109
5.3.3 Normative considerations............................................................................113
5.3.4 Summary..................................................................................................... 114
5.4 Final formulation ................................................................................................115
5.5 Conclusion.......................................................................................................... 116
6. Intentions, Norms, and Difficult Cases.................................................................. 119
6.1 Introduction.........................................................................................................119
6.2 Doing/allowing and intending/foreseeing...........................................................121
6.2.1 Two separate distinctions............................................................................ 121
6.2.2 Intentions and expectations ........................................................................ 123
6.2.2.1 The closeness problem and Bennett's solutions...................................124
6.2.2.2 Fitzpatrick's constitutive relation and the appeal to background 
expectations .................................................................................................... 126
6.2.2.3 Intentions and causal networks............................................................128
6.3 Salient Norms......................................................................................................130
6.3.1 Norms and intentions.................................................................................. 132
6.3.2 Norms and Disagreement............................................................................133
6.4 Difficult cases and the alternative thesis.............................................................134
5
6.4.1 The Smith/Jones case.................................................................................. 134
6.4.2 Trolley cases ...............................................................................................136
6.4.3 Preemptions ................................................................................................137
6.4.4 Borderline cases.......................................................................................... 138
Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 145
Bibliography.................................................................................................................. 147
6
List of Figures and Tables
Figure 2.1: Assassination.................................................................................................39
Figure 2.2: Bodyguard.....................................................................................................39
Figure 2.3: Dropping the cigarette...................................................................................42
Figure 2.4: Queen of England..........................................................................................43
Figure 2.5: Backup.......................................................................................................... 44
Figure 5.1: Asian flu...................................................................................................... 104
Figure 6.1: Impoverished Village ................................................................................. 138
Figure 6.2: Hospital....................................................................................................... 138
Figure 6.3: Interpose......................................................................................................139
Table 4.1.......................................................................................................................... 83
Table 5.1.......................................................................................................................... 97
Table 5.2........................................................................................................................ 102
7
Acknowledgments
First and foremost, I am grateful to my supervisor Katie Steele. Katie provided extensive and  
extremely helpful feedback on countless drafts of my thesis, no matter how busy she was. Katie 
paid care and attention to my work, and her advice has shaped and improved this thesis greatly.  
Her support during these four years has been invaluable.
I am also grateful to Susanne Burri for being a fantastic second supervisor. Especially in my last  
year, Susanne has provided insightful comments, and even more helpful advice and support.  
Susanne is both kind and efficient, and she always had time when I needed to discuss an issue.
I  thank  the  LSE  Philosophy  Department  for  my  four-year  scholarship,  and  for  being  an 
outstanding work environment. I learned a lot from my fellow PhD students, and I should offer 
special thanks to Kamilla Buchter, Aron Vallinder and Christina Easton.
Finally, I would like to thank Christian List and Fiona Woollard for being my examiners. Their 
thorough comments and feedback have helped me perfectioning this thesis, and have given me a 
lot to think about for future developments. 
I thank my brother and my sister for acting as my personal debate club, and Nicole, my brilliant  
friend.
8
Introduction
The idea  that  doing  and  allowing  amount  to  two distinct  forms  of  human  behaviour,  with 
different meaning and significance, strikes us as intuitive and reasonable. There are reasons to 
believe that there is a fundamental asymmetry between “doing” and “allowing” in general; in 
this thesis, however, I focus narrowly on the dichotomy between doing harm and allowing harm 
to occur, as opposed to doing good or allowing good to occur, since the former has been more 
thoroughly investigated in moral philosophy. We do, in fact, use this distinction in everyday life; 
when forming moral judgements, at least prior to reflection, we seem to share an overwhelming 
intuition that doing harm is somehow worse, or harder to justify, than allowing it to occur. This 
thesis sets out to examine this doing/allowing distinction. 
The doing/allowing debate in moral philosophy revolves around two main questions: i) where to 
draw the line between doings and allowings, and ii) whether this distinction matters morally.  
That is,  whether doing behaviours are descriptively different from allowing behaviours, and 
whether doing harm is harder to justify than allowing harm. In this thesis, I strive to keep these 
two questions  apart,  and to  address  the  descriptive and the normative task separately.  As  I  
examine these issues, nonetheless, I observe that the most promising descriptive accounts of the 
doing/allowing distinction incorporate moral considerations. At the same time, disputes about 
whether the distinction is morally significant turn out to be intimately tied up with disputes 
about how to distinguish doing from allowing in the first place. I conclude that disagreement  
regarding  doing  and  allowing  classifications  and  the  relative  moral  significance  of  such 
behaviours depends on both empirical  and normative features.  My proposed account of the 
doing/allowing distinction ultimately aims to explain persistent disagreement in everyday use of 
this  dichotomy and  in  moral  theorising,  while  preserving  the  intuition  that  doing/allowing 
classifications capture morally relevant features of behaviours so described.
In this sense, this thesis aims to bring together two different lines of investigation regarding the 
doing/allowing distinction, which do not often engage with each other. In the first camp, authors 
like Philippa Foot, Warren Quinn, Jeff McMahan, Frances Kamm, and Fiona Woollard strive to 
explain  the  different  meaning  that  commonsense  morality  seems  to attach  to  “doings”  and 
“allowings”. They take seriously our intuitive judgements about specific cases, and try to build 
upon them a systematic account of the doing/allowing distinction, which justifies the insight 
that  “doing is worse than allowing”.  Still  in this  first  camp,  authors  like Jonathan Bennett, 
Shelly Kagan, and James Rachels have however challenged the idea that the doing/allowing 
distinction, in spite of its central role in everyday moral practice, is morally relevant. They argue 
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that the different significance we attach to doings and allowings is not justified after all, either 
because this distinction is grounded in morally irrelevant features or because it disappears upon 
careful analysis. In the second camp, authors like Tamara Horowitz, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, 
and Fiery Cushman have been investigating the doing/allowing distinction as a cognitive bias 
or, more charitably, as the byproduct of our (flawed) moral reasoning skills. The role of our 
intuitions  about  specific  cases  is  thus  downplayed,  as  moral  intuitions  seem,  under  closer 
scrutiny, generally unreliable, controversial and frame-dependent. 
In this  thesis,  I  take from the first  camp the idea that,  if  we aim to explain commonsense 
morality, we need to account for our use of the doing/allowing distinction. This means that, to 
some extent, we cannot easily dismiss the intuitive judgement that doing harm, all other things 
being equal, is worse than allowing harm, and that these two conducts are somehow distinct.  
Nonetheless, I also look at evidence of disagreement and framing effects. From the second camp 
I thus take the idea that our moral intuitions, if not unreliable, might be context- and agent-
dependent. My project aims to preserve both insights.
From this intermediate position,  I  thus argue that  doing/allowing classifications  are morally 
significant, as “composite judgements” which incorporate considerations that matter for moral 
evaluation.  As  such,  these  descriptions  of  behaviours  should  be  taken  seriously  and  can 
legitimately  serve  our  everyday  moral  practice.  On  the  other  hand,  doing/allowing 
classifications are also less stable, more controversial and less clear-cut than some might hope. 
Different agents, contexts and framings may make salient different considerations, and deliver 
different doing/allowing descriptions. Unlike cognitive bias theorists, nonetheless, we need not 
conclude that our moral intuitions lead us completely astray. In many cases, doing/allowing 
classifications  are  “robust”  and  agreed-upon;  in  these  circumstances,  we  should  keep  our 
intuitive judgement that doing harm is morally worse than allowing harm, all other things being 
equal. In controversial cases, which I argue are often under-described, I suggest that we should 
look at those things which are not “equal”, that is, are frame- or agent-dependent. 
Summary of chapters
In Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, I analyse how we should best conceptualise the doing/allowing 
distinction, and I survey the main alternative accounts for explaining the difference between 
doing and allowing, setting aside the problem whether this distinction is morally significant. 
Specifically, I compare causal approaches, which distinguish doing and allowing on the basis of 
how an agent caused an outcome, with what I call “norm-based” accounts, which attempt to  
explain the distinction by appealing to independent moral features. I conclude that a “mixed” 
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causal  account,  like  Christopher  Hitchcock's  self-contained  network  model,  which  takes  on 
board  norm-based  considerations  in  the  identification  of  specific  types  of  causal  relations, 
amounts  to  the  most  suitable  tool  for  tracking  our  everyday  use  of  the  doing/allowing 
distinction. 
I  then  start  examining  the  question  of  whether  the  doing/allowing  distinction  is  morally 
relevant, and I outline two main theoretical hypotheses to this end, which I call the “negative”  
and the “positive” theses. The positive thesis amounts to the position that there is a fact of the 
matter whether an action is an instance of “doing” or else “allowing”, and this classification is  
morally significant  per se, that is, it is a fundamental one and cannot be expressed by other 
moral features or principles. The negative thesis, on the other hand, argues that there might or  
might not be a fact of the matter whether an action is a “doing” or an “allowing”, but in any case 
this distinction is not morally relevant per se. The middle chapters of this thesis survey different 
arguments and evidence in favour of both the positive or the negative thesis.
In Chapter 3, I discuss and critique an influential strategy employed in the literature for settling 
this  issue,  which amounts to describing “fully-equalized cases”,  so-named because they are  
designed  to  test  agents'  responses  to  the  doing/allowing  distinction  alone.  In  Chapter  4,  I 
consider the significance of “framing effects”, that is, the fact that agents' classification of the 
(seemingly) same action as an instance of “doing” or else “allowing” can sometimes depend on  
the precise description or “framing” of the action. I conclude that, despite the attempts to use 
fully-equalized cases or evidence of framing effects  in support  of  either the positive  or the 
negative  thesis,  neither  of  these  strategies  provides  a  compelling  case  in  favour  of  either 
position.
More specifically, persistent disagreement and lack of consensus, in both people's intuitions and 
moral theorising, seem to amount to the most prominent feature of the comparisons between 
allegedly fully-equalized cases.  The analysis of  the nature  and source of such disagreement  
suggests that the project of disentangling the doing/allowing distinction from any other relevant 
aspect of the context, while prima facie promising, is ultimately unsuccessful. In any case, what 
should be concluded from the analysis of fully-equalized cases remains at least controversial.
Supporters of the negative thesis argue that framing effects challenge the moral significance of 
the distinction. If our intuitions about what counts as “doing” and what counts as “allowing” are 
influenced by seemingly morally irrelevant features, such as the description one uses or the 
order information is presented, then we have reasons to reject the idea that “doing” should be 
harder to justify than “allowing”. I discuss in particular the “Asian flu” case, which has been 
employed  to  show  that  the  doing/allowing  distinction  collapses  into  reasoning  biases  and 
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psychological attitudes to risk.  Nonetheless, it is open to supporters of the positive thesis to 
argue that while framing effects are real, they have no implications for the significance of the 
doing/allowing distinction. Rather, they point to flaws in our moral reasoning that need to be, 
and can be, corrected on reflection. In this way, framing effects do not necessarily amount to 
evidence  in  favour  of  either  thesis,  though  they  do  suggest  that  the  distinction  might  be 
ultimately ambiguous. With “ambiguous” I mean here that there may not always be a “correct” 
classification of actions as doing or allowings, as in some cases different classification might be 
tenable, depending on the agent and of the framing of the case.
It thus looks like neither the negative nor the positive theses emerge as a clear winner. Beyond  
that, both theses seem to account for aspects we intuitively feel are right: the positive thesis 
captures the intuition that, with doing/allowing classifications, we are onto something morally 
significant,  but also requires us to downplay evidence of disagreement.  The negative thesis, 
conversely, may adequately explain disagreement, controversial cases and examples of framing,  
but may go against strong intuitions of moral relevance. 
In Chapter 5, I suggest that a different proposal, which I call the “alternative thesis” may deliver  
a way out of this standoff, and preserve both aspects. The alternative thesis takes the following 
form: the doing/allowing distinction may be ultimately ambiguous, that is, it can be frame- and 
agent-dependent, but it is nonetheless morally relevant, that is,  all other things being equal, 
“doing” is harder to justify than “allowing”. To do so, the alternative thesis must both argue that  
frame-dependency does not rule out moral significance (contra the positive and the negative 
thesis) and that the doing/allowing distinction is not morally relevant per se (contra the positive 
thesis), but still captures morally relevant features. Specifically, I define the alternative thesis as  
a “reductionist” proposal, insofar as it does not consider the doing/allowing distinction as a 
fundamental feature of actions. I further argue that the attractiveness of the alternative thesis lies  
in its explanatory advantages, which I outline in terms of three desiderata: i) it captures the idea  
that “doing” and “allowing” are both causing in a specific way, ii) it explains and allows for 
disagreement and frame-dependency in doing/allowing classifications, and iii) it accounts for 
the fact that the distinction is morally relevant.
My idea is to cash out the alternative thesis using Hitchcock's self-contained network model: I  
define “doing” actions as instances where an outcome counterfactually depends on the agent, 
within  a  “self-contained”  causal  network.  “Allowing”  actions,  on  the  other  hand,  describe 
situations  where  the  outcome  counterfactually  depends  on  the  agent,  within  a  “non-self-
contained” causal network. Doing/allowing classifications, within this model, thus clearly track 
whether  an  agent  is  causally  relevant  to  an  outcome in  an  “act”  (doing)  rather  than  in  an 
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“omission” way (allowing).
The identification of “self-contained” causal networks, however, depends in this model upon 
which values are assigned to the variables, and, specifically, which value is set as the “default”  
for all the variables in the network. This feature of the model reflects the insight that doing and  
allowing are defined with reference to the “normal” course of events. The assignment of default 
values thus incorporates agents'  expectations and judgements regarding both descriptive and 
normative features  of the context.  So doing/allowing classifications  may vary depending on 
what agents think will happen or should happen, and depending on the specific framing people  
may infer different “normal” courses of events.
In most straightforward, detailed and agreed-upon cases, doing/allowing classifications reliably 
track other morally relevant considerations such as whether the agent intended the harm or the  
agent  acted  violating  a  standard  norm.  I  show  how the  self-contained  network  model  can 
incorporate these features in Chapter 6. In particular, I argue that doing/allowing classifications 
may be best interpreted as a “composite judgement”, which tracks different moral and empirical 
considerations.  On  the  other  hand,  when  cases  are  unfamiliar,  under-described,  or  pitch 
different  norms  against  one  another  in  a  fairly  extreme  way,  different  doing/allowing 
classifications are reasonable and justifiable, as different default values are legitimate. In these  
cases, disagreement is to be expected.
This model, I argue, satisfies all three desiderata. On my proposed account, the doing/allowing 
distinction clearly has moral significance, as it captures morally relevant considerations in a 
composite  judgment.  It  cannot,  however,  ultimately  be  reduced to  a  single  moral  principle 
which consistently explains all the doing/allowing distinctions we draw and why we disagree 
about them. However, my model enables us to analyse doing/allowing attributions on a case-by-
case basis.
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1. Analysis of Doing vs Allowing: Causal Accounts
The idea  that  doing harm  and  allowing a  harm  to  occur  amount  to  two distinct  forms  of 
conduct, with different significance and meaning, strikes us as intuitive and reasonable. We do, 
in fact, use this distinction in real life for many practical circumstances, such as assigning blame 
and  responsibility  and  calculating  compensations.  When  forming  moral  judgements, 
specifically, at least prior to reflection, we seem to share an overwhelming intuition that doing  
harm is somehow worse than allowing a harm to occur, and should rank higher in terms of the 
magnitude of the wrongdoing. 
While the moral significance and practical implications of the doing/allowing harm distinction 
are my ultimate interest, I set these concerns aside in the first and second chapters of this thesis.  
For  the  moment,  my  task  will  be  an  analysis  of  this  commonly  perceived  fundamental 
dichotomy in the  realm of  human behaviour,  the doing/allowing distinction,  which is  often 
employed in non-moral cases as well. This analysis will take the form of a search for the most  
suitable and convincing explanation for the fact that, to use a paradigmatic pair of cases,  when I 
throw a rock at a window, I am “doing” something, while when I do not check and fix my 
boiler, I am “allowing” something to occur. 
1.1 Doing as Causing
One of the most widespread insights in the doing/allowing literature is that this distinction has 
something to do with causation. Intuitively, when I throw the rock at the window I cause the 
window to break, and, possibly, a subsequent threat to other people; on the other hand, my 
negligence in checking the status of my appliances does not cause ‒ or at least does not cause in 
the same way ‒ the boiler to break, with the related hazard. While this idea appears sound and 
persuasive,  the question of which account of causation is more suitable for cashing out the 
doing/allowing distinction is by no means a straightforward one to answer.
The theoretical approaches to the concept of causation are extremely numerous and varied, and 
it  is  not  my place  here  to  provide  a  detailed  review  and  a  comparative  assessment  of  all 
alternative frameworks. In order to navigate my way across the huge literature on the nature of 
causal connection, I focus narrowly on how well different causal accounts fit the way we talk  
about human agency in particular. While all causal models can, at least in principle, be applied 
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to human agency, my aim here is to specify desiderata that can then be used to assess how well a 
causal account tracks and makes sense of our employment of the doing/allowing distinction. I  
will articulate these desiderata as I go along my survey.
The alternatives on the table when it comes to the nature of causal relations can be classified 
into two main families, which may be referred to as  process theories  and  difference-making 
accounts  respectively. The general idea behind process theories is that causation amounts to 
some concrete physical connection, and causing is producing. Difference-making accounts, on 
the other hand, rely on the insight that causing is making more likely to occur. 
In the present chapter, I will address both difference-making and process theories of causation,  
as  well  as  more  informal  versions  of  process  theories.  I  will  start  from difference-making 
accounts, and then move on to process theories. I  argue that both accounts, at least in their  
philosophy of science formulation, have some key gaps when it comes to distinguishing doing 
and allowing in human agency. In both cases, moral philosophers have attempted to fill these  
gaps.  I  will  survey  some  of  these  attempts,  and  conclude  that  refined  difference-making 
accounts are most promising in this respect. Some missing details of these refined difference-
making accounts will be spelled out in Chapter 2.
1.2 Difference-making accounts
The basic intuition behind difference-making accounts is that causal relations are defined in 
terms of  counterfactual  conditionals.  Roughly,  as  Lewis  (1986)  puts  it,  we can capture  the 
notion of causal relation with the following definition: an event E causes an event F if, had E 
not occurred,  F wouldn't have occurred either. With respect to the doing/allowing distinction, 
we can thus make sense of this dichotomy as tracking the impact of an agent's conduct on the 
upshot: doing x would mean causing x, in the sense that had one not acted in that way, x would 
not have occurred. Allowing x would then be not causing x, in the sense that had one not acted 
in that way, x would have occurred anyway.
As mentioned above, difference-making accounts of causation share the idea that causing is 
making an upshot more likely. The relation between an agent and the upshot, therefore, may be 
also a probabilistic one, thus taking the counterfactual form “E causes F just in case if E had not 
occurred,  F  would  have  been  less  likely”.  The  counterfactual  approach,  in  its  general 
probabilistic form, is implemented in slightly different ways by various authors, including von 
Wright (1975), Woodward (2004), Pearl (2000), Price and Menzies (1993). These differences do 
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not concern us here. As mentioned, in this section, I focus rather on the general merits and 
problems of counterfactual accounts.
Let's  start  testing  the  counterfactual  approach  to  causation  with  a  couple  of  classical 
doing/allowing examples. When I break the window by throwing a rock, I cause the broken 
window, as reflected by the truth of the following counterfactual: if event  E, my throwing the 
rock,  had  not  happened,  in  most  counterfactual  scenarios  event  F,  the  window  breaking, 
wouldn't have occurred either, or, at least, it would have been less likely. On the other hand,  
when I stand by while a rock slips, crushing into someone beneath, I do not cause the injury, as  
reflected by the falsity of the following counterfactual: event  F (the rock crushing a person) 
would have occurred (or, at least, would have likely occurred) in most counterfactual situations 
where action E, my standing aside, had not occurred; precisely, F would not have occurred only 
in the specific scenario where I had tried to stop the rock and my efforts had been successful. 
Recall now that causing means doing and not causing means allowing. So the analysis seems to 
fit our intuitions:  I “did” something throwing the rock, and I “allowed” something to happen 
when I did not stop the slipping rock. 
I  will  now  briefly  address  a  salient  worry  about  difference-making  accounts,  which  is 
preemption;  I  will  then  move  to  what  I  consider  the  key  issue,  and  first  desideratum  ‒ 
distinguishing between acts and omissions.
1.2.1 Preemption
Since  Lewis'  first  analysis  of  causation  in  terms  of  counterfactuals,  a  wide  number  of  
counterexamples and objections have been put  forward in the literature, resulting to several 
revisions and refinements of the simple counterfactual framework sketched above, and which 
are common to most major contemporary accounts. Peter Menzies (2003) classified the main 
objections as context-sensitivity, temporal asymmetry, preemption and transitivity.1 It is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to address all of these issues, so I focus here on the most relevant to the 
doing/allowing distinction. In this section, I briefly discuss preemption, while in 1.4.1 I deal 
with a specific instance of context-dependency. 
Take the following simple example of preemption:2 
An assassin, Alice, poisons her victim's drink. To be sure of the success of her mission,  
1 Menzies (2003), pp. 5‒13.
2 I take this formulation of the Backup example from Hitchcock (2009), p. 588.
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however, she also has a Backup, Bob, who is ready to poison the drink if Alice fails in 
her attempt.
This  apparently simple  case  provides  a  powerful  and notorious counterexample to  standard 
counterfactual analysis: intuitively, we consider Alice's poisoning as causing the death of the 
victim. However, the existence of a genuine causal connection is ruled out by counterfactual 
analysis: due to the presence of the backup (Bob) the victim would have died anyway, had Alice 
not poisoned her drink. 
This  bug  within  counterfactual  accounts  looks  like  bad  news  if  we  want  to  ground 
doing/allowing classifications in this causation model. If “doing” amounts to causing, indeed, 
we could not define preemption cases as instances of doing, which is clearly unacceptable if we  
are interested in keeping track of our intuitions and practical use of the distinction. It seems 
untenable, indeed, to argue that Alice “did not” kill the victim, merely because there was a 
backup  who  could  have  taken  over  had  she  failed.  An  adequate  counterfactual  account, 
therefore, would need to address the issue of preemption, so as to make sense of the way we 
understand human agency. 
Different approaches have been put forward in the literature to solve the puzzle preemption 
cases pose to counterfactual analysis. Some authors, like Lewis (1986), Paul (2000) and Coady 
(2004), suggest that a more fine-grained description of events might be the solution: the upshot, 
in Backup, could be defined as “the victim dies at t1, drinking that kind and specific amount of 
poison”. In this sense, when the outcome is characterised in more precise terms, we get the 
result that only Alice, and not Bob, could have caused it as, say, Bob would have poured the 
poison later or used a different amount of poison. Sartorio (2005) proposes a different approach, 
which is to argue that, in Backup, we can still identify a group, formed in this case by Bob and 
Alice, which counterfactually causes the upshot. While this solution does not allow us to claim 
that  Alice  “did” kill  the victim, we can at  least  conclude that  there was a “doing” conduct  
involved, and that Alice was part of the group who caused the upshot to occur. While the first 
solution sounds convincing, it also seems that adding precision would require us to describe the 
outcomes in details which are arguably irrelevant, such as the precise time the upshot occurred. 
This, however, does not look promising if we aim to capture our intuitions about human agency.
More complex preemption examples, moreover, seem even harder to accommodate;3 there is 
thus huge disagreement in the literature as to whether any proposal can successfully account for 
all instances of preemption. Some authors, like Hitchcock (2001), have therefore suggested that 
counterfactual theory might as well bite the bullet and simply provide some useful tools for 
3 See, for instance, the “Spell case” in Schaffer (2000), p. 165. 
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describing causal relations among agents and upshots in preemption cases. For the time being, I 
note  that  counterfactual  accounts  may  have  difficulty  in  making  sense  of  our  intuitive  
assessments of causation in some “gimmicky examples”4 like preemption. These tricky cases 
seem also to reveal that  the counterfactual account of causation must be supplemented with 
something further that is sensitive to context in order to account for some problematic examples. 
This could mean that refined counterfactual accounts might be more “nuanced” and less elegant 
than  one  might  have  liked.  I  will  come back to  this  point  at  the  end of  Chapter  2,  when 
defending Hitchcock's model as a suitable account for capturing the doing/allowing distinction.
1.2.2 Distinguishing acts and omissions 
Let's  now  leave  technical  difficulties  like  preemption  aside  and  go  back  to  the  correct  
identification  of  doing  and  allowing  conducts.  What  seems  particularly  appealing  and 
convincing about counterfactual analysis is the idea of evaluating whether an agent amounts to a 
difference maker with respect to the outcome. As Kagan (1989) puts it,5 this captures the insight 
that I cause an outcome when I interfere with the natural course of events, while I do not cause 
it when I do not interfere, as my existence would not make any difference to this natural course. 
The  doing/allowing  distinction,  in  this  sense,  would  be  tracking  this  crucial  notion  of 
interference. While the idea that “doing” behaviours amount to “causing as interfering” appears 
particularly straightforward, the understanding of “allowing” within the counterfactual model 
sketched above nonetheless seems unsatisfactory upon closer reflection. On the one hand, if  
allowing is “not causing”, it remains unclear what should distinguish “allowing” behaviours 
from all  other  instances  of  non-causal  relation between two events.  In  the  boiler or  in  the 
slipping  rock cases,  as  well  as  in  classical  “refraining”  or  “not  aiding”  examples,  the 
characterisation of the agent's behaviour as “allowing” seems arguably to appeal to the fact that 
her conduct was, somehow, causally relevant to the upshot. This particular relation between the 
agent and the outcome may be different from the one between my throwing the rock and the  
window breaking, but, surely, it is also distinct from the connection between my brushing my 
teeth and the water boiling in the kitchen. Instances of allowing, in short, seem to refer to cases  
where the absence of the agent, or her inaction, are causally relevant to the outcome ‒ like my 
not checking the boiler. Allowing cases are typically referred to as (causally relevant) omissions. 
If we want to make sense of the way we use “allowing” attributions, therefore, we need a causal 
4 Kagan  (1989)  uses  this  term  to  refer  to  cases  which  seem  particularly  tricky  and  not  easy  to 
accommodate within standard models of the doing/allowing distinction.
5 Kagan (1989), pp. 92‒101.
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account where omissions are not dismissed and equated to all other causally unrelated events. 
One might respond that counterfactual accounts do in fact treat omissions as causally relevant, 
as they can be conceived as difference makers, raising the probability of an outcome; in some 
sense, had I not neglected my boiler, it would have been less likely for it to break. Upon specific 
formulations  and  interpretations  of  counterfactuals,  like  using  fine-grained  descriptions  of 
events, most omissions can be thus conceived of as difference makers. But in this case we have 
the opposite problem: we cannot distinguish omissions from other causes, and so it looks like 
behaviours that are intuitively allowings would be classified as doings. When talking about my 
negligence  in  checking  the  boiler,  which  seemingly  classifies  as  an  instance  of  allowing,  
however, we want both to maintain that my behaviour had an impact on the outcome, but also  
that I “did not” break the boiler.
While it looks like counterfactual analysis is going to be too crude to handle the doing/allowing 
distinction, it may be that it is simply underspecified (as already suggested above in relation to 
preemption),  and  needs  to  be  supplemented  with  further  detail.  That  is  indeed what  I  will 
propose in the next chapter. For the time being, I note that this discussion has so far revealed 
two key desiderata for an account of causation which can capture the doing/allowing distinction. 
Firstly,  we  need  to  account  for  omissions  as  genuine  causes.  Secondly,  cashing  out  the 
doing/allowing distinction further requires that we properly distinguish between two kinds of 
causally relevant behaviours, and between the different impact doing and allowing conducts 
seem to have on an upshot. Roughly, causal accounts of the doing/allowing distinction must 
allow for both  acts  and  omissions  to count as causally relevant,  and provide a criterion for 
discriminating the former from the latter. To be clear, I do not take the act/omission distinction  
to be equivalent to the doing/allowing distinction;6 as I will articulate more thoroughly in this 
thesis, I think that the latter is more complex and articulated than the former. Nonetheless, to  
make  sense  of  the  doing/allowing  distinction,  we  still  need  to  distinguish  between  two 
fundamental ways in which an agent can be causally relevant to an outcome, which I identify as 
the act/omission distinction.  In the first  two chapters of this  thesis,  I  will  thus use the two 
distinctions interchangeably.7
I will soon return (in 1.4) to the question of whether more sophisticated counterfactual accounts 
6 For instance, I think it is possible to allow harm by acting, like in the Impoverished Village example 
discussed in section 6.4  of this thesis.
7 Specifically, I use the act/omission distinction to talk about the causal contribution of an agent to an 
outcome. As I will explain in Chapters 5 and 6, however, my account of the doing/allowing distinction 
allows for other considerations, beyond causal relevance, to be incorporated into these classifications. 
In this respect, the doing/allowing distinction does not coincide with the act/omission distinction. In 
“non moralised” examples, and in my analysis in Chapters 1 and 2, we can nonetheless talk of these  
two distinctions as equivalent, insofar as we are focusing on capturing the specific causal impact of an 
agent on an outcome.
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can accommodate the act/omission distinction. But first, I examine whether traditional process 
theories can handle the distinction in a more straightforward way. I will argue that they cannot,  
despite looking promising in this regard (which is why the remainder of the chapter will dwell,  
for the most part, on sophisticated counterfactual approaches).
1.3 Process Theories 
As mentioned above, the underlying intuition of process theories is that causation amounts to 
causal connections or chains of events involving some form of continuous change (Ducasse 
1926),  energy flow or transfer of  energy (Skyrms 1984),  a  physical  process  (Salmon 1984, 
Mackie 1974) or some kind of  transference of properties (Aronson 1971, Kistler 1998). When it 
comes to evaluating the role of a human agent or of a specific human conduct within one of 
these models, what we will be looking at is the agent's contribution to the outcome in terms of 
energy transfer or physical process. 
Let's  now move to how process theories  can account  for the doing/allowing distinction,  by 
taking a fairly generic version of a physical connection model, like that proposed by Aronson 
(1971).8 According to Aronson, causation is the transference of a specific quantity, such as, for  
instance, velocity, momentum, kinetic energy, or heat  9 by the means of the contact between 
cause and effect. Specifically, “A in ‘A causes B’ refers to an object that successfully transfers 
one of its quantities to the effect object.”10 We can then judge the role of the agent as a cause in 
bringing about some upshot by tracking the transference of this quantity, and assessing whether 
or not the transference was successful. For instance, when I throw a rock, I could say that my 
kinetic energy is transferred to the rock, and from the rock to the window, thus establishing a 
proper causal relation. On the other hand, my not fixing the boiler does not transfer any kind of 
quantity to the boiler: to be fair, one could argue that when I do not check my appliance the 
limestone accumulates in the pipes, the limestone in the pipes blocks the cooling system, the 
heat transfers to the back wall of the boiler and so on. This quantity, however, is not something 
the agent A passes to the object B, and the relation cannot be thus described as causal. Within  
this model, doing would then amount to causing, while allowing behaviours would not amount 
to causal connections.
Process theories seem to be immune from tricky counterexamples like preemptions. In Backup, 
8 Aronson's account is also taken to represent standard physical process frameworks in Schaffer (2000).
9 These quantities are the ones used by Aronson as examples, but this is by no means intended as a  
closed list.
10 Aronson (1971), p. 422. 
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any physical connection model delivers the classification of Alice's behaviour as doing, thus 
matching our natural intuitions in this case. Defining causation in terms of a physical connection 
between  the  agent  and  the  upshot  might  also  have  some  advantages  in  the  light  of  the 
act/omission distinction. Process theories clearly do not have the problem of blurring what are 
intuitively acts and omissions, or doings and allowings. Doings are causes whereas allowings 
are not. But the problem remains of distinguishing omissions from causally unrelated events. 
According to Aronson's model, indeed, the boiler example would fall into the same category of 
the relation between brushing one's teeth and the water boiling, As I argued above, however, a 
causal  model  tracking  our  intuitions  about  human  agency  must  recognise  at  least  some 
omissions as causally relevant. Yet, the notion of physical connection fits well our intuitions of  
what counts as an “act”, while, in simple counterfactual accounts, both actions and omissions 
can  equally  play  the  role  of  difference  makers.  A  sophisticated  process  theory,  which 
supplements this “core” or genuine definition of causation with further criteria accounting for 
omissions, might thus still have a better shot than counterfactual accounts. I now examine one 
of these refined proposals.
While many physical connection models bite the bullet and do not provide a detailed account of 
omission as causes (as Aronson himself, Armstrong (2004), or Beebee (2004)), other authors try 
to define a broader family of causal notions which can address those cases which are commonly 
perceived as allowings. Phil Dowe (2000, 2001), for instance, claims that even if omissions are 
not  causes according to his conserved quantity theory,  they nonetheless amount to a “close 
relative”,  which  he  variously  defines  as  causation*  or  “quasi-causation”,  and  whose 
identification relies on counterfactual analysis. Specifically, Dowe begins with an analysis of the 
crucial case of prevention:
“A prevented B if A occurred and B did not, and there occurred an x such that: (1) there 
is a causal interaction between A and the process due to x, and (2) if A had not occurred, 
x would have caused B.”11
This definition leads to the following account of omissions as “quasi causes”: 
“not-A quasi-caused B if B occurred and A did not, and there occurred an x such that (1) 
x caused B, and (2) if A had occurred then A would have prevented B by interacting 
with x.”12
In this sense my not checking the boiler (not-A), quasi caused the boiler to break (B), because 
the deterioration process of the pipes (x) caused B, and had I checked the boiler (A), this would 
11 Dowe (2001), p. 221. 
12 Ibidem, p. 222. 
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have prevented B. As results from the definition of prevention, it also holds that my checking  
the boiler would have prevented it from breaking: checking the boiler (A) prevents the break (B) 
because the associated counterfactual is true (if I check the boiler, it is less likely that it breaks); 
the process of deterioration x is physically connected to A, and if I do not check the boiler, the 
deterioration causes it to break.
Relying on Dowe's analysis,13 we could identify “real” causes, within some specific physical 
connection account, as acts, and thus instances of “doing”. On the other hand, relations between 
an agent and an upshot which satisfy the definition above would amount to “quasi-causation”: 
these cases,  arguably,  capture  our  intuitive understanding of  omissions and thus classify as 
“allowing”. This framework, which can be considered a hybrid view between genuine physical 
connection  accounts  and  difference-making  approaches,  seems  to  adequately  satisfy  the 
requirement made at the end of 1.2, i.e.,  to distinguish between different ways or degrees a 
conduct can be causally relevant to an upshot.
Even  if  more  sophisticated  process  theories  seem  to  allow  for  a  satisfactory  act/omission 
distinction, the project of capturing our intuitive understanding of causal relations in terms of 
physical connections faces some serious difficulties.  While the cause  versus quasi-cause (or 
similar) might appear a promising distinction, it does not seem to adequately map onto cases  
that we intuitively regard as doings  versus allowings. This is not only the case of tricky or 
“borderline”  examples,  like  withdrawing  aid  or  removing  barriers,  which  pose  a  serious 
challenge to any doing/allowing account. As Schaffer (2000) argues, it is more the case that 
physical  connection  amounts  to  just  one  way of  causing.  If  we  narrow down instances  of 
genuine causation to relations where actual physical processes are involved, many behaviours 
we intuitively perceive as actions, and which cannot be possibly described in terms of physical  
processes, would thus fall in the quasi-causation, or allowing, category. Schaffer defines these  
examples as instances of causation by  disconnection,  and he claims that  their pervasiveness 
threatens the soundness of process theories as a whole.
Suppose, for instance, that I am a powerful mobster and I call one of my affiliates, ordering the 
killing of the major. It would be difficult to explain my contribution to the major's death in 
terms of the transference of a quantity, or property, from me to the major. There are, however,  
even  more  worrisome  examples:  to  show  how  causation  by  disconnection  is  ubiquitous, 
13 Dowe's account is  of course more elaborate than the brief overview I offer  here; specifically,  his  
definition  of  quasi-causation  is  further  refined  so  as  to  accommodate  cases  of  preemption  and 
overdetermination. In this discussion, I take Dowe's proposal as representative of a class of physical  
connection frameworks addressing the notion of quasi- causation in terms of counterfactual analysis, 
such as, for instance, Persson's (2002) “fake causation” account. 
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Schaffer famously analyses the case of an agent firing a gun and killing another man.14 At every 
step of the causal  route,  Schaffer  argues,  we can see that  causation  works not  by physical 
connection  but  instead  by  disconnection:  for  instance,  the  firing  of  the  bullet  through  the 
victim's heart intuitively causes it to stop. But, as Schaffer observes, heart piercings cause death 
only by disconnection, as the brain is kept alive by an influx of oxygenated blood, and heart 
piercings cause death by disconnecting this influx, resulting into oxygen starvation. The mobster 
and the firing gun case are thus cases of quasi-causation. Of course, one might press that quasi-
causation is still a relation of causal relevance. Yet, this dismissal is extremely counterintuitive 
and untenable: firing a gun,  in fact,  appears  a straightforward case of genuine causation or 
“doing”, and one we would unanimously agree upon; a causal account which confines genuine 
causation and doing conducts to cases of physical connections seems therefore inadequate for 
tracking our understanding of the doing/allowing distinction.
In conclusion, elaborate versions of physical connection accounts, such as Dowe's proposal, 
seem at first to provide a straightforward solution to the issue of correctly distinguishing the 
causal contribution of acts and omissions, versus lack of causal relation altogether. Specifically, 
instances of physical connections between an agent and an outcome seem to match our intuitive 
understanding of acts, or “doings”. Nonetheless, the category of “quasi” causal relations, which 
should  account  for  causally  relevant  omissions,  does  not  successfully  map  our  intuitive 
understanding of allowing. The model, indeed, does not account for causation by disconnection. 
Given the results of this analysis, I turn in the following section to sophisticated difference-
making accounts, to see whether they are up to this task.
1.4 Distinguishing acts and omissions: the counterfactual approach
As  I  argue  in  1.2,  counterfactual  analysis  appears  to  be  underspecified  when  it  comes  to 
discriminating  between the different  causal  impact  that  acts  and  omissions  can have  on an 
outcome. In short, in the simple counterfactual model I examine above, both acts and omissions 
can count as difference makers, and thus causes; while it is certainly an advantage that some 
instances of omissions can be recognized as causally relevant, this becomes a problem if we are  
interested in what distinguishes “doing” from “allowing” conducts. 
Moral  philosophers  have attempted to fill  this  apparent  gap in  the counterfactual  model  of 
causation by proposing ways to distinguish acts and omissions. The various proposals can be 
14 Schaffer (2000), pp. 286‒292.
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carved up in the more traditional terms of act/omission or action/inaction, but are also referred 
to as positive/negative relevance; in this study, I do not advocate for one taxonomy over the 
others,  as  my  interest  is  rather  to  examine  whether  the  suggested  dichotomy  tracks  our 
doing/allowing classifications.15
Some negative/positive relevance accounts, like Donagan's (1977), do not seem to provide a 
substantially different analysis with respect to general counterfactual frameworks. According to 
Donagan, we can test for the different ways an agent could be relevant to an outcome making 
reference to what would have happened if the agent  had “abstained from intervening in the 
course of nature”,16 that is, had not acted or made any movement at the given relevant moment. 
If  the upshot would have occurred anyway, had the agent  not  interfered with the course of 
nature, the behaviour amounts to allowing; if the upshot would have not occurred, had the agent 
not  interfered,  the behaviour  amounts  to  doing.  In  spite  of  being  intuitively  appealing,  this 
account  does  not  make  any  significant  progress  in  distinguishing  omissions  from causally 
unrelated events. This counterexample by Frances Howard-Snyder (2002), for instance, shows 
that cases of collective responsibility are impossible to deal with appealing to this interpretation 
of positive/negative relevance: 
“Suppose an SS officer, Franz, tortures someone to death. But this is standard practice in 
the Gestapo. If Franz had stayed home with a sore throat, or if Franz had never existed, 
his pal Hans would have done the torturing, in the same way, at the same time Franz  
did. (...) then Franz is negatively relevant to the victim’s death by torture. That is, Franz 
merely allowed the death to occur”.17
Yet, this conclusion strikes us as counterintuitive, as Franz's action is clearly a doing.  This, 
however, is not the only problem of Donagan's account: even if Franz's action were an actual 
instance of allowing harm, his behaviour does not count as a difference maker at all with respect  
to the outcome; this framework thus does not adequately account for omissions. 
A much better worked out proposal is Jonathan Bennett's (1995), which is known as the “most  
of the things she could have done” account. For an agent to be positively relevant to an upshot, 
Bennett requires that most of the ways she could have behaved would not have lead to the 
upshot, while she is negatively relevant if this condition is not satisfied. In this sense, when I  
refrain from stopping the slipping rock, or I am too careless to fix my boiler, I am causally  
relevant to the rock's crushing a person or to the boiler's breaking, since I could have stopped  
15 I also assume that all the different dichotomies put forward in the literature refer to this intuitive  
distinction I call here doing/allowing.
16  Donagan (1977), chapter 5.2, “Doing Evil”.
17 Howard-Snyder (2002), “The Doing/Allowing Distinction”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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the rock or fixed the boiler; most of the ways I could have behaved, however, including going  
on  holiday,  having  lunch,  or  brushing  my teeth,  would  have  lead  to  the  same  upshot.  My 
behaviour is thus negatively relevant to the harmful consequence, and can be classified as an 
instance of allowing. To sum up, Bennett understands the positive/negative distinction in terms 
of how informative a proposition is about the agent's bodily movements. In the fixing my boiler 
example,  the  proposition  describing  my  brushing  my  teeth,  or  going  on  holiday,  is  not 
particularly informative with respect to the outcome “the boiler breaks”. The behaviour thus 
counts as negatively relevant. On the other hand, throwing the rock amounts to a informative 
proposition with respect to the outcome “the window breaks”. Therefore, my behaviour counts 
as positively relevant to the outcome. 
The first advantage of Bennett's framework is that it replaces the obscure notion of “course of 
nature”,  absent  the  agent,  with  the  slightly  more tangible  concept  of  the set  of  behaviours 
available  to  the  agent.  The  specific  relation  among  the  set  of  all  possible  conducts,  the 
behaviour  displayed by  the  agent  and  the  occurrence  of  the  upshot  is  further  analysed  by 
Bennett in terms of explanation: one's behaviour is negatively relevant to an upshot if a negative 
fact  about  this  behaviour  is  the  least  informative  fact  that  suffices  to  complete  a  causal  
explanation of it; on the other hand, one's behaviour is positively relevant to that upshot if a  
positive fact about the latter is the least informative fact about one's conduct that suffices to  
complete  a  causal  explanation  of  it.  This  intuition  seems  particularly  adequate  for  many 
doing/allowing examples: if I don't check my appliances and the boiler breaks, the breaking of 
the boiler could be explained by the fact that I was brushing my teeth (a positive fact about my 
behaviour), but could also be explained by the fact that I did not check the boiler, that is, a  
negative fact about my behaviour. On the other hand, if I throw a rock at the window, a positive 
fact about my behaviour, that is, me throwing the rock, is sufficient for explaining the breaking  
of the window. But while Bennett seems to avoid reference to the normal course of nature, what 
counts as an “adequate explanation for an outcome” subtly turns on this notion. Suppose that a 
lifeguard on duty, instead of patrolling the beach, is partying with her friends. A child gets in the 
water, swims too far away, screams for help, nobody rescues her, and she eventually drowns. In 
this example, it looks like two “explanations” of the outcome are reasonably tenable: the child 
drowned  because  the  lifeguard  did  not  rescue  her  (negative  fact,  allowing),  and  the  child 
drowned because the lifeguard was partying with her friends (positive fact, doing). In the next  
chapter, I argue that appeal to the normal or standard course of events is indeed inescapable 
when it comes to making doing/allowing attributions.
Beyond  this  observation,  Bennett's  more  detailed  (if  ultimately  incomplete)  account  of  the 
doing/allowing distinction has the crucial advantage of distinguishing between omissions and 
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causally  unrelated  events  while,  at  the  same  time,  allowing  for  omissions  to  be  causally 
relevant. In Bennett's model, omissions can indeed amount to part of the explanation for the 
occurrence of a given outcome. Yet, they differ from acts insofar as they can be characterised as 
negative facts about the agent's behaviour.
Bennett's  proposal  is  not  itself  immune  to  counterexamples,  in  which  the  suggested 
positive/negative relevance model seems to fail to keep track of our common understanding of 
behaviours  as  doings rather  than  allowings.  Quinn,  for  instance,  argues  that  in  some cases 
Bennett's  account  wrongly  classifies  “not  moving”  as  positive,  while  making  any  move 
whatsoever as negative. Therefore, his account fails to classify as doing harm some behaviours 
which intuitively fall in this category. To see this point, Quinn (1998, p. 295) discusses the 
following case:
Reverse Immobility. Henry is in a room with a motion detector, which is connected to a  
bomb’s detonator. If any motion is detected within the next minute, a bomb will go off  
in another room, killing Bill. If Henry remains perfectly still for one minute, the bomb 
will not go off, and Bill will live. Henry waves his arm and Bill is blown to smithereens. 
In Reverse Immobility, it looks like Henry did make Bill die. However, on Bennett’s account, 
Henry  has  merely  allowed  Bill  to  die,  since  the  proposition  “waving  one's  arm”  is  not 
particularly informative with respect to the outcome “Bill is blown to pieces”. Arguably, Quinn 
claims,  this  is  incorrect.  I  do not  think that  this  counterexample is  particularly compelling. 
Again, what strikes me as counterintuitive about this scenario is the peculiar situation the agent 
finds herself in, which makes the “standard” consequences of her behaviours very different from 
what could have been expected in “normal” cases.
To  sum up,  more  elaborate  counterfactual  accounts,  like  Bennett's  analysis,  seem to  have, 
despite some remaining difficulties,  adequate resources for distinguish between the different 
causal  impact  of  acts  and  omissions,  and  thus  between  doing  and  allowing  behaviours. 
Nonetheless,  we  have  so  far  identified  a  problem  for  counterfactual  accounts  of  the 
doing/allowing distinction  ‒ there is a need to appeal to a further concept such as the natural  
course  of  events.  In  the  remainder  part  of  this  chapter,  I  address  what  looks like  a  further 
challenge;  I argue that  responding to this challenge also ultimately rests on a notion of the  
normal course of events.
1.4.1 Not all omissions are allowings
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Up to now, we have required from an adequate causal account to consider omissions as causally 
relevant,  even if  at  a  different  level  or  degree  with respect  to  actions.  Specifically,  I  have  
suggested that it is both intuitive and practical to talk about omissions as causes, or at least as 
causally relevant. Equally sound motives, however, demand that not all omissions should count 
as causes. To illustrate this point, let's take the famous Neighbour/Queen of England example:1
I'm leaving for a holiday break and I ask my neighbour to water my flowers; she forgets  
to do so and my flowers die.
Bennett's counterfactual account delivers in this case the intuitively correct classification of my 
neighbour's behaviour as an instance of allowing: most of the ways she could have behaved, 
indeed,  excluding  “water  the  flowers”,  would  likely  have  lead  to  the  death  of  the  flowers  
anyway. The same intuition,  clearly,  does not  hold for any other  person's,  such as, say,  the  
Queen of England's,  relation with my flowers. Counterfactual analysis,  nonetheless, delivers  
exactly  the  same  verdict  about  the  Queen  of  England's  behaviour  which,  just  like  my 
neighbour's, should thus count as “allowing” my flowers to die: after all, according to Bennett's 
interpretation,  a  negative  fact  about  the  Queen's  conduct  (not  watering  my  flowers)  also 
amounts to the least informative negative fact about her behaviour that explains the death of my 
flowers. 
This counterexample is clearly worrisome: while it seems fair to accept that the neighbour's 
sloppiness had an impact on the death of the flowers, it appears ridiculous to claim that the  
Queen of England counts as a difference maker with respect to this upshot. This same reasoning, 
besides, can be extended, leading to the conclusion that I am causally relevant to the death of all  
flowers in the world (or at least in the neighbourhood) that I did not water. In short, we do not 
perceive all omissions as instances of “allowing” the upshot to occur. An adequate account of 
the  act/omission  distinction,  therefore,  must  also  properly  discriminate  between  “genuine” 
omissions, which count as causally relevant, such as my neighbour's carelessness, and “false”  
omissions we do not perceive as causally relevant and thus proper instances of allowing, such as 
the Queen's minding her own business. 
This issue, which is crucial for correctly tracking the doing/allowing distinction, amounts to a 
general  challenge  counterfactual  analysis  faces  when  it  comes  to  justifying  our  intuitive 
judgements of causal relevance. In 1.2.1 I diagnosed this problem as one concerning context-
dependency. A related issue that others address concerns the distinction between causes and 
background conditions (see, e.g., Schaffer (2005)). Considering a simple example that does not 
involve the doing/allowing distinction: when I drop a lighted cigarette which produces a fire, the 
1 Schaffer (2000), p. 297. This example is also discussed in detail in Hitchcock (2001).
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lighted cigarette is taken to be the cause of the fire, while the presence of oxygen, which is 
equally  necessary  for  the  fire  to  develop,  is  considered  as  a  fixed  background  condition.  
Similarly, the fact that the Queen of England does not usually care about my flowers could 
count as a fixed background condition of the context, while my neighbour is the relevant cause. 
This  division,  plausibly,  explains  why  we  consider  the  Queen's  behaviour  as  not  causally 
relevant, as opposed to my neighbour's negligence. As Schaffer observes, however, the selection 
we make between what is causally relevant and what is just part of the normal description of the 
context seems extremely arbitrary, and the task of spelling out adequate criteria has resisted 
many theoretical efforts. As Lewis (1986, p. 162) puts it:
“We sometimes single out one among all the cause of some event and call it ‘the’ cause,  as  
if there were no others. Or we single out a few as the ‘causes’, calling the rest mere ‘causal  
factors’ or ‘causal conditions’ (...) We may select the abnormal or extraordinary causes, or 
those under human control, or those we deem good or bad, or just those we want to talk 
about. I have nothing to say about these principles of invidious discrimination.”
I focus here on Schaffer's proposal for solving this impasse. The proposal rests on the insight 
that we should look at causation not as a binary relation of the form “c causes e”, but rather as a 
quaternary and  contrastive  relation of the form “c  rather than  c*  caused  e  rather than  e*”.2 
Specifically, Schaffer proposes the following counterfactual definition for contrastive causation: 
“c rather than c* causes e rather than e* if and only if, if c* had occurred, then e* would have 
occurred (formally, O(c*) > O(e*)) , where C* and E* are non-empty sets of contrast events”. 
That is, C* and E* are sets of variables that may be represented by a set of values. The second 
main insight behind the idea of contrastive causation is that the sets C* and E* are fixed by 
context. So, when asking “what initiated the fire?”, Schaffer suggests that we set the presence of  
oxygen as a fixed background condition and focus on, for instance,
{c: the dropping of a lighted cigarette; c1*: the occurrence of a shortcut; c2*: a lightning strike}, 
as only c1* and c2* amount to relevant alternatives. In the same way, when asking “why did the 
flowers die?”,  the event that  the Queen could have watered my flowers amounts to such a  
remote possibility that it should not be included in the set C* of the relevant alternatives with 
respect to the context. Arguably, different sets C* will be triggered, depending on the context in 
which the causal inquiry is made. Yet, as Schaffer admits,  a proper solution to the issue of 
causal selection should further elaborate adequate criteria for distinguishing between relevant 
alternatives and fixed background conditions.
The selection of real omissions from false omissions, in this sense, seems to share the same kind 
2 Schaffer (2005), p. 297.
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of  difficulty  discussed  at  the  beginning  of  this  section  in  relation  to  the  positive/negative 
relevance distinction proposed by Donagan and Bennett.  An adequate causal account of the 
doing/allowing distinction, as argued so far, requires that a) we can properly distinguish acts  
from omissions, and b) we can properly distinguish real (or causally relevant) omissions from 
false (or not causally relevant) omissions. In a difference-making analysis, the complete success 
of both tasks seems to rely, however, on notions such as the natural course of events, the normal 
or salient explanation, the identification of a standard set of background conditions and the like. 
On the one hand, by allowing an agent's impact on an outcome to come in different degrees (the 
extent to which the probability of the effect is raised), counterfactual  analysis appears thus to 
accommodate the doing/allowing distinction. On the other hand, it appears that a supplementary 
account of what  is  the standard or normal course of events is needed,  if the counterfactual  
approach is to deliver the correct verdicts regarding the doing/allowing distinction.  In other 
words,  counterfactual  reasoning,  as  exemplified  by  elaborate  accounts  such  as  Bennett's  or 
Schaffer's, has the necessary tools to identify actions and omissions in a way that matches our 
doing/allowing classifications, thus satisfying both a) and b). In order to get the right results,  
however, we need to better elaborate the criteria for assessing which conduct is normal more 
appropriate for the agent in a given situation.
In the first  half  of  Chapter 2,  I  will  discuss the main competitor  to causal  accounts  of  the 
doing/allowing distinction, which I call “norm-based accounts”. In the latter part of Chapter 2, I 
will show how insights from these so-called norm-based accounts can in fact help to fill in this  
remaining gap in the counterfactual approach. In this respect, I will argue that these accounts are 
better seen as supplements to the counterfactual approach.
Before examining the norm-based accounts, and how they can contribute, rather than compete 
with, difference-making accounts, it is worth making sure that a sophisticated difference-making 
account,  supplemented  with  an  appropriate  interpretation  of  what  counts  as  a  “normal” 
behaviour  or  standard  interpretation,  is  really  the  most  suitable  alternative on the table  for 
tracking the doing/allowing distinction. To this end, I want to address one last class of theories 
that have been suggested by moral philosophers. I will call these “informal process theories” or 
“sequence accounts”.
1.5 “Sequence” Theories 
In discussing process theories,  I  argued that  physical  connection does not  always track our 
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ordinary judgments about which behaviours amount to positive actions, or genuine instances of 
causation.  Some  moral  philosophers  interested  in  the  doing/allowing  distinction,  however, 
suggest what looks to be a “looser” interpretation of physical connections so as to accommodate 
disconnection counterexamples, and match our intuitive act/omission distinction. Note that, if 
these accounts are indeed successful, they would amount to a better alternative than elaborate  
difference-making proposals, as they would account for the doing/allowing distinction without 
appealing to the notions of normal behaviour or standard explanation.
In moral theory, less stringent interpretations of process theories, which do not require the actual 
transference of properties or energy, have been put forward to better cope with the notion of 
human agency. Foot (1978, 1984, 1985), for instance, argues that the agent's role in bringing  
about a harmful effect is to be classified as initiating, sustaining,  enabling or forbearing-to-
prevent an appropriate harmful sequence which directly connects the agent to the upshot. These 
different levels of contribution to the upshot determine the classification of a conduct in terms 
of doing rather than allowing. Philip  Wolff (2007, pp. 85‒89), on the other hand, suggests an 
account based on the “configuration of forces”. Within this model, causal relations between an 
affector and a patient are dependent on the following three conditions: 1) whether the patient is 
represented  as  having  a  force-based  tendency  towards  an  endstate,  2)  whether  the  forces  
represented as exerted by the patient and affector are concordant, and 3) whether the patient is 
represented  as  making progress  towards  the  endstate.  For  instance,  according to  Wolff,  the 
notion of “causation” is applied if a patient does not have a tendency towards an endstate, the 
affector exerts a force on the patient towards the endstate (the forces of the patient and affector  
are  not  concordant),  and the patient  makes progress  towards the endstate.  “Doing” actions, 
Wolff argues, satisfy all the conditions above: when the assassin fires the bullet, the victim does 
not  have a  tendency towards the endstate “dying”,  the bullet  fired by the gun exerts  a not 
concordant force with respect to the oxygen flux, and the patient thus makes progresses towards 
the endstate “dying”. On the other hand, “allowing” cases occur when the patient has a tendency 
towards the endstate, the forces exerted by the affector and the patient are concordant and the  
patient  progress  towards  the end states.  These conditions,  for  instance,  apply  to  the  classic 
“allowing” case of the slipping rock. Barry and Øverland (2017), similarly, identify two criteria 
so as to assess whether the conduct amounts to doing or allowing: whether the behaviour of the 
agent is a relevant action (i.e., the agent has a direct enterprise in bringing about the upshot) and  
whether there is a complete causal process connecting the agent and the upshot.3
Fiona Woollard (2015) suggests a more sophisticated model, which draws on both Foot's and 
3 Barry  and  Øverland  argue that,  according  to  this  model,  the  third category  of  “enabling” should 
supplement the classic doing/allowing dichotomy. 
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Bennett's  proposals.  As  Woollard's  account  ultimately  appeals  to  the  notion  of  harmful 
sequence, I discuss it in this class of refined process theories.4 According to Woollard, Foot's 
analysis must be supplemented with the idea that we should look at whether a  relevant fact 
about the agent's behaviour is part of the harmful sequence. Woollard first argues that “an agent 
counts as doing harm if and only if some fact about the agent’s behaviour is part of the sequence 
leading to harm; the agent counts as merely allowing harm if and only if a fact about the agent’s 
behaviour is relevant to, but not part of, this harmful sequence.”5 However, this definition must 
be supplemented with an account of what makes a fact a part of the harmful sequence. To do so, 
Woollard  distinguishes  between  substantial and  non-substantial  facts:  the  former  are  more 
intuitively perceived as “natural” parts of a sequence, such as my throwing a rock, while the 
latter  usually  amount  to  fixed background conditions,  such as  my brushing my teeth  every 
morning. Specifically, a fact counts as substantial if it is either positive or contradicts normal 
presuppositions.6 She then  concludes  that  if an  agent  is  relevant  to  a  harm through a  non-
substantial fact about her body, then her actions are merely a condition for, rather than part of,  
the harmful sequence, and this would count as allowing harm. On the other hand, if there is a  
complete sequence of substantial facts leading from the agent to an harmful effect, the agent's  
action would count as doing. This account seems to fit our intuitions about what counts as doing 
and what counts as allowing. There is a harmful sequence in place connecting my neighbour to 
the death of my flowers. My neighbour's action also appears to be a condition for the harmful  
outcome: she is relevant to the upshot through a negative (and thus non-substantial) fact about  
her body, that is, not watering my flowers, and her behaviour thus counts as allowing. On the 
other hand, a man firing his gun counts as part of the harmful sequence: there is a positive fact 
about his body (firing the gun) which connects him through a complete chain to the harmful 
upshot.
All these accounts, in short, stick to the intuition that there must be a sort of physical connection 
or succession of events relating the agent and the outcome, but further examine the agent's  
behaviour on the basis of the type of interaction between the agent and this causal sequence; the 
doing/allowing  distinction  tracks  the  different  nature  of  these  interactions,  which  stand  for 
different degrees of the agent's causal contribution with respect to the outcome. 
A clear advantage of these models is that they replace a very narrow account of what counts as a 
4 Note  that  Woollard  does  not  define  “sequences”  in  causal  terms.  Specifically,  she  argues  that 
“sequences are not spatio-temporally continuous causal chains.” (p. 28). It is thus in a broad sense 
only that I discuss Woollard's account among informal process theories, insofar as she uses the notion 
of a chain of facts connecting the agent to the outcome.
5 Woollard (2015), p. 23.
6 Woollard's  definition  of  positive/negative  facts  draws  on  Bennett's  analysis.  For  a  more  detailed 
survey of the different ways in which a fact can be substantial, see Woollard (2015), pp. 36‒59.
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“connection” with a broader, and more intuitive, notion of a natural sequence or succession of 
events.  As  Wolff's  interpretation of  the  bullet  case  suggests,  there  is  a  very  prominent  and 
tangible connection between the fired bullet and the death of the victim, besides the hard facts  
about  the  physical  processes  going  on  at  the  level  of  human  biology.  Similarly,  it  seems 
extremely reasonable to describe my flowers dying as a natural and self-sustaining sequence of  
events that my neighbour appears to “allow”. The notion of “relevant fact”, likewise, appears to 
conveniently  track  our  intuitions  of  “doing  something  in  a  causal  way”.7 Arguably,  these 
proposals can successfully cover most of our attributions of doing and allowing, by relying only 
on this apparently self-evident and macroscopic identification of succession of phenomena, and 
on the agent's contribution to the sequence. 
My worry, however, is that these models are just concealing and making implicit the appeal to 
what counts as normal or standard, especially when it comes to sequences and configurations of  
forces involving human agency. Specifically, I argue that some prior judgements over which 
explanations are salient, which behaviours are appropriate, or what amounts to a positive action 
lie behind the identification of a certain sequence, configuration of forces among events, or even 
“tendency towards an end-state”8.  Moreover,  while processes such as a rock slipping might 
stand out as “natural”, or sequences such as drowning a person seem highly discernible, picking 
out  the  appropriate  sequence  is  not  as  straightforward  when  evaluating,  for  example,  my 
neighbour's contribution to the death of the flowers. Arguably, the reason why my neighbour's 
role with respect to the upshot, as opposed to the Queen's, is conceived of as “allowing”, is that 
there is a general  understanding that,  once a promise has been made,  this  generates certain 
obligations in the promiser with respect to the promisee. This, in turn, identifies the neighbour 
as contributing to the harmful sequence, in the sense of failing to interrupt it, but not the Queen, 
who is perceived as completely extraneous to this sequence. In short, just as we can pick out a 
sequence  connecting  my  neighbour  to  the  flowers,  we  could  also  look  at  the  sequence 
connecting  the  Queen  to  the  flowers;  clearly,  only  one  sequence  seems  appropriate  when 
assessing causal relevance, but this appears to be a matter of choice rather than of hard facts.  
Woollard seems to make a similar remark when discussing the distinction between substantial  
and  non-substantial  facts,  and  ultimately  concedes  that  these  classifications,  which  make  a 
substantive work in distinguishing doings and allowings, rely on prior judgements.9 My point is 
that,  in  selecting  the  adequate  sequence  and  assessing  the  agent's  contribution  to  it,  these  
accounts  already  encode  a  specific  understanding  of  which  explanation  is  relevant  for  the 
outcome to occur, and which individuals could or could not intervene on the sequence. This,  
7 Barry and Øverland (2017), pp. 82‒83. 
8 Wolff (2007), p. 87.
9 Woollard (2015), p. 61. 
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however, reflects a previous evaluation of which behaviours are expected, which explanations 
are commonly accepted and which kind of obligations and social interactions are at play in the 
context at issue. 
In this sense, Foot-style accounts of the doing/allowing distinction, while extremely plausible 
and intuitive, still depend on this prior assessment of what amounts to a normal sequence of 
events, just like elaborate difference-making accounts like Bennett's or Schaffer's. With respect 
to the latter, however, these models seem to have the disadvantage of making this feature less 
explicit and, arguably, less debatable and identifiable. I conclude, therefore, that a framework 
that  incorporates  and  makes  explicit  the  prominent  and  central  role  of  norm-based 
considerations is preferable for reasons of clarity and transparency.10 
10 A notable exception is Woollard's  (2015) proposal,  which discusses  at  length the substantial/non-
substantial distinction. As I will discuss in Chapter 2, however, we can assign to this feature an even 
more prominent role in cashing out the doing/allowing dichotomy. 
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2. Analysis of Doing vs Allowing: “Norm-based” and “Mixed” 
Accounts
In this chapter, I continue my survey of the most adequate accounts for tracking our every-day 
use of the doing/allowing distinction. I introduce the main alternative to causal accounts; I call  
this  the  “norm-based”  account.  I  then  argue  that  a  suitable  model  for  the  doing/allowing 
distinction should incorporate aspects from both these two frameworks. Specifically, I describe 
in detail Christopher Hitchcock's “self-contained network” account, and illustrate its merits in 
matching our intuitive doing/allowing attributions, whilst at the same time solving most of the 
difficulties analysed throughout Chapters 1 and 2.
2.1 Norm-based accounts 
In this chapter I use the label “norm-based” to describe all accounts that attempt to justify the 
doing/allowing  distinction  by  referring  as  well  to  independent  and  external  features  and 
principles, which are usually of moral nature. Note that these accounts do of course retain some 
causal and/or descriptive aspect; after all, they rely on a notion of when an agent acts. But the 
difference with causal accounts is that when it comes to classifying different actions as doings 
rather than allowings, there is a more direct direct appeal to norms rather than an attempt to  
appeal to causal notions. For the purpose of this chapter, I only focus on whether these models 
adequately match our common doing/allowing classifications, and can thus make sense of our 
intuitive use of this distinction. In this section, my aim is not just to provide a survey of these  
accounts, but also to see whether some aspects of these positions may be used to flesh out a  
more elaborate difference-making model, in the sense of supplementing it with a more detailed 
understanding of what is “normal”. 
I first deal with the most influential of these accounts, which I call the rights-based proposal, 
analysing  Philippa  Foot's  (1978)  and  Warren  Quinn's  (1989)  proposals;  secondly,  I  turn  to 
Shelly Kagan's (1989) framework, which can be considered as a broader norm-based proposal. 
Note that, in this preliminary survey, I am concerned specifically with how different accounts of 
the doing/allowing distinction draw the line between doing and allowing behaviours, and not 
with the further issue of justifying whether this distinction matters morally. For this reason, I 
define here as “norm-based” accounts only the frameworks which appeal to notions of self-
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ownership, rights, and rules of conduct as a way to discriminate between doing and allowing 
behaviours, and not the proposals which use these notions to further explain moral significance.
2.2 Rights-based accounts 
I  interpret  Philippa  Foot's  (1978)  account  as  the  first  “rights-based”  analysis  of  the 
doing/allowing  distinction.  She  argues  that  negative  rights  (namely,  rights  against  one's 
interference) are different from, and stronger, than positive rights (rights to be provided a good, 
or aid). She further argues that we classify an action as “doing” when it violates one's negative  
rights, while we classify an action as “allowing” when it violates a positive right. Note that, in 
Chapter 1, I classified Foot's account as an informal process theory, insofar as it rests on the idea 
of a sequence connecting the agent to the upshot. Nonetheless, Foot draws a line among the  
different  ways an agent  can be relevant  to a harmful  sequence,  and classifies initiating and 
sustaining a sequence as doing, while enabling and forbearing-to-prevent amount a sequence as  
allowing.  Therefore,  while  the  distinction  Foot  draws  among  four  different  ways  of  being 
related  to  a  harmful  outcome  is  purely  descriptive,  the  further  distinction  between  which 
sequence  counts  as  doing  and  which  as  allowing  is  not  merely  descriptive.  This  further 
distinction, in this sense, is based on the insight that initiating and sustaining involve a violation 
of  negative  rights,  while  enabling  and forbearing-to-prevent  involve  a  violation  of  positive 
rights. Foot's account, therefore, retains a causal aspect, but then makes use of the concept of 
negative/positive rights as to draw the doing/allowing distinction.
Warren Quinn's proposal provides a similar analysis of the relation between doing/allowing and 
positive/negative rights.  Quinn's  reflection begins  with the insight  that  the most  simple  and 
straightforward  way  to  think  about  the  doing/allowing  distinction,  the  action/inaction 
distinction, is open to counterexamples. In general, reviewing Bennett's and Foot's accounts, he 
notices  that  no matter  how sophisticated or  refined  a causal  analysis  of  the  doing/allowing 
distinction is, there seem to be some cases we perceive as doing, but which nonetheless fall into 
the “allowing” category according to the model at issue. In particular, Quinn claims that in some 
instances  we  undoubtedly  kill,  or  harm,  without  having  caused  the  harm to  occur,  having 
positive relevance to the consequence and so on. 
Suppose, for example, that I am driving a train directed towards a house on fire where people 
are trapped, because I want to rescue them. Ahead of me, I notice someone tied to the tracks,  
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and I  decide  not  to  stop  the train and so  run over  the  person.1 This  action,  Quinn argues, 
amounts to killing (or doing), despite my good intentions to save the people trapped in the fire 
and, most of all, despite the fact that most causal models would not describe my behaviour as 
causing the death, or as being positively relevant to the death. For instance, on Bennett's terms, 
the agent could count as only negatively relevant to the death of the victim, since most of the 
way  she  could  have  behaved  would  have  resulted  in  the  train  running  over  the  person.  
Specifically, it looks like a negative fact about the agent's behaviour − not stopping the train − is 
part of the explanation of the harmful upshot; there is seemingly only one way the agent could 
have behaved, that is stopping the train, which would have prevented the death of the person.
The reason why we regard this action as an instance of doing, therefore, must lie elsewhere, and 
amounts  to  something more than what  can be captured by a  factual  analysis  of  the  events 
involved. Quinn's intuition is that the person tied to the tracks has authority or ownership over 
her  body,  which  creates  a  specific  obligation  in  other  agents  towards  her,  and  a  general  
expectation that this authority is to be respected. In other words, Quinn is speaking the language 
of rights: some rights a person has, such as “I have the right not to be drowned”, are negative 
rights,  which  generate  an  obligation  not  to  interfere  with  the  person,  and  cannot  thus  be 
trumped.  On  the  other  hand,  some  rights  are  positive,  in  the  sense  that  they  require  the 
intervention of some other agent for their fulfilment, such as “I have the right to be rescued from 
drowning”. Positive rights certainly generate some sort of obligation, but, Quinn argues, they 
are clearly less compelling and stringent than the kind of obligations negative rights give rise to. 
The subsequent move is then to equate cases of “doing” with violations of negative rights and 
cases  of  “allowing”  with violations  of  positive  rights.  This  account,  therefore,  is  similar  to 
Foot's, but it extends it with an underlying justificatory concept of self-ownership, from which 
the  notion  of  rights  stems.  To  be  clear,  Quinn  also  offers  a  descriptive  account  of  the 
doing/allowing distinction; my argument is rather that most of the focus and of the theoretical  
work is done at the level of the concept of self-ownership.
Quinn's proposal, as Woollard (2015, p. 107) argues, seems extremely persuasive: ownership 
over one's body and mind could thus be an intuitively relevant feature when judging an agent's 
conduct as an instance of doing harm rather than allowing it to occur. Specifically, Woollard  
argues that what we are concerned with when making this distinction is the fact that we are  
imposing on others: an agent is doing harm if she intrudes upon what belongs to others. In the 
train example, the person tied to the track has ownership over the integrity of his/her body, such  
that the fact that another agent runs over me makes the action an intrusion or imposition.2 
1 For a detailed discussion of this example, see Quinn (1989).
2 To be clear, I do not consider Woollard's proposal as a norm-based account, insofar as it only uses the 
notions  of  self-ownership  and  imposition  to  justify  the  moral  relevance  of  the  doing/allowing 
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Rights-based justifications of the doing/allowing distinction have been variously criticised with 
the charge of arbitrariness. Quinn's account, indeed, like Foot's, selects a specific moral feature, 
such as the distinction between negative and positive rights violation, or the related concept of 
self-ownership, and assumes that this distinction determines the classification of an action as 
doing  or  allowing.  But,  as  Howard-Snyder  (2002)  objects,  there  is  nothing  to  the 
positive/negative  dichotomy  that  makes  it  “trump”,  or  makes  it  particularly  significant  in 
assessing moral value, or, more accurately, in distinguishing between doing and allowing. Why 
would other classifications, such as “rights of adults” and “rights of children” be not equally 
suitable candidates for informing our moral judgements? The fact that we rely on a specific 
moral  norm  rather  than  another  in  spelling  out  doing/allowing,  in  short,  seems  extremely 
arbitrary and unjustified, because it requires us to commit to a specific moral theory. Moreover, 
the problem of providing an adequate justification for the doing/allowing distinction is then 
simply shifted to the next level,  namely to the problem of why the positive/negative rights 
distinction,  among others, is particularly relevant.  This consideration leads to an even more 
serious problem for rights-based accounts, which is their lack of explanatory power in justifying 
the significance of the doing/allowing distinction. By equating doing and allowing with negative 
and positive rights violations, indeed, we are simply re-labelling an already existing morally 
relevant dichotomy: in short, we already know that violating rights is morally bad, and violating 
negative  rights  is  comparably  worse  than  violating  positive  rights.  In  this  sense,  these 
doing/allowing models are simply introducing a new pair of terms, which completely overlap 
with positive/negative rights  violation.  But  then  there  is  nothing distinctly  morally  relevant 
about doing versus allowing. 
This line of criticism, while serious and challenging, is nonetheless not the focus of this chapter, 
which is instead the assessment of alternative analyses of the doing/allowing distinction. The 
charge of arbitrariness, indeed, raises the further issue of whether any norm-based account could 
in principle  provide an adequate  justification for the distinct  moral  significance attached to 
doing and allowing.  Here,  however,  my task is  just  to  test  whether  a  specific  account  can 
consistently track our common doing/allowing classifications. 
In this respect, the standard theory of positive and negative rights violation, which Woollard 
spells out as “not intruding”, seems to match our intuitions in cases which are, at least to some  
extent,  “ethically  sensitive”:  the  trolley-style  example  used  by  Quinn,  or  the 
Drowning/Rescuing  cases.  Seemingly,  however,  for  some  “non  moralised”  examples,  the 
discussion in terms of the violation of rights may not turn out to be so reasonable. Let's take, for 
distinction. In this sense, I only refer here to her discussion of the merits of Quinn's account, and to 
how she elaborates on Quinn's concept of self-ownership.
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instance, the example of the Neighbour: while there could be agreement over the fact that she is 
allowing my flowers to die, it would be difficult to justify this classification in terms of rights  
violation; it would, indeed, seem excessive to claim that I have a positive right to have my 
flowers watered during my trip, or that such an informal promise is kept. Similarly, cases where 
the (harmful) upshot amounts to a minimal threat or even nuisance to other people may be  
difficult  to  describe  as  intruding  or  imposing  over  these  people's  belongings  or  safety. 
Nonetheless, the kind of behaviour performed by the agent could strike us as an instance of  
“doing” or “allowing” harm. 
Another counterargument to the rights-based account is Shelly Kagan's (1989, p. 101) respirator 
example: in case a), my enemy sneaks into the hospital room where I lie in a coma and removes  
my  respirator;  in  case  b),  by  contrast,  the  doctor,  acting  upon  the  decision  of  the  ethical 
committee, switches off the respirator. Kagan argues that case a) amounts to doing harm, while 
b) to allowing a harm to occur. This classification, which is seemingly reasonable, cannot thus 
be easily captured in terms of negative or positive rights, or in terms of “not intrusion”: the  
distinction, rather, seems to appeal to further ethical norms, principles and considerations. 
In  summary,  the  rights-based  account  claims  that  the  doing/allowing  distinction  tracks 
positive/negative rights violation, or whether there was an imposition on something in the realm 
of  the  agent's  self-ownership.  While  these accounts  seem generally  reliable  in  tracking  our 
doing/allowing  assessments,  there  are  some  cases  that  are  not  well  captured  by  the 
negative/positive  rights  dichotomy.  First,  in  these  cases,  it  could  be  argued  that  other 
expectations or obligations, which are less stringent and binding than rights or intrusion, may 
guide our doing/allowing assessments, like in the Neighbour example. This would not preclude 
the rights-violation account from serving as  a specific or narrow version of a broader model. 
Secondly, there are cases where an agent's behaviour violates someone's positive rights, but in a  
way which intuitively characterises as an action. If I stop the lifeguard who is coming to rescue 
you,  I  am only  interfering  with  a  positive  right  of  yours,  that  is,  the  right  to  be  rescued; 
nonetheless, it is reasonable to argue that I “did” harm.  Plausibly, it still appears to be relevant,  
in distinguishing between doing and allowing,  the way an agent  behaved in relation to the 
outcome, in terms of impact and causal relevance. In this sense, it may not be reasonable to  
completely dismiss causal models as a tool for tracking the doing/allowing distinction; rights-
based  accounts,  thus,  may  be  more  fruitfully  employed  as  a  complement  rather  than  an 
alternative to causal accounts. Before turning to this hypothesis, I will consider whether there is 
a better norm-based account which can accommodate for these difficulties.
38
2.3 Kagan's norm-violation account 
In his survey of the debate concerning doing/allowing, Shelly Kagan (1989) notices that it is 
extremely difficult to find a univocal explanation that consistently and reliably captures all our 
classification of actions as doing or allowing harm, especially when it comes to “gimmicky 
cases” and fictional counterexamples. His idea is that this difficulty can be traced back to the 
fact that, when we evaluate whether an action is an instance of doing or allowing, we make 
reference to a set of norms: when an action violates one of these norms, this becomes a salient 
feature in the process of bringing about harm, and it is thus characterised as doing harm. If, on 
the  other  hand,  the  behaviour  that  brings  about  harm  complies  with  the  set  of  commonly 
accepted norms,  we perceive it  as allowing harm. With respect  to the rights-based account,  
Kagan suggests a different analysis of the doing/allowing distinction: within the former view, 
both doing and allowing harm amount to rights violations, but doing actions would capture 
violations of “more important” rights. On the other hand, Kagan's proposal is that only doing 
actions involve a kind of norm violation. As to the concept of norms, Kagan allows for two 
alternative  interpretations,  one  merely  descriptive  and  one  normative.  In  the  former 
interpretation,  norms simply  refer  to  what  are  “normal”  or  common behaviours  in  specific 
circumstances. On the other hand, we can regard the concept of norm as normatively loaded, 
thus referring to moral principles and rules we ought to conform with. 
This account appears to offer a convincing psychological justification for our common use of 
the doing/allowing distinction: something may strike us as an instance of doing something when 
it is “abnormal”, and contrasts with widely accepted rules of behaviour. This idea, which is  
underlying Bennett's and Schaffer's models, also plays a central role in Hitchcock's account, 
discussed in the following section. Note too that this framework does not force us to commit to  
any specific moral theory or principle, thus avoiding the charge of arbitrariness. While rights-
based accounts make substantial claims about the content of moral norms, this framework does 
not rely on any specific content or structure of such norms, but merely on the basic concept of  
norm compliance versus violation. 
We  can  now turn  to  assessing  whether  Kagan's  norm-violation  account  complies  with  our 
intuitions  regarding  the  classification  of  cases.  In  many  circumstances,  this  model  seems 
successful in singling out  commonly perceived “doing harm” actions as instances  of norm-
violation. Arguably, all the doing harm examples discussed throughout Chapter 1 can be cashed 
out as violations of some norms, or at least violations of standardly expected behaviours, such 
as breaking the window by throwing a rock. My worry, however, is that this framework is not as 
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accurate when it comes to cases of allowing harm.3 More precisely, Kagan's proposal suggests 
that, for any behaviour which results in a harm, if the behaviour violated a norm, then it is an 
instance of doing; on the other hand, if the behaviour complies with standard rules of conduct, it 
is an instance of allowing. This understanding, nonetheless, does not seem accurate without 
further criteria for identifying which norms or rules can carry out the test. To be sure, for some  
allowings behaviours, Kagan's account seems to deliver the right classification. If I do not save 
a  person  from  drowning,  and  there  are  a  lot  of  people  around  who  could  save  her,  it  is 
reasonable to argue that I was not the one who was expected to do the saving, and thus my 
action characterises as allowing harm. But what about the Boiler or the Neighbour example? 
Standard rules of good conduct require that I regularly check and monitor my house appliances 
to prevent incidents and subsequent threats, or that my neighbour should keep a promise she 
made  to  me.  In  this  sense,  my  negligence,  or  the  neighbour's,  should  count  as  doing,  a 
conclusion that is apparently counterintuitive. Of course, it could be argued that these norms are  
not as stringent as the obligation not to throw rocks, and this distinction explains the different 
assessments  of  the  two  cases.  Kagan,  however,  does  not  offer  any  further  details  beyond 
discriminating doing versus allowing in terms of norm-violation.
My intuition is that the agent's causal impact on the upshot, and whether her behaviour was, so 
to  speak,  positively  or  negatively  relevant,  still  has  some  influence  over  doing/allowing 
classifications. Imagine, for instance, that Bob is stung by a bee and is in anaphylactic shock. A  
doctor  standing  nearby  has  an  adrenaline  shot  which  could  save  Bob,  but  refrains  from 
administering the injection. The doctor is certainly violating a fairly strict norm of behaviour, or 
her so-called “physician's oath”. However, it seems untenable to describe her conduct as doing 
harm to Bob: the sting caused the anaphylactic shock, and the doctor is just refraining from 
performing a medical procedure, and thus allowing the harm to occur, no matter how hideous 
her behaviour is. This judgment, arguably, captures the insight that the bee and the doctor have a 
different  causal  impact  on  the  harmful  upshot;  it  seems,  therefore,  that  the  doing/allowing 
distinction is also sensitive to this feature. 
In conclusion, Kagan's suggestion, though not completely successful, is extremely insightful in 
relating the doing/allowing distinction to a salient abnormal or inappropriate conduct versus an 
ordinary but morally wanting conduct. While I agree that norm-violation has a prominent role in 
tracking doing/allowing classifications, different types of causal impact seem to play as well an  
irreducible part as well, which Kagan's proposal fails to account for. 
In the next section, I suggest that the most adequate account for tracking the doing/allowing 
3 This is a worry Kagan is aware of too: he claims that this “norm-violation” interpretation might be too 
crude (p. 97), but he does not offer any indication so as to refine this account.
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distinction relies on a difference-making model to assess the impact or the role of the agent, but 
also  relies,  in  assessing  the  action/omission  distinction,  on  the  idea  of  which  conduct  is 
“normal” and appropriate for the agent, and thus on an underlying “norm-based” framework. 
2.4 Hitchcock's “self-contained network” model 
Most recent approaches in the literature on causal relations have employed structural equation 
frameworks  to  make  sense  of  counterfactuals  (Hitchcock  2001,  2007;  Woodward  2003; 
Woodward and Hitchcock 2003, Halpern and Hitchcock 2013). In his 2007 paper, specifically,  
Hitchcock  tackles,  amongst  other  things,  the  issue  of  adequately  discriminating  acts  from 
omissions, and argues that the idea of “self-contained networks” can successfully capture this 
distinction. While this model shares most of the features of counterfactual accounts, it can also 
be considered as incorporating many aspects of so-called norm-based accounts, especially in the 
assessment of the distinction between default and deviant variables. 
Before  discussing  this  central  insight,  I  briefly  sketch  Hitchcock's  structural  equation 
framework.4 First, let a causal model be an ordered pair <V, E>, where V is a set of variables 
and E is a set of equations among these variables. For simplicity, a variable here can take two 
values, where one value represents the occurrence, and the other the non-occurrence of a given 
event,  or  of  a  specific  version  of  the  event.  Let's  take  this  straightforward  Assassination 
example: Alice poison's the victim's drink, and the victim dies. The variables in the story are:
A = 0 if Alice does not poison the drink, 1 if she does;
C = 0 if the victim does not die, 1 if she does.
Hitchcock argues that the counterfactuals we use when discussing the case (in Assassination, “if 
Alice  had  not  poisoned  the  drink,  the  victim wouldn't  have  died”)  can  be  represented  by 
equations  among  the  variables:  the  variables  on  the  the  right-hand  side  of  an  equation, 
specifically, work as antecedents of the corresponding counterfactuals, while those on the left  
work as consequents. In Assassination, the equation describing the causal model is:
C = A
At this point, we can calculate the value of a variable on the left-side of the equation depending 
on the values taken by the variables on the right-side. For instance, for A = 1 that is, when Alice 
4 Throughout this section, I follow Hitchcock's (2007) formalisation. 
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poisons the drink, we have C = 1, that is, the victim dies. For the equation C = A, we can  
stipulate that C counterfactually depends on A, because we can compute the value of C fixing 
the value of A, and the resulting counterfactuals are true: if Alice had not poisoned the drink, the 
victim would have died; if Alice had not poisoned the drink, the victim wouldn't have died.5
For reasons of convenience, Hitchcock suggests that we can represent causal models as graphs,  
with nodes corresponding to the variables; an arrow from one variable to another represents the  
fact that the former appears on the right-hand side of an equation with the latter on the left. 
Hitchcock then defines the former variable as a parent of the latter. For Assassination, we thus 
have: 
A                          C
Figure 2.1: Assassination
Where A is a parent of C.
Let's now see how this simple model can be further refined so as to distinguish between acts and 
omissions, which amounts to the first desideratum spelled out in Chapter 1. To do so, let's take 
this second assassination example, which I call  Bodyguard:6 Alice poisons the victim's drink; 
the victim's bodyguard has an antidote but she does not administer it to the victim. Obviously,  
the victim wouldn't have died if Alice hadn't poisoned the drink, but she also wouldn't have died 
had the bodyguard administered the antidote. The causal graph representing this story is the 
following: 
                 D
                            
                                      B             
  A                         
Figure 2.2: Bodyguard
Where:
A = 1 if Alice poisons the victim's drink, 0 if otherwise; 
B = 1 if Bodyguard administers the antidote, 0 if otherwise; 
5 More  technically,  Hitchcock  (2007,  p.  502)  defines  the  notion  of  counterfactual  dependence  as 
follows:
 Let <V, E> be a causal model, let X, Y ∈ V, and let the actual values of X and Y in the model be x 
and y, respectively. Y counterfactually depends upon X in <V, E> just in case there exist values of X 
and Y x' ≠ x, y' ≠ y (respectively) such that “if X had x', then Y would have been y'” is true in <V, E>.
6 Ibidem, p. 504. 
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D = 1 if victim dies, 0 otherwise: and 
D = A & not-B. 
The difficulty with this case is the one of correctly identifying the causal impact of actions and 
omissions. Counterfactually speaking, indeed, Alice's poisoning the drink is causing the death of 
the victim in exactly the same way the bodyguard's refusing to administer the antidote is: both A 
and  B  are  thus  parents  of  D.  This  conclusion,  of  course,  strikes  us  as  intuitively  wrong, 
suggesting that we need further criteria for distinguishing actions from omissions (which is the 
first desideratum). Recall that, as second desideratum, an adequate model of the doing/allowing 
distinction also has to distinguish between “real” and “false” omission.
With respect to the first task, Hitchcock argues that his model can successfully account for the  
difference  between  Alice's  and  the  bodyguard's  behaviours,  by  defining  two  alternative 
mechanisms causation can amount to, each capturing the specific way Alice and the bodyguard 
are  causing  the  outcome.  According  to  Hitchcock,  in  Bodyguard,  when  we  read  the 
counterfactual “had Alice not poisoned the drink, the victim wouldn't have died”, this appears to 
be a self-contained story, and Alice's behaviour seems a satisfactory explanation for the victim's 
death. On the other hand, when we read the counterfactual “had the bodyguard administered the 
antidote, the victim wouldn't have died” the story is not self-contained or complete: we feel we 
should know more, as refraining from giving the antidote would not itself and alone bring about 
the victim's death. 
The idea of self-contained or else incomplete causal relationships, relies, in Hitchcock's view,  
on another distinction, the one between  deviant  and  default  values of a variable. The default 
value of a variable is defined as the value that the variable would take if there was no further  
information about intervening causes, and the situation were a sort of “self- persisting” system. 
For instance, in both Assassination and Bodyguard, the default value for C and D is 0, as it is 
reasonable to expect that, without anyone trying to poison her, the victim would stay alive. A 
variable which takes a deviant value, on the other hand, amounts to an event that somehow 
requires an explanation, like the fact that Alice decides to poison the victim's drink. Hitchcock 
claims that, in the realm of human behaviour, this distinction allows us to identify self-contained 
versus non-self-contained networks and thus track the act/omission distinction.  As should be 
clear  from  this  explanation,  what  default  values  we  assign  to  variables  depends  on  our 
experience and our judgment; it is not something that we can settle independently of our broader 
understanding of the situation.
Let's now see in more detail how deviant and default values can help in distinguishing between 
self-contained and non-self-contained causal networks. The idea is that we can think of self-
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contained  causal  networks  as  networks  providing  a  “sufficient”  explanation  of  the  causal 
relation at issue. The connection between the drink being poisoned and the victim's death, in this 
sense, amounts to a satisfactory self-sustaining explanation of the events. On the other hand, a 
causal  network  is  non-self-contained  if  it  strikes  us  as  incomplete:  in  short,  to  explain the 
occurrence of the outcome, we must  appeal  to other features which are not included in the 
network. For instance, the fact that the bodyguard did not administer the antidote is by no means 
a satisfactory explanation for the death of the victim. According to Hitchcock, we can think that 
a causal network is self-contained, when, if all the parents of a variable X all take their default  
value, they cannot cause X to take its deviant value. More intuitively, a causal network “is self-
contained when it  is  never  necessary to  leave  or  augment  the  network  to  explain  why the  
variables  within  the  network  take  the  values  that  they  do.  When a  variable  (...)  in  a  self-
contained network takes a deviant value, this can be explained in terms of the deviant value of 
one or more of its parents in the network.”7 
Let's be more precise here about what counts, according to Hitchcock, as a causal  network. 
First, Hitchcock introduces the notion of a path as the “set of variables that are all connected by 
a series of arrows that meet tip to tail.” In short, we can think of paths as a causal “route” which  
leads from a parent(s) to a child. In Assassination, there is only one path connecting A and C, 
namely {A, C}. In Bodyguard, {A, D} and {B, D} are the two causal paths connecting A with D 
and B with D respectively, that is, two possible “routes” or ways an outcome can be produced.  
A causal network connecting variable X with variable Y can then be defined as  the set of all 
variables that feature in paths connecting X to Y. In both these simple examples, the causal  
networks coincide with the paths: the causal network connecting A with C is {A, C}, while {A, 
D} and {B, D} are the causal networks connecting A with D and B with D.8
We can now define more formally when a causal network is self-contained  versus non-self-
contained. Hitchcock provides the following definition, which captures the idea of “sufficient” 
explanation expressed above: 
“Let <V, E> be causal model, and let X, Y ∈ V. Let N ⊆ V be the causal network 
connecting X to Y in <V, E>. Then the causal network N is self-contained if and only if  
for all Z in N, if Z has parents in N, then Z takes a default value when all of its parents 
in N do (and its parents in V\N take their actual values).”9
By implication, a causal network is non-self-contained if and only if, for some Z in N where Z  
7 Hitchcock (2007, p. 510).
8 I distinguish here between these two  notions as, to discuss the case of preemption, I will appeal to 
both.
9 Hitchcock (2007, p. 510). 
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has parents in N, Z takes its deviant value while all of its parents in N take their default value 
(and its parents in V\N take their actual values). In this latter case, to explain the deviant value 
of the child variable, we need to look outside the causal network. 
Let's  test  this  formal  definition  with  the Assassination  and  Bodyguard  examples.  In 
Assassination, we can set the default value of C as 0, and the default value of A as 0 as well,  
since it is not reasonable or natural to expect that someone will poison the drink. The causal  
network  {A, C} connecting A and and C is self-contained: when C takes its default value, its  
parent A takes its default one as well. More precisely, it is not possible for C to take its deviant 
value if its parent takes its default one. This matches the intuition that the fact that Alice poisons 
the drink amounts to a satisfactory and self-sustaining explanation for the death of the victim.  
What about Bodyguard? Here, the default value of D is set as 0; the default values of A and B 
are set as 0 as well, as it is not “normal” to expect that Alice will poison the drink, or that 
someone will administer an antidote.10 The causal network {A, D} is self-contained, as it is not 
possible for D not to take its default value if A takes its default one; this, again, matches our  
intuitions about what counts as a sufficient explanation. {B, D}, on the other hand, is non-self-
contained: D can take a deviant value even if B takes its default one. This result matches the 
intuition that B is not a satisfactory explanation of D.
We have thus met the first  desideratum: “acts” can be defined as instances of counterfactual 
causation in a self-contained causal network, like Alice's behaviour in both Assassination and 
Bodyguard; “omissions” can be defined as instances of counterfactual causation in non-self-
contained causal networks, like the bodyguard's behaviour in Bodyguard. In both instances, the 
outcome counterfactually depends on the agent's behaviour, so both actions and omissions count 
as  causally  relevant;  the  model,  however,  allows  us  to  discriminate  between  two  types  of  
conduct, or two ways of causing the upshot. This conclusion, arguably, matches our intuitive 
understanding that Alice “did harm” to the victim, while the bodyguard merely “allowed harm” 
to occur.
Let's  now  get  to  the  second  desideratum,  that  is,  distinguishing  omissions  from  causally 
unrelated events or, differently put, the selection of causes versus background conditions. Prima 
facie, Hitchcock's model seems not particularly well-equipped. Let's take again the  Dropping 
the cigarette example, and test how this model accounts for the connection between the presence 
of oxygen and the starting of the fire. We can draw here the following causal graph:
10 Specifically,  Hitchcock (p.  507)  argues  that  “temporary actions  or  events  tend  to  be  regarded  as 
deviant outcomes. In the case of human actions, we tend to think of those states requiring voluntary 
bodily motion as deviants and those compatible with lack of motion as defaults.”
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                                   O
C                        
Figure 2.3: Dropping the cigarette
Where: 
F = 0 if the fire doesn't start, 1 if it does, and Def(F) = 0;11
C = 0 if I don't drop the cigarette, 1 if I do, and Def(C) = 0;
O = 1 if the oxygen is present, 0 if it isn't, and Def(O) = 1;
F = C & O.
The presence of oxygen counts here as allowing harm: F counterfactually depends on O, since 
the counterfactual “had the oxygen not been present, the fire wouldn't have start” is true. Also,  
the causal network {O, F} is non-self-contained: the outcome could take its deviant value when 
O takes its default one. This result, clearly, does not match our intuitive understanding that the 
presence  of  oxygen  amounts  to  a  background  condition,  which  is  weaker  than  a  causally 
relevant omission. 
Yet, according to Hitchcock, we can still successfully distinguish “real” omissions from mere 
background conditions by appealing to the notions of default and deviant value. Roughly, we 
can identify whether a variable intuitively counts as “allowing” by looking at the value this  
variable takes in the causal model: if the variable takes the default value, we can describe it as a  
background  condition,  and  thus  a  “false”  omission,  while  if  it  takes  its  deviant  value  we 
consider it as causally relevant, and thus an allowing. 
Let's see how this suggestion works in the Neighbour/Queen of England example. Here, we can 
build the following causal model:
               C
                                  B
A                           
11 I refer here to Hitchcock (2007)'s formalisation, where Def(X) for any variable X indicates the default  
value of the variable. 
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Figure 2.4: Queen of England
Where:
A = 1 if neighbour waters my flower, 0 if not (where Def(A) = 1);
B = 1 if Queen of England waters the flower, 0 if not (Def(B) = 0);
C = 1 if flowers die, 0 if not, and
C = not-A & not-B.
The fact that A takes 1 as default accounts for the fact that, given the promise the neighbour  
made, it is reasonable to expect that she does indeed water my flowers. B, on the other hand, 
takes 0 as default  because it  is not  expected at  all  that  the Queen turns up and waters my 
flowers. The identification of the causal networks {A, C} and {B, C} self-contained rather than 
non-self-contained depends here upon which value we assign as default to the outcome C, the 
flowers dying. I think that the best solution here, while not particularly elegant, is to assign 
different  default  values  depending  on  which  causal  account  we  are  considering.  When 
evaluating {A, C}, Def(C) should be put at 0, since it is to be expected that the flowers die, 
which is what will “naturally” happen if nobody waters them. The causal network is non-self-
contained: the outcome C can take its deviant value 0 (that is, the flowers live) exactly when its  
parent  A takes  its  default  value  1  (the  neighbour  waters  the  flowers).  This  also  correctly 
identifies the neighbour's negligence as a real omission, since not watering the flowers amounts 
to a “deviant” behaviour. Let's now turn to the case of the Queen. When evaluating {B, C}, we 
could reasonably put Def(C) as 1, the flowers live, because this is what we expect given that the 
neighbour was asked to water the flowers. The casual network is again non-self-contained: the 
outcome can be deviant (that is, the flowers die) even when C takes its default value; this would 
happen in the case that  the neighbour is negligent.  The Queen's  behaviour also counts as a 
“background” condition, as her not watering the flowers is the default. This solution, though not 
particularly elegant,  can correctly  define the neighbour's  behaviour  as allowing,  but  not  the 
Queen's. We can generalise this solution, and thus have that Hitchcock's model is in line with 
the second desideratum too ‒ it can distinguish between background conditions and omissions.
In the following section, I deal with a challenge for most counterfactual accounts of causation, 
preemption, and I examine whether the self-contained network account can accommodate this 
difficulty.  I  conclude  that,  at  least  to  some  extent,  preemption  cases  remain  problematic.  
Nonetheless, as I argue in 2.4.2, this model has some promising advantages, and, despite the 
difficulties it has in dealing with preemption, it still amounts to an adequate framework of the 
doing/allowing distinction.
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2.4.1 Remaining difficulties: preemption
One issue remains open with respect to this model, namely the technical difficulty of correctly  
accounting for preemption cases as doings. Recall the standard preemption case of Backup.12 In 
this example, Alice poisons the victim's drink, and Backup is ready to do the same if Alice fails 
her task. The variables in this story thus are: 
A = 1 if Alice poisons the drink, 0 if she doesn't;
B = 1 if Backup poisons the drink, 0 if she doesn't;
C = 1 if the Victim dies, 0 if she doesn't.
The equations for this model are:
B = not-A 
C = A ˅ B 
The first equation reads as “if Alice hadn't poisoned the coffee, Backup would have”, while the 
second equation reads as “if Alice or Backup had poisoned the coffee, the victim would have 
died”. For the sake of simplicity, we can consider the following causal graph:
                                  C
 A
                       B
Figure 2.5: Backup
In  Backup,  {A,  C}  and {A,  B,  C}  are  both  paths  from A to C.  According  to  Hitchcock's 
definition, there is only one causal network connecting A to C, which is {A, B, C}. The default 
value for C is 0, that is the victim does not die. The default value fo A and B is 0 as well, that is,  
that they do not poison the victim. Despite the fact that Alice's behaviour strikes us as doing 
harm,  the  self-contained  network  model  does  not  deliver  here  the  same  result.  The  causal 
network{A, B, C}, indeed, is non-self-contained, because B takes its deviant value exactly when 
its parent, A, takes its default one. Even worse, note that C does not counterfactually depend  
upon A, as the counterfactual “had Alice not poisoned the drink, the victim wouldn't have died” 
12  Hitchcock (2007), p. 499.
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is false. Alice's behaviour thus does not amount to a doing neither an allowing.
Hitchcock (2001) and Halpern and Pearl (2005) provide a promising strategy for restoring the 
intuition that Alice causes in fact the death of the victim, by the means of further technical  
refinements.  The underlying idea is that in cases of preemption one causal  path is “direct”,  
namely {A, C}, while another is “indirect”, that is {A, B, C}, as it runs through B. The variable 
B, Hitchcock argues, makes “some sort of cancellation”, which is responsible for the fact that C 
does not counterfactually depend on A. As Hitchcock puts it “we need to isolate the influence of  
the former (A) on the latter (the outcome C) along the direct path. We can do this by ʻfreezingʼ 
the  indirect  path.  That  is,  when we hold the value of  B fixed  at  its  actual  value  of  0,  the  
counterfactual dependence of C upon A is restored.”13 Leaving further technicalities aside, this 
strategy amounts to consider the counterfactual “if Alice had not put poisoned the drink, and 
Backup (still) did not put poison in the coffee, then victim would not have died.” Intuitively, this 
counterfactual is true, and the related causal network is self-contained; we can thus conclude 
that, consistently with our intuitions, Alice did harm the victim. Systematic “freezing” in cases 
of preemption requires some further technical moves that I do not spell out here in details. Note  
that, as I anticipated in Chapter 1, accommodating for preemption require us to refine the model  
introducing aspects that are context-sensitive, like the distinction between direct and indirect 
causal paths.
This sophisticated model, Hitchcock concedes, is not itself immune to counterexamples: there 
are  in  fact  even more complex  preemption  scenarios  where  our  intuitions  about  an agent's 
causing an outcome are not captured by the counterfactual model.14 It is beyond the scope of this 
section  to  dwell  on  these  further  difficulties.  In  summary,  preemption  remains  so  far  not 
completely  resolved  in  structural  equation  frameworks,  despite  the  freezing  strategy 
successfully accounts for most simple cases. Regarding more complex ones, I suggest that the 
self-contained  model  can  bite  the  bullet,  and  still  serve  as  an  adequate  framework  of  the 
doing/allowing distinction, in the light of its advantages, which I examine in 2.4.2.
2.4.2 Deviant, default, and norms 
Hitchcock's model, I argue, possesses adequate tools to assess the different causal impact of acts 
and omissions, and to discriminate between real and false omissions, and thus may capture our 
doing/allowing  classifications.  The  model  also  makes  explicit,  in  the  identification  of  the 
13 Ibidem, p. 520.
14 For one of these examples, see p. 520. 
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deviant or default value of a variable, the role of presuppositions and expectations about what is 
“normal” in laying the ground for evaluating the agent's impact on the outcome. As Hitchcock 
argues,  in  some  cases  such  as  Dropping  the  cigarette,  the  default  value  may  be  set  by 
“objective” or factual features of the context: there usually is oxygen in the atmosphere, and 
thus  the  default  value  for  this  variable  is  1.  Arguably,  however,  in  cases  involving  human 
agency, the definition of “normal” rather relies on a set of social expectations, including moral 
principles, obligations, standard rules of conduct and so on. While Hitchcock does not further 
analyse the process at work in the identification of the deviant/default value of the variables, I  
think  that  norm-based  accounts  can  shed  light  on  this  mechanism,  providing  some  helpful 
indications and criteria. In this sense, I suggest that norm-based considerations help “set the 
scene”, in selecting, by the means of fixing the deviant/default value, which conducts amount to 
normal  behaviours,  standard  explanations  or  background  conditions  versus actual  causes. 
Ultimately, counterfactual analysis delivers an assessment of the agent's causal impact on the 
upshot,  by  the  means  of  identifying  relations  of  counterfactual  dependence.  The  persistent 
intuition  that  the  way  an  agent  brought  about  an  outcome  (act/omission)  matters  to  the 
doing/allowing distinction is thus captured in counterfactual terms; the insight that what counts 
as  “normal”  influences  this  classification is  captured by the norm-based  considerations  that 
perform the groundwork. 
Let's now discuss in more detail how these norm-based considerations help in setting the value 
of variables. An appropriate norm-based account, as I argued in section 2.1, should be broadly 
construed to account for more stringent obligations, such as rights violations, as well as less 
stringent rules of conduct, such as keeping promises. Kagan's norm violation proposal, in this 
sense,  seems  to  offer  a  suitable  framework,  as  it  can  incorporate  the  whole  set  of  social  
expectations which can influence our doing/allowing evaluations. Any specific description of a 
succession of events, of a choice problem or of a social interaction, commonly encodes and 
incorporates an understanding of how events should naturally occur, what is expected from the  
agent in such circumstances and which rules and behaviours are appropriate to the context. Note 
that, as I will argue at length in the following chapters of this study, some cases are nonetheless 
under-described; in these examples, it might then be indeterminate what is the normal course of  
events,  and different  people  might  have different  expectations about  what  is more likely to 
happen. Similarly, some examples may be under-described in yet another respect: it is not clear 
which are  the  relevant  moral  principles  or  rules  we hold each other  to  in  a  given  context.  
Ultimately, many of these empirical expectations or moral considerations may possibly apply in 
a given case. However, when evaluating a specific case, only a subset of moral principles, social  
expectations or common explanations will  stand out  as relevant or  salient  to a given agent. 
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Finally, people might also have different moral convictions and beliefs: they might thus agree 
on which norms are relevant in a given but disagree on their relative importance, and on which 
behaviour is, all-things-considered, more appropriate. 
Let's start  testing this hypothesis with some of the cases discussed in these chapters.  In the 
Neighbour example, what stands out is plausibly the expectation that the person who makes a 
promise should keep it.  In Quinn's trolley case, what seems more relevant is the fact that a  
person has a negative right not to be run over, or a non-intrusion claim over her body, and thus  
the agent ought not to violate them. Similarly, a doctor has the deontological duty to perform 
life-saving treatments; reasonable prudential reasons require that I check my house appliances; 
the breaking of something, like a window, must usually be explained by an external interfering 
force,  such my throwing a rock;  the standard explanation for the occurrence of fire  is  that 
something inflammable reacts with the oxygen in the atmosphere;  the expected result  for a  
rock's slipping down the hill is that it continues to slip, and so on. Once the commonly expected 
or agreed upon conduct or succession of events is set, the variable describing the conduct, or 
event, at issue takes the default value if it complies with these standard expectations and more 
or less stringent obligations or rules. On the other hand, if the conduct violates one of these 
rules,  or  a  phenomenon  does  not  occur  according  to  the  standard  explanation  or  natural 
succession of events, the variable describing it takes the deviant value.
This interpretation of norm-violation as a way for setting deviant and default variables in turn 
allows  the  classification  of  a  behaviour  as  a  doing  or  an  allowing  (or  neither).  In  the 
Neighbour/Queen of England example, my neighbour seemingly violated the standard rule of 
behaviour of keeping one's promises; this consideration explains why the variable describing 
her conduct takes the deviant value 0 in the related causal network model, since, as noted above, 
expectations set the default value as 1, that is, the neighbour waters my flowers. Furthermore, 
the default value for the variable describing the flowers dying is 1, as the standard or expected 
succession of events is for flowers to “naturally” die, unless someone waters them. The standard 
expectation regarding the Queen's conduct, or other random agents', is that they just go on with 
their normal life without watering someone else's flowers: in this sense, the Queen watering my 
flowers would amount to an extremely abnormal behaviour on her part, and thus B takes the 
default value 0. Once the values are set, Hitchcock's analysis delivers the following verdict: C 
counterfactually depends upon A, since had the neighbour not watered my flowers, they would 
have died; the causal network is non-self-contained, since the outcome C sometimes takes its 
deviant value (the flowers live) when all its parents take their default one (the neighbour waters 
the flowers and the Queen does not). The relation between B and C is again of counterfactual 
dependence in a non-self contained network, but C takes here its default value. According to my 
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suggested  interpretation of  these  results,  my neighbour's  negligence classifies  as  a  causally 
relevant  omission,  and  thus  as“allowing”,  while  the  Queen's  action  classifies  as  a  false 
omission, and thus not as “allowing”; this description, seemingly, matches our intuitions about 
the cases. 
This  model  may  successfully  accounts  for  most  of  our  attributions  of  allowing,  such  as 
negligence, refusing to aid or refraining. These are cases where the agent's conduct seemingly 
violates  some  kind  of  normal  expectation  or  standard  explanation  which  is  salient  for  the 
situation or interaction at issue, and thus the relative value takes its deviant value, but the impact 
of the agent is perceived as an omission, as the upshot was somehow going to occur anyway. On 
the other hand, norm violations we perceive as doings may have the structure of counterfactual 
dependence in a self-contained network. Eventually, capturing Kagan's intuition, conducts that  
do not amount to violation of norms, or alterations in the standard course of events, will be often 
defined as neither doings nor allowings. 
This  interpretation  of  Hitchcock's  model,  of  course,  leaves  room for  disagreements  in  our  
doing/allowing classifications.  As I  argued above,  individuals  can reasonably have different  
empirical or moral expectations, depending on which course of events or rule of behaviour they 
pick as salient. Moreover, as I will discuss in Chapter 4, doing/allowing classifications may as  
well vary across descriptions. Different “framings” of the apparently same situation or decision 
problem can trigger the perception of different norms as salient, or explanations as standard, and 
thus define a behaviour as compliance or violation, or a variable as a background condition 
rather  than  a  “real”  cause.  These  different  expectations,  in  turn,  will  deliver  different 
doing/allowing classifications. Eventually, interpersonal disagreement can reflect actual moral 
disagreement. In Kagan's Respirator example (p. 73), one's moral beliefs about the legitimacy of 
euthanasia  may  influence  the  assignment  of  default  values  in  the  relevant  causal  network 
framework, thus inducing a different doing/allowing classification depending on the agent who 
makes the judgement. I will discuss this example in detail in 5.3.2.
Note too that, in my interpretation of doing/allowing in the the self-contained network model, 
the “explanation” does not run very deep. Some may argue that, in fact, we are simply putting 
our intuitive understanding of what counts as doing and what counts as allowing in the value 
assignment to variables. I am willing to concede this point. For the time being, I have simply 
argued that this model seems to adequately describe our use of the doing/allowing distinction. 
In  the  next  chapters,  I  will  elaborate  on  these  observations.  Ultimately,  I  will  argue  that 
accounting for disagreement and context-dependency of doing/allowing classifications amounts 
to an explanatory advantage of the self-contained network model. Moreover, I will suggest that 
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this model, rather than being “circular”, may help shed light on which normative features the 
doing/allowing distinction incorporates.
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3. The strategy of “fully-equalized cases”
This  chapter,  together  with  Chapter  4,  sets  out  to  isolate  the  question  of  whether  the 
doing/allowing distinction amounts to a morally relevant one. One way to do this, which has 
been widely employed in the literature, is to look for cases where there seems to be general 
agreement about the characterisation of actions as doing vs allowing, and consider intuitions in 
these cases about whether the distinction matters morally. I explore here a promising strategy 
for doing such a test in a controlled manner: the strategy of comparing “fully-equalized cases”.
First, in 3.1, I outline two main positions one could take with respect to the moral relevance of  
the doing/allowing distinction, which I call the “positive” and the “negative” theses. In 3.2., I 
introduce three examples of fully-equalized cases, and discuss people's responses to them. In 
3.3,  I  argue  that  pervasive  disagreement,  which  is  a  characteristic  of  discussion  on  fully-
equalized cases, does not seem to amount to evidence in favour of the positive or the negative  
thesis.
In  this  chapter,  I  also  argue  that  when  we  try  to  control  for  all  other  factors  apart  from  
doing/allowing, the examples discussed in the literature become fuzzy, artificial and confusing. 
Specifically, I claim that when we try to achieve fully-equalized cases, the agreement over how 
to draw a line between the two different types of conduct and, more importantly, the agreement 
over whether this distinction is morally relevant  might start  to look more tenuous.  In some 
examples of fully-equalized cases, disputes about whether the distinction matters morally are 
intimately tied up with disputes about how to classify actions as doing vs allowing in the first 
place.  Other  examples,  in  the  attempt  to  separate  doing/allowing  from,  for  instance,  the 
intending/foreseeing distinction, end up being extremely contrived, such that intuitions about 
these examples do not seem reliable. As a result, I conclude that moral reasoning over fully-
equalized cases is not a good guide to moral truths. Anecdotal evidence and some problematic 
features of empirical surveys in this field (3.3.3) also suggest that the underlying rationale of the 
fully-equalized cases  strategy – disentangling the doing/allowing distinction from any other 
morally relevant feature of the context – might prove unfeasible. 
3.1 The question of moral relevance
In the previous chapters, I outlined and compared alternative accounts of the doing/allowing 
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distinction, assessing their success in distinguishing between doing and allowing behaviours. 
The focus of this task, in short, was to identify which framework is descriptively adequate for 
capturing our intuitive and everyday use of the distinction. My interpretation of Hitchcock's  
model, I argued, best fits the way we distinguish between doing versus allowing behaviours.
While the issue of the descriptive adequacy of moral categories is an interesting analysis per se, 
its traditional role in moral philosophy is that of a preliminary enquiry and necessary tool for  
dealing with the more significant question of moral relevance. This point is particularly true 
when it comes to the doing/allowing distinction. As I argued in Chapter 1, the principle that 
“doing  harm is  morally  worse than  allowing it  to  occur”  strikes  us  as  uncontroversial  and 
obvious in very many cases. In moral philosophy, this principle has been famously defended by, 
among others, Frances Kamm (1996) and, more recently, Fiona Woollard. As Woollard (2015)1 
puts it, in fact, it seems that: 
“If there is no moral difference between doing and allowing, then morality must either be far 
more permissive than we generally suppose – permitting us to kill to protect our personal 
projects – or far more demanding – requiring constant sacrifice from us to save the lives of  
others”.
Despite the persistence and reasonableness of this intuition, however, there is still disagreement  
in the literature over the  true moral relevance of the doing/allowing distinction, once we get 
down to the details. Opponents of this principle,  that doing harm is worse than allowing it, such 
as Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2008), James Rachels (1975), Shelly Kagan (1989) and Jonathan 
Bennett (1995), claim that the mere fact that a behaviour is an instance of doing, and another is 
an instance of allowing, is not morally relevant in judging the former to be worse than the latter, 
offering a wide range of counterarguments.2 
In this chapter, I will argue that the failure of the strategy of fully-equalized cases seems to show 
that the separation between the descriptive question and the question about moral relevance 
might be harder to achieve that one might hope. This conclusion, while not necessarily ruling 
out  the position that  the doing/allowing distinction is  morally  relevant,  might  challenge the 
1 Fiona Woollard (2015) pp. 17–20.
2 Recall that, in this study, I discuss the issue of the moral relevance of the doing/allowing distinction 
referring  to the distinction between doing  harm (or  doing something bad) and allowing  harm (or 
allowing something bad to happen). Of course, the moral relevance of doing/allowing could also be 
discussed by referring to doing good/allowing something good to happen, and to the moral principle  
that  “doing  good is  morally  better/preferable/more  praiseworthy  than  allowing the  same  good to 
occur”.  The  first  interpretation,  however,  is  far  more  discussed  in  the  literature;  it  is  not 
straightforward, moreover, that these two moral principles should be simply treated as symmetrical. In 
this sense, “doing good is better than allowing it” would require a separate and specific analysis. In 
the  remainder  of  this  thesis,  therefore,  whenever  I  talk  about  the  moral  significance  of  the 
doing/allowing distinction, I refer to the “harm” interpretation.
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apparently intuitive idea that  doing and allowing are  morally  significant  features  per se.  In 
chapter 4, I will continue this task and focus on what I perceive to be the second main challenge 
to the moral relevance of the doing/allowing distinction: frame-dependency.
In this chapter,  I  do not survey all  of the different accounts which have been upheld in the 
literature,  both  by  advocates  and  opponents  of  the  moral  relevance  of  the  doing/allowing 
distinction, but rather I outline two main positions, with respect to whether doing and allowing 
amount to morally relevant features.
I  summarize  the  two main  positions  concerning  the  moral  relevance  of  the  doing/allowing 
distinction as follows:
Positive thesis: there is a fact of the matter whether a behaviour is an instance of doing 
rather than allowing; this distinction is morally relevant as, all other things being equal, 
a “doing” behaviour is morally worse than an “allowing” behaviour.
Negative thesis: there might, or might not, be a fact of the matter whether a behaviour 
is an instance of doing rather than allowing. Whichever the case, this distinction is not 
morally relevant for assessing the relative moral value of actions.
Let's clarify the implications of the positive and negative theses, as I formulate them above.3 
First,  note that,  the way the positive  thesis is  characterised,  there could still  be room for a  
“doing-harm” behaviour to be morally  preferable to an “allowing-harm” behaviour,  if  other 
considerations are more significant in the moral evaluation of cases. In other words, the positive 
thesis does not require that doing harm is always morally worse than allowing a harm to occur, 
independently of any other consideration; the thesis rather makes the much more limited claim 
that this distinction is morally relevant. Secondly, my loose formulation of the negative thesis 
does not differentiate between positions which deny that doing and allowing behaviours can be 
descriptively distinguished,  and accounts  which allow for this  empirical  distinction but  still 
argue that it is not morally significant. Either way, the negative thesis, so formulated, states that 
the doing/allowing distinction has no distinct role in assessing the moral value of actions.
It  is  also  worth  clarifying  the  relationship  between  a)  descriptive  frameworks  of  the 
doing/allowing distinction, which may be more or less adequate in capturing our everyday use 
of these classifications, and b) different accounts of the moral relevance of the distinction. As I 
argued  in  Chapter  2,  my  proposal  is  that  a  “mixed”  account,  like  Hitchcock's,  can  quite  
successfully track our doing/allowing attributions in most scenarios. This conclusion, however, 
is  not  necessarily  evidence  in  favour  of  the  position  that  the  doing/allowing  distinction  is 
3 This characterisation of the positive and the negative theses does not refer to any particular framework 
or account of the doing/allowing distinction.
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morally relevant  per se, or even that there is a fact of the matter whether there are “correct” 
doing/allowing  characterisations.  The  self-contained  network  model,  in  this  sense,  merely 
accounts for our ordinary  use and intuitions about the distinction.  In this chapter, I will thus 
assume that the descriptive problem has been solved. Therefore a background assumption is that 
doing/allowing is best cashed out in terms of Hitchcock's model, but in fact, the arguments in 
the chapter do not make reference to this model. 
Here, in particular, I outline and discuss a common strategy, employed by both the supporters of 
the positive and negative theses, for assessing whether the doing/allowing distinction is morally 
significant per se, once all other features of the behaviours at issue are controlled for . In 3.2 I 
simply describe the strategy, including key examples in the literature and responses to these 
examples. In 3.3,  I will then turn to a more in-depth analysis of the viability of the strategy.
3.2 Discussing fully-equalized cases
First,  I  should  address  a  naïve  line  of  argument  against  the  positive  thesis.  Compare,  for 
instance, our moral judgements in the two following actions: Killing an assailant in self-defence 
and  Refusing to rescue a person tied to a track. Reasonably, most people would classify the 
former action as an instance of doing harm, and the latter as merely allowing a harm to occur, as  
it boils down to refraining from untying the person. There is no disagreement, in short, over the  
factual  description  of  the  two  behaviours.  Nonetheless,  contrary  to  what  supporters  of  the 
positive thesis claim, most agents also argue that the latter is morally worse than the former, or,  
more specifically,  that  Killing an assailant would be morally permissible,  while leaving the 
person tied would be morally wrong. This, apparently, violates the intuition that “doing is worse 
than allowing”. 
Clearly, however, this counterexample is extremely naïve and does not effectively challenge the 
positive thesis: for doing and allowing to amount to morally relevant features, it need not be the 
case that all instances of doing harm are worse than all instances of allowing harm, no matter  
the circumstances. This point is true for many other moral principles. While conceding that, for  
instance, loyalty is morally better than disloyalty, we can grant that committing a murder for the  
sake of loyalty is, all things considered, morally bad. In other words, the positive thesis only 
claims that “doing harm is worse than allowing it” all other things being equal. For the “doing” 
and “allowing” characterisations to be morally significant, therefore, we do not need to prove 
that  they  alone  and univocally  determine  our  moral  judgements  in  all  cases.  In  Killing  an 
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assailant vs Refusing to rescue the tied person, for instance, other moral considerations, like the 
right to defend oneself and the duty to rescue, play a larger role in the evaluation of cases.
In short, it can be argued that Killing an assailant and Refusing to rescue are  vastly different 
cases, and that their comparison is  not a reliable indicator of the role of the doing/allowing 
distinction  in  moral  judgements.  Too  many  independent  considerations  affect  the  relative 
assessment  of  these  behaviours. If  we  seek  to  analyse  the  specific  import  and  role  of  the 
doing/allowing distinction,  therefore,  we  must  make  sure  that  only  and exactly  this feature 
decides our relative moral evaluation of cases. To have strong evidence in favour of the positive 
thesis and against the negative thesis, therefore, we need to show that when two cases share all 
the morally relevant features, and only differ in the fact that one is an instance of doing a harm, 
while the other amounts to allowing the harm to occur, the former is judged as morally worse  
than the latter.
What has just been described amounts to the strategy of so-called “fully-equalized cases”. This  
strategy has been employed and defended, among others, by Jeff McMahan (2013), who argues 
that this amounts to an epistemically reliable method to test our moral intuitions, “filter(ing) out  
irrelevant  details  which  could  distract  and  confuse  them,  thereby  allowing  us  to  focus  on 
precisely those considerations that we wish to test for moral significance.”.4
Note that the strategy of fully-equalized cases seems to require a consensus on what actually 
amounts to fully-equalized cases. I will examine this issue more thoroughly in 3.3. For the  
remainder of 3.2, I put this question aside and describe three influential examples of (allegedly) 
fully-equalized cases. Specifically, I first describe such cases (3.2.1)  and discuss responses in 
these examples (3.2.2).
3.2.1 Candidate fully-equalized cases
In this section, I describe three influential examples of fully-equalized cases: the Smith/Jones 
example  by  Rachels  (1975),  Thomson's  (1986)  trolley  examples,  and  the  active/passive 
euthanasia case.
The Smith/Jones example
The first, most influential, pair of examples is from Rachels (1975, pp. 78–80), who describes 
4 McMahan (2013), p. 9.
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the two following (allegedly) fully-equalized cases: 
Smith (doing harm). Smith drowns his cousin in the bathtub in order to inherit a large 
sum of money. 
Jones (allowing harm). Jones, motivated by the same intention and with the same plan 
in mind, finds his cousin already drowning in the bathtub and refrains from saving him,  
watching him die. 
The two cases, Rachels argues, are identical except for the fact that one is commonly classified  
as doing a harm, while the other can be thought of as an instance of allowing a harm. This  
classification clearly complies with most descriptive frameworks discussed in Chapters 1 and 2.  
He  then  claims  that  Smith's  and  Jones's  behaviours  are  morally  equivalent,  and  that, 
consequently, “doing” is no worse than “allowing”, when we get rid of all other distinguishing 
factors. He argues that the reason this distinction is thought of as morally relevant is that cases 
of doing harm are usually “crueller”, or more callous, due to other features that set them apart 
from allowings, which are properly controlled for in this example.5 
Specifically, Rachels' case seems well-controlled because both Smith and Jones have the same 
intention when entering the bathroom: to kill their respective cousins. I will come back later (in 
3.2.2) to the question of whether we can really control for intentions; for the moment, I just note 
here that both Smith and Jones desire as the outcome of their action the death of their cousin. 
This is the goal both individuals' conduct aims at, rather than the death of the cousin being a 
(more or less regrettable) side effect of their acting.  This is a particularly clever aspect of the 
example,  since  most  cases  of  allowing harm are  effectively  cases  of  foreseeing rather  than 
intending harm in the sense just alluded to. Roughly, I am foreseeing a harm when I can expect 
or reckon it to be a side-effect of my acting, but the real aim of my action is a distinct and 
separate one.6 For instance, when Refraining from rescuing the tied-up person, which is a clear-
cut case of allowing, we might think that killing that person is not within the realm of the agent's 
aims and goals, and so the harm done is not intended. In Rachel's case, however, the “allowing” 
behaviour is arguably motivated by the same intentions as the “doing” behaviour.
The trolley example(s)
Philippa Foot (1978) and Judith Jarvis Thomson (1986) provide a second influential model of 
5 Rachels (1975), p. 16.
6 In the present chapter, I will only talk about intentions in an informal way, appealing to our intuitive  
understanding of this notion. In Chapter 6, I will discuss the intending/foreseeing distinction more 
thoroughly.
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the strategy, comparing two fully-equalized cases involving the choice between the death of one 
or five innocent people. To be clear, neither Foot nor Thomson define theses examples as fully 
equalized cases, but rather use them as a way to argue for or against the permissibility of killing. 
In doing so, however, the doing/allowing distinction also seems to become relevant, and for this 
reason trolley cases are often discussed in relation to the debate. As it will emerge from my 
discussion here and in chapter 6, I do not think trolley cases pose a threat to most accounts of  
the doing/allowing distinction. The reason why I discuss trolley cases here is that some pairs of 
trolley cases could be (in my view, wrongly) described as equalized cases, which only differ in 
the fact that one compares doing with doing (or allowing with allowing) and the other doing 
with allowing.
To place trolley cases in the literature, Foot argues that doing harm (or, using her terminology, 
killing) is worse than allowing harm (or letting die) because killing one person is worse than  
letting five die, and people would choose the former over the latter. On the other hand, if we had 
to choose between killing one and killing five (or letting one die and letting five die), we might  
choose the action which minimizes the number of deaths.7 
Thomson challenges this view by arguing, on the contrary, that we can build two fully-equalized 
cases (again, this terminology is not Thomson's), both involving the choice between killing one 
and letting five die, where our intuitions about the permissibility of killing one change. If this 
were the case, we would have a case against the intuition that, all  other things being equal, 
killing (doing) is worse than letting die (allowing). To do so, Thomson compares different cases. 
I focus here on Fat Man versus Bystander.
Fat Man: 
“you are standing on a footbridge over a trolley track. You can see a trolley hurtling  
down the track, out of control. You turn around to see where the trolley is headed, and 
there are five workmen on the track where it exits from under the footbridge. What to 
do? Being an expert on trolleys, you know of one certain way to stop an out-of-control 
trolley: Drop a really heavy weight in its path. But where to find one? It just so happens 
that standing next to you on the footbridge is a fat man, a really fat man. He is leaning 
over the railing, watching the trolley; all you have to do is to give him a little shove, and 
7 To illustrate this point, Foot uses herself a Trolley case, which is identical to Thomson's Bystander, but 
it is the driver who chooses between switch and don't switch. Trolley is then compared with Riot: you 
can either execute an innocent man (killing), or let  five men die in the riot which will inevitably  
follow if you don't execute the one man. Foot then argues that, in Trolley, both Switch and Don't 
Switch, if performed by the driver, amount to killing. While it will be impermissible to execute in 
Riot, it seems permissible to switch in Trolley. Therefore, Foot concludes, agents are appealing to the 
principle “killing is worse than letting die”, as they would minimize the number of deaths only if that 
does not require choosing the “doing” conduct when the “allowing” conduct is available.
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over the railing he will go, onto the track in the path of the trolley.”8
According to Thomson, in Fat Man, the available options are:
Push (doing harm). Push the innocent fat man and stop the trolley.
Do nothing (allowing harm). Let the trolley run over five innocent workmen.
Thomson argues that, in this case, it is impermissible to Push, so it seems that killing one is  
morally worse than letting five die.
In Bystander, Thomson describes a different trolley scenario:
The trolley is running towards five track workmen. There is  a spur of track leading off 
to the right. On the spur of the track there is another workman. You are a bystander  
observing the situation, and you could throw the switch, thus turning the trolley.
Here, Thomson argues that the two options are characterised as follows: 
Don't switch (allowing harm). Let the trolley continue along its track and run over five 
innocent people.
Switch (doing harm). Pull the switch and turn the trolley which runs over one innocent 
person.
Here,  Thomson argues that  it  is  permissible to turn the trolley, and thus,  killing one is  not 
morally worse than letting five die.
The two cases,  according  to Thomson,  are  identical  in  all  respects,  as they both involve a 
comparison between doing harm to one and allowing harm to five.  Contra Foot,  however, 
Thomson concludes that people do not seem to appeal to a moral difference between doing and  
allowing, as this would not explain people's different intuitions in these two cases. Arguably, we 
would  need  to  appeal  to  other  features  of  the  two  cases  so  as  to  justify  different  moral  
judgements. For instance, it could be argued that the agent's intentions in Fat Man are not the  
same as in Bystander. It is true that, in both cases, the ultimate goal is to save the five workmen;  
nonetheless, at least according to some accounts of intentionality, we might say that when one  
throws the switch one is merely foreseeing the death of the person on the spur of the track,  
while when one pushes a man onto the track one intends the death of the man – even if this is a 
means to save five. I will come back to this issue in 3.3 and, more thoroughly, in Chapter 6 of  
this thesis.
Also note that it is at least controversial whether, in Bystander, Switch is an instance of doing  
harm. On Foot's account, for instance, both Switch and Don't Switch amount to allowing, as 
8 Thomson (1986), p. 1409.
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neither of them involves initiating or sustaining a harmful sequence. Among others, Rickless 
(1997) also argues in this direction. Again, I will discuss this lack of consensus in 3.3.
The active/passive euthanasia example
The debate  over the permissibility  of euthanasia  often revolves around the comparison and 
relative evaluation of different medical practices in end-of-life situations. The standard way9 of 
distinguishing between and legislating on euthanasia practices, in legal  codes,  bioethics and 
common discourse thus usually draws a line between so-called: 
Active euthanasia (doing). Behaviours like administering a lethal injection.
Passive  euthanasia  (allowing).  Behaviours  like  refusing  to  provide  life-sustaining 
treatments, switching off of life-supporting machines and so on.
This distinction seemingly tracks people's, including medical professionals', persistent intuition 
that injecting a lethal drug into a dying and suffering patient would amount to killing her (doing 
harm), while merely denying treatment, or even “unplugging the machine”, should be classified 
as  letting  die  (allowing  harm).  In  both  situations,  however,  the  intentions  of  the  doctor 
performing the practice are to bring about the death of the patient so as to end her pain and 
suffering;  moreover,  we  may assume that  both behaviours  are  equally  effective in  bringing 
about  the  outcome of  the  death of  the  patient.  Thus,  these  two cases  are  apparently  fully-
equalized, such that the only difference is that one is a doing and the other an allowing. If we do 
perceive the two actions to be morally distinguishable, therefore, this seems to be evidence in 
favour of the positive thesis. 
3.2.2 Responses to the fully-equalized cases
In  this  section,  I  briefly  discuss  responses  to  the  three  fully-equalized  cases  above,  to  see  
whether these examples provide strong evidence in favour of either the positive or the negative 
thesis. I conclude that none of them does, as there is no shared intuition in these cases. This  
persistent disagreement gives us reason to examine whether these cases are actually controlled,  
and, if they are, whether controlled cases are indeed a reliable test for our intuitions over the 
moral relevance of the doing/allowing distinction.
In  Smith/Jones,  Rachels argues that ultimately the “doing” and the “allowing” conducts are 
9 NHS, https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/euthanasia-and-assisted-suicide/. 
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morally  equivalent.  Contrary  to  this  intuition,  however,  it  can  be  argued  that  it  is  at  least  
disputable that Smith's action is not, all things considered, worse that Jones's. In criminal law,  
for example, Smith would surely be regarded as guiltier  than Jones.  Frances Kamm (2007)  
further argues that the two cases are not intuitively equivalent, as we could not impose the same 
losses on Smith and Jones,  if  those losses were necessary to bring the cousin back to life:  
specifically, she claims that it would be permissible to shoot Smith, but not Jones, if this would  
be necessary to bring the cousin back.10 
The  trolley  cases,  even  more ostensibly,  are  the  subject  of  ongoing debate.  It  is  extremely 
controversial whether it would be permissible to Switch in Bystander, as well as whether Switch 
amounts to doing harm or allowing harm. Ultimately, disagreement is also the trademark of the 
active/passive euthanasia debate. On the one hand, this distinction, which arguably tracks the 
doing/allowing  dichotomy,  and  thus  different  ways  of  being  relevant  to  the  harm,  is  often 
intuitively recognized and employed for legislative purposes. On the other hand, many scholars 
argue that the two conducts are morally equivalent and the active/passive distinction is tenuous,  
irrelevant or obscure.11 Here, again, we thus seem to see disagreement over the moral relevance 
of the doing/allowing distinction.
In all three examples, the most evident result seems, therefore, to be an overall and persisting  
lack of consensus  – both in the literature and in people's intuitive responses –12 regarding the 
assessment of otherwise equalized cases. The idea that we can remove all confounding factors, 
and then see whether doing and allowing behaviours are, or are not, morally equivalent is thus 
at least controversial.  However, some might still consider the disagreement as some evidence 
for the positive/negative thesis. At first sight, the lack of consensus could be seen as bad news 
for the positive thesis. After all, if doing and allowing were morally significant characteristics, it 
should be expected that, when properly isolated, their contribution would strike most people and 
authors as clear-cut and straightforward, thus leading to a smaller number of “deviations” and a  
more robust agreement across individuals. 
This, however, would be a premature conclusion. In fact, the lack of consensus may equally be  
used  by  advocates  of  the  positive  thesis  to  argue  that  there  is  at  least  some  resistance  to 
assimilating doing and allowing behaviours, thus challenging the negative thesis. 
It seems, therefore that little can be concluded from the fully-equalized cases strategy. Lack of 
consensus and persistent disagreement could in fact be symptomatic of a number of things. It 
10 Kamm (2007), p. 17.
11 Some  notable  examples  in  moral  philosophy  are  Rachels  (1975),  Dworkin,  Nagel,  Kamm  and 
Thomson (1997), who discuss the matter thoroughly in “The Philosophers' Brief”.
12 For some experimental surveys, testing subjects' intuitions in different trolley cases, see Petrinovich, 
O’Neill and Jorgensen (1993); Greene et al. (2001), Greene (2015).
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could be that the doing/allowing distinction does not matter morally, or that it does matter but 
there is disagreement over the analysis or detection of a doing versus an allowing conduct.  In 
the  next  section,  I  examine  more  closely  the  nature  and  the  reasons  for  this  persistent 
disagreement.  My conclusion is rather negative:  the strategy of fully-equalized cases  is  not 
successful in illuminating moral reasoning.
3.3 Problems with the strategy
The fully-equalized cases strategy, as I argued in 3.2, has some undeniable merits and seemingly 
amounts to a promising tool for isolating the role of the doing/allowing distinction in our moral 
evaluations. My contention, however, is that  the idea of eliciting reliable intuitions regarding 
fully-equalized cases with respect to the doing/allowing distinction is ultimately untenable.  I 
argue that, in general, one of two problems arise. First, fully-equalized cases cannot be actually 
achieved, whether because not all factors are controlled for (trolley examples), or because in  
controlling  for  other  factors,  we  also  lose  consensus  over  factual  doing/allowing 
characterisations  (trolley  and  euthanasia).  The  second  problem  is  that  even  though  fully-
equalized  cases  are  actually  achieved,  they come at  the cost  of  the examples  becoming so  
contrived and confusing that they compromise intuitions (Smith/Jones example). In this section, 
I will discuss how these problems inevitably arise in the process of trying to equalize cases with  
respect  to  doing/allowing.  I  start  with  equalizing  consequences  (3.3.1),  which  is  relatively 
straightforward. Things start to unravel, however, when we try to equalize for intentions (3.3.2). 
In 3.3.3, I conclude with some remarks on the methodology of testing people's responses to 
fully-equalized cases.
3.3.1 Controlling for consequences
First of all, it is worth examining more carefully what Rachels, Foot, and Thomson, mean by 
“equalized cases”, with respect to the doing/allowing distinction. In particular, we can formulate 
this question as: what particular moral features do they think must be controlled for? The first of 
these features is the impact or seriousness of  consequences; the  “harm” brought about by the 
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compared actions must be equivalent.
What we need to clear from the picture is the fact that, in the majority of cases, behaviours 
which are classified as “doing harm” have worse consequences than behaviours we commonly 
describe as “allowing”. Generally, it can be argued that, if I drown a person (a typical case of 
doing harm), the outcome of my action will almost certainly be her death, while if I refrain from 
giving money to a beggar (a typical case of allowing harm), the chances that she will eventually 
die are much lower. Generally speaking, it is frequently observed that cases in which I merely  
fail to provide aid involve far less serious expected consequences than cases where I bring about 
a  harm  or,  in  other  words,  it  may  appear  that  “allowing”  behaviours  merely  raises  the 
probability of harmful consequences occurring, while the “doing” actions bring them about for 
sure, or at least the weaker claim: the probability of harm in the doing cases is higher than in the  
allowing cases.13 
This  consideration,  to  be  sure,  could  initially  raise  some  questions  over  the  stance  of  the 
doing/allowing distinction. It could be claimed that there is nothing more to the doing/allowing 
distinction than the fact that instances of “doing” have worse consequences than instances of  
“allowing”. It is not difficult, however, to come up with examples where allowing behaviours 
have  no  better  outcomes  than  doing  behaviours.  For  instance,  the  outcome  of  the  action 
“drowning a person” (doing harm), is equivalent to the outcome of the action “refraining from 
saving a person from drowning” (allowing harm), when nobody else could possibly perform the 
rescue, and where the conditions are such that the person is virtually certain to die unless aided. 
When we equalize outcomes, we see that the doing/allowing distinction does not simply amount 
to the relative seriousness or probability of negative consequences. 
Furthermore, consequences-equalized cases, such as the Drowning vs Rescuing example, do not 
appear  particularly unrealistic  or  artificial.  Indeed,  there  are  quite natural  cases  which even 
reverse the usual pattern of (likelihood of) bad consequences, such that the allowing behaviour 
has worse consequences than the doing behaviour. This is true of the trolley examples discussed 
above. If the cases are equalized in all other ways, this can be useful for making the relative  
badness of doing,  per se, more pronounced  ‒  it is bad enough to outweigh the consequences 
being more benign. But there is a worry that trolley cases are not equalized in other ways with 
respect to intentions, as I briefly mentioned in 3.3.1, and as I discuss in more detail  in the 
section below.
13 Causal accounts taking the general counterfactual form “E causes F iff had E not occurred, F would 
have been less likely” could for instance draw a line based on “likelihood” of harmful consequences  
occurring. 
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3.3.2 Can we really control for intentions?
In this section, I show that the problems of the strategy of fully-equalized cases start when we 
try to control for intentions. I discuss this claim by examining each of the three cases in turn. I 
start  with  the  Smith/Jones  case,  which  is  the  one  which  seeks  to  equalize  intentions  more 
straightforwardly. 
The Smith/Jones example
The  Smith/Jones  example  not  only  equalizes  consequences,  but  appears  to  also  equalize 
intentions. In fact, Rachels makes a point of this. He argues that the intentions of Smith and 
Jones must also be the same – killing the cousin in order to inherit – if we want to assess our 
intuitions  about  doing  and  allowing  only.  Rachels'  worry  here  is  to  make  sure  that  the 
doing/allowing distinction does not overlap with another widely recognized dichotomy in moral 
theory, the one between intending and foreseeing. This is not the place here to discuss this moral 
categorization at length; I thus stick to an intuitive understanding of what counts as intending 
harm. The intending/foreseeing  distinction clearly strikes us as  morally relevant:  intuitively, 
intending a harm seems morally worse than merely foreseeing it. Furthermore, this principle 
appears to have such fundamental moral significance that it could be questioned whether the 
doing/allowing  distinction  actually  amounts  to  a  separate  and  independent  moral 
characterisation.14 In many cases, such as Drowning vs Rescuing, these two distinctions seem, in 
fact, to collapse. The consequences of not aiding a person drowning (allowing) and drowning a  
person (doing) may indeed be the same, that is, a dead person, but while in the former case our 
actions can be described as merely foreseeing the harm our action brings about, in the latter the 
action can be described as intending this harm directly. We could argue,  therefore,  that  the  
reason why drowning seems much worse than not rescuing captures this aspect, rather than the 
doing/allowing distinction.  
The Smith/Jones example seems to do a better job, and the relative simplicity of this pair of  
cases seems to be good news. Nonetheless, as I argued in 3.2.1, what should be concluded from 
the Smith/Jones case is controversial. While Rachels, Sunstein (2003) and other authors argue 
14 In Chapter 6 of this thesis, I will discuss in detail the relationship between the doing/allowing and the  
intending/foreseeing distinction. I will argue that the two distinctions do not overlap, but doing harm 
may capture,  in  some specific  circumstances,  our  judgements  on whether  the agent  intended the 
outcome. For the moment, however, I will simply assume that the two distinctions are separate, whilst  
illustrating the difficulties in disentangling the two.  
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that  Jones's  behaviour is no better  than Smith's,  Trammell  (1975, 1979) and, more recently,  
Kamm, claim that Smith's behaviour is more objectionable. I argue that the lack of consensus 
may be caused by two distinct reasons. On one hand, there might be substantial disagreement 
over the fact  that  doing and allowing amount to morally relevant  features  of actions, when 
outcomes and intentions are controlled for. If this were the case, the Smith/Jones example could 
actually amount to a test of either the positive or the negative thesis. Unfortunately, this test  
does not seem to produce the agreement one would hope for. My contention, however, is that 
disagreement may also depend on the fact that this scenario is particularly difficult, and puts us 
in a cognitively stressful situation, in which it is reasonable to expect that people's intuitions are  
not very clear-cut and precise. 
To see this point, let's focus on Jones's story. In this example, Jones has a specific goal in mind,  
that is, the death of his cousin, and a precise plan to achieve his goal, that is, drowning the  
cousin in the bathtub. We find out that, for what seems to be an extremely lucky – at least for 
Jones – coincidence, the plan is already unfolding: the cousin is drowning by chance without 
him doing the drowning. This turn in the story, I think, makes this scenario very contrived and 
confusing. While we experience luck and coincidence in our everyday lives, it also seems that in 
this case luck plays a crucial part  – after all, it is by mere chance that Jones does not end up 
doing harm! I conclude that testing people's reactions in this particularly tricky and artificial 
case might not provoke intuitions which are reliable, or, most importantly, which can be easily 
generalized to more familiar cases.
In summary, the Smith/Jones example seems indeed to control for intentions. Nonetheless, there 
is by no means agreement over whether Smith's behaviour is worse than Jones's. Moreover, 
equalizing intentions appears to create here a contrived case.
The active/passive euthanasia example
This example also seems to successfully equalize for intentions – in both the active and the 
passive case, the intention is to bring about the death of the patient, thus ending pain. In fact, it  
has been suggested (Rachels 1975) that the Smith/Jones example – which seems indeed fully-
equalized  –  is  exactly  equivalent  to  the  active/passive  euthanasia  case.  Nonetheless  it  is  
controversial  whether active euthanasia is indeed morally worse than passive euthanasia,  or 
whether the two classes of practices are morally equivalent.  I  argue here that,  in this case,  
contrary  to  my original  assumption  throughout  this  chapter,  disagreement  over  whether  the 
doing/allowing distinction matters morally is ultimately tied up with disagreement over where 
to draw the line between doing and allowing. Hence, the descriptive problem and the moral 
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relevance problem may be harder to separate than one might hope.
My claim is  that  people  could  disagree in  the  first  place on whether  one  specific  medical  
practice, such as disconnecting a feeding tube, removing a respirator, or even administering a 
lethal injection, amounts to an instance of killing (doing harm) or letting die (allowing harm). 
This descriptive disagreement cannot be put aside when examining whether doing is worse than 
allowing. I have suggested that the descriptive question of how to distinguish “doing” from 
“allowing” behaviours can be solved by appealing to a suitable causal model such as the self-
contained network account.  Nonetheless,  there still  seem to be “borderline” cases  in which  
doing/allowing classifications might be ambiguous. This hypothesis will be the central claim of 
Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. For the moment, note that the euthanasia example differs in at 
least one respect from the Smith/Jones case: while the cousin in Smith/Jones is alive and well,  
and would not die if he did not drown in the bathtub, the practices under investigation here  
apply to end-of-life situations.15 We might thus think that, within a reasonably short period of 
time, the patient would die anyway. The doctor's conduct, in this sense, seems to hasten death,  
which will inevitably (and arguably soon) occur. To be sure, the doctor is somehow relevant to 
death of the patient, and often seems to perform a specific practice, and this is ultimately the  
reason  why  we  talk  about  this  example  in  relation  to  the  doing/allowing  distinction. 
Nonetheless, when it comes to evaluating the type of impact the doctor had on the death of the 
patient, it looks like our answers could be different depending on which specific description of 
the outcome we use. Specifically, if the outcome is broadly described as “death of the patient”,  
we  could  think  that  the  doctor  had  an  impact  on  how  the  death  was  brought  about,  but 
ultimately he “did not” cause the outcome. On the other hand, if the outcome is described as  
“death at specific time t, in this specific way”, we could legitimately argue that the doctor “did” 
cause the outcome. In Chapter 5, I suggest a more thorough analysis of this example using the 
self-contained network model. Even prior to formal analysis, however, both classifications seem 
tenable and justifiable.16
If my hypothesis is correct, then in the euthanasia case we would have two cases which are 
actually fully-equalized, but where the characterisation of one conduct as doing and the other as  
allowing is not uncontroversial or straightforward. Therefore, this example does not amount to 
reliable  evidence  in  favour  of  either  the  positive  or  the  negative  thesis.  Even  worse,  this  
example  would  show  that  the  task  of  investigating  the  question  of  moral  relevance 
15 This is, of course, a simplification, as we could also speak of euthanasia in situations where the patient  
is not terminally ill. Here, for the sake of the argument, I exclude this case. 
16 This  disagreement  seems  to  be  supported  by  empirical  results.  Cushman,  Knobe  and  Sinnott-
Armstrong (2008),  for  instance,  performed  a  survey  with  borderline  euthanasia  examples,  asking 
subjects to classify them as doings or allowings. The results show a significant disagreement over the  
correct characterisations (even prior to the authors' introduction of “morally ambiguous” descriptions).
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independently of the descriptive problem is ultimately unsuccessful, at least in borderline cases. 
The trolley example
Let's finally examine the nature of disagreement in the trolley examples, and see whether they  
actually control for intentions. Unlike the two previous cases, it is controversial here that Fat  
Man and Bystander are properly equalized. As I briefly mentioned above, one might argue that 
Push, as opposed to Do Nothing, Switch, and Don't Switch, cannot count as merely foreseeing 
harm since it amounts to using a person as a means to an end. This difference could explain our 
intuitions that Push is not permissible, as opposed to Switch. If this were the case, the Fat Man 
vs Bystander  case  would  thus  simply  not  control  for  intentions,  at  least  within  some 
interpretations of intending/foreseeing.
For the sake of the discussion, let's nonetheless assume that all four conducts are instances of 
foreseeing the death of one person, as a side-effect of saving five. First, as Thomson (2008) has 
recently argued, it is at least controversial that, in Bystander, Switch is permissible. Second, it is 
also controversial  whether Switch counts as doing or allowing.  After  all,  one might  say,  in 
contrast to Foot and Thomson, it is the trolley which ultimately runs over the one person. Again, 
if  this  were the case,  we would not  have evidence in favour  of the positive  thesis nor the 
negative  thesis.  Like  for  the  euthanasia  examples,  the  conclusion  would  thus  be  that  what 
looked to be straightforward cases in terms of classifying actions as doing/allowing, are not so 
on closer inspection. Finally, I still think that the trolley cases do not adequately isolate the 
import of the doing/allowing distinction, and thus cannot serve as a test for its moral relevance, 
even if we grant that intentions are properly controlled. Note that the trolley cases have the 
structure of “moral  dilemmas”;  that  is,  it  looks as if none of the options is  clearly morally 
required, yet agents are forced to make a choice.17 Agents, in short, are being asked how far they 
would go (or, more precisely, how far they think it is permissible to go) in order to save five 
people. Among all the different considerations they could ponder, there is also the fact that the 
options might differ in terms of doing/allowing classifications. What we are ultimately testing 
here, in conclusion, would be the import of the doing/allowing distinction on such evaluation. I 
think  this  amounts  to  a  very  convoluted  way  to  test  for  the  moral  relevance  of  the 
doing/allowing distinction.
In conclusion, none of the examples discussed in 3.2 seems to provide a decisive case in favour  
of either the positive or the negative thesis. To start with, it is controversial whether the trolley  
17 Thomson  (1986)  makes  this  point  arguing  that  in  trolley  cases  most  people  would  answer,  for  
instance, that Switch is, all things considered, permissible. 
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cases  adequately control  for intentions.  Even if  they do so,  in trolley  cases  and euthanasia 
examples, there is further controversy over the factual characterisations of behaviours as doings 
or allowings. This observation gives us reason to be sceptical that,  at  least for “borderline”  
cases,  we  can  successfully  keep  the  factual  and  the  moral  issues  apart.  Finally,  in  the 
Smith/Jones  case,  which seems actually  fully-equalized,  there is  still  disagreement over  the 
equivalence of the doing and the allowing behaviours.  In  the next  and final  section,  I  will  
further explore my earlier remarks about the difficulty and artificiality of fully-equalized cases.
3.3.3 Testing intuitions in fully-equalized cases
From my survey above, two hypotheses remain open with respect to the source and nature of 
disagreement  in  fully-equalized  cases.  It  could  be  the  case  that  the  controversy  reflects 
substantial disagreement over whether doing is worse than allowing, that is, between supporters 
of the negative and the positive theses. However, disagreement could also point to the fact that  
this strategy is not particularly adequate in eliciting our moral intuitions. In this last section, I  
discuss  some remarks  in  favour  of  the  latter  option.  To be  clear,  I  still  think  that  the  two 
hypotheses can be true at the same time; I, thus, just emphasize here the importance of the latter.
Firstly,  when  presented  with  Rachels-style  examples,  it  is  not  uncommon to  find  a  strong 
tendency from individuals of various and disparate backgrounds to refuse even to engage with 
these exercises, as well as a reluctance to provide decisive answers. I observed these kinds of  
responses  and  attitudes  to  be  almost  equally  predominant  among  philosophy-educated 
subjects.18 Most students in my classes, fellow researchers and people from different fields made 
explicit  their  discomfort  in  thinking  about  Smith/Jones,  and  looked  doubtful  about  the 
possibility of reaching a reasonable and meaningful resolution. This persistent reaction seems to 
reflect my contention that the attempt to achieve fully-equalized cases appears to disable our  
moral  intuitions  and  to  challenge  the  common  strategies  we  standardly  employ  in  moral 
reasoning. 
These  kinds  of  common reaction  that  I  witnessed  while  researching  this  topic  lead  me  to 
question  the  role  that  empirical  surveys  play  in  this  debate.  After  all,  anecdotal  evidence  
amounts to a low-probative type of empirical finding, and more structured experimental results  
18 I would like to thank for this paragraph all my fellow PhD colleagues, who were thoroughly and 
repeatedly surveyed on these cases. I am also grateful to my audience at King's College Graduate  
workshops.
70
over fully-equalized cases are available in the literature. I think, however, most experimental  
settings  may  not  adequately  test  for  the  moral  relevance  of  the  doing/allowing distinction;  
specifically, I argue, they do not help to illuminate whether empirical disagreement actually 
points to substantial controversy over the moral relevance of the distinction or rather to the fact  
that  fully-equalized  cases  appear  puzzling and artificial,  challenging  subjects'  intuitions  and 
reasoning skills.
But what would it actually take to test these for these two hypotheses? A way to do so would be  
to  systematically  keep  track  of  the  kinds  of  reactions  expressed  above  (refusal  to  engage,  
confusion), and to ask subjects to motivate their answers. Experimental surveys, however, do 
not always include as available options “I do not know”, or “I do not think I can meaningfully  
solve  this  task”.19 When  they  do  so,  the  prevalence  of  these  answers  is  not  specifically 
investigated. Greene et al. (2009), for instance, test different trolley cases, and simply exclude 
from analysis subject “who reported being unable/unwilling to suspend disbelief (31). (...) as  
well as data from 10 subjects reporting confusion.”20 Note that the survey was performed on 664 
subjects, so people who did not engage are more than 6% of the total. What would be helpful, 
moreover, would be also reporting qualitative evidence about  how individuals perform their 
value judgements, or their reaction to the task. Some notable exceptions, such as Jou, Shanteau 
and Harris (1996) seem to provide evidence in favour of my claim. Jou, Shanteau and Harris 
(1996), for instance, tested for “reciprocal answers”. They asked subjects to motivate and justify 
their  response  to  evaluative  questions,  and  reported  that  these  justifications  are  often 
inconsistent, showing an underlying lack of understanding of the scenarios.21 
It is not my place here to discuss or criticize the methodology of such experimental surveys. I  
just  note  that  the  status  of  the  experimental  literature  does  seem to adequately  answer  the 
question of the source of empirical disagreement in fully-equalized cases. There are reasons to 
speculate,  however,  that  more qualitative  experimental  settings,  as  well  as  investigating  the 
prevalence and motivations of people resisting the task, may provide further support for the 
claim  that  most  people  do  find  these  scenarios  confusing,  and  that  we  should  thus  start 
questioning whether the whole strategy is cognitively and psychologically meaningful.
Trammell  (1975,  1979),  in  his  defence  of  the  moral  relevance  of  the  killing/letting  die 
distinction,  makes some similar  remarks.  The case he discusses was introduced by Michael 
19 See, for instance, Barry, Lindauer and Øverland (2014), or Osman (2015).
20 Greene et al. (2009), p. 184.
21 Specifically,  there  is  a  significant  number  of  “reciprocal  answers”.  In  an  experimental  setting 
involving the choice between two “fully-equalized” options, Jou, Shanteau and Harris (1996, p. 5)  
define “reciprocal answers” as justifications for one's choice which make explicit reference to the  
other option, by providing a rationale which could be equally applied for justifying  both options. 
According to the authors, this result proves that agents are confused about the cases. 
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Tooley in 1972, and is identical in all respects to Smith/Jones. The author also argues that the 
lucky  coincidence,  and  the  fact  that  Jones  cynically  and  satisfactorily  observes  his  cousin 
drowning “have a ʽmaskingʼ or ʽsledgehammerʼ effect, which makes it difficult to evaluate the  
significance of the distinction.”22 Nonetheless, “The fact that one cannot distinguish the taste of 
two wines when both are mixed with green persimmon juice, does not imply that there is no 
distinction between the wines.” Similarly to my argument,  Trammell  claims that  comparing 
fully-equalized  cases  can  be  extremely  misleading,  as  it  artificially  pulls  apart  aspects  of  
behaviours which, although distinguishable in principle, usually come together in our “practical 
moral life”.23
In summary, it is reasonable to think that disagreement over fully-equalized cases depends, at 
least to some extent, on the fact that these scenarios are particularly difficult, unfamiliar and 
“unnatural”. As a result, our moral intuitions over these cases do not seem particularly reliable  
as a test for the relevance of the doing/allowing distinction.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that, while comparing fully-equalized cases seems, in principle, a  
useful  tool  for  testing  the  positive  and  the  negative  theses  regarding  the  relevance  of  the 
doing/allowing distinction, the most influential examples of this strategy do not live up to this  
promise. In the active/passive euthanasia and in trolley examples, the comparison of allegedly 
equalized  cases  appears  to  generate  further  disagreement  over  the  correct  classification  of 
conducts,  which  cannot  be  easily  separated  from  the  issue  of  the  moral  relevance  of  the 
distinction. In this sense, this case seems to challenge the assumption that we can separate this 
latter question from the descriptive task of drawing a line between doing and allowing.
Furthermore, trolley cases amount to particularly difficult moral dilemmas, which are arguably 
too  extreme  and  far  from ordinary  to  count  as  reliable  instances  of  moral  intuitions.  The 
Smith/Jones case, which seems to be adequately controlled, may also appear confusing and 
artificial. 
The result of this survey leaves us with with the problem of explaining the pervasive lack of 
consensus. First, lack of consensus does not seem to be evidence in favour of either the positive 
or  the  negative  thesis.  Moreover,  my  suggestion  is  that  the  underlying  strategy  of  fully-
equalized cases, which assumes that we can actually disentangle this distinction from all other 
22 Trammell (1975).
23 Ibidem, p.132.
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morally relevant features of the context, might ultimately prove unfeasible. 
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4. Moral Framing  
This chapter continues examining the issue of whether the doing/allowing distinction is morally 
relevant by considering the import of framing effects. First, I briefly describe what we refer to,  
in psychology and behavioural decision theory, as framing effects (4.1). In particular, I show 
how they seem to affect our doing/allowing classifications of apparently equivalent conducts. 
These  results,  arguably,  raise  some  problematic  questions  for  the  reliability  of  our  moral 
intuitions in general, and, more specifically, seem to challenge the positive thesis, that is, the  
claim that doing and allowing characterisations amount to morally significant features. 
I  appeal  to an influential  example in the moral  literature,  the “Asian flu” case,  in order  to  
examine in detail how empirical evidence regarding the persistence of framing effects impacts 
the  positive  and  negative  theses  (4.2).  On  the  one  hand,  it  could  be  argued,  following 
deflationist proposals such as Tamara Horowitz's and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong's, that framing 
effects prove that the doing/allowing distinction, under closer scrutiny, collapses into reasoning 
biases, such as the loss/no gain effect or the endowment effect. This interpretation thus seems to 
negate the positive thesis (4.3). A second position, upheld, among others, by Frances Kamm, 
claims instead that framing effects do not really affect the doing/allowing distinction once we  
examine  these  cases  more  thoroughly  and control  for  cognitive  biases.  This  conclusion  is, 
therefore, compatible with the positive thesis, as it suggests that there could be a “correct” and 
morally relevant characterisation of doing and allowing that agents might fail to track in some 
specific situations (4.4). 
In 4.5 I argue for third hypothesis: contra Horowitz and Sinnott-Armstrong, the doing/allowing 
distinction  does  not  collapse  into  reasoning  biases  or  behavioural  effects  described  in  the 
literature;  contra Kamm,  however,  the  doing/allowing  distinction  may  still  be  subject  to 
framing. This hypothesis, while not ruling out the positive thesis completely, seems to further 
challenge the idea that we can meaningfully disentangle the doing/allowing distinction  from 
other descriptive and normative features of the context, and further suggests that doing/allowing 
classifications might ultimately be ambiguous.
4.1 Framing effects
A “framing effect” is generally said to occur when two descriptions of apparently equivalent 
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decision problems induce systematically different responses and decisions.1 This widespread 
phenomenon in choice contexts has been widely investigated in behavioural psychology and 
decision theory, following the seminal 1979 paper by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, and 
has been gathering strong empirical support. “Framing effects” can be caused by a variety of 
reasoning biases. Levin, Schneider and Gaeth (1998) report an exhaustive list of framing effects 
documented in medical decisions, bargaining settings, responses to moral dilemmas or in courts.  
In particular, Levin et al. suggest that framing effects can be classified according to  what  is 
being framed, and they distinguish between  attribute framing,  risky choice framing and  goal 
framing. While I do not necessarily agree that these three categories are mutually exclusive or 
jointly  exhaustive,  they  are  arguably  a  useful  tool  for  illustrating  the  most  influential  and 
investigated cases of framing effects.
Attribute framing refers to cases  where an attribute or property of an object  or  an event is 
described  in terms of either its positive qualities or its negative qualities, yet it can be easily 
inferred that  the  overall  qualities  are  in  each case the  same.  Empirical  findings report  that 
objects or events that are positively described are usually evaluated more favourably, or chosen 
over the negatively described objects. A typical example of this phenomenon is the preference 
for a product described as “25% lean” over a product described as “75% fat”.
Risky choice framing refers to cases of describing options in terms of probabilities of achieving 
gains or losses. The different options are usually equivalent with respect to expected monetary 
value, but one amounts to a sure outcome while the other is a risky prospect/involves a gamble.  
The sure outcome and the gamble are “both described  either in terms of gain outcomes and 
probabilities or else in terms of equivalent loss outcomes and probabilities”.2 Typically, agents 
tend to value more favourably or choose the sure outcome, and to have different risk attitudes 
with respect to outcomes depending on whether they are described in terms of probable gains or 
probable  losses.  These  effects  have  been  extensively  examined  and  attributed  to  different 
features of human cognition, such as risk aversion, uncertainty aversion, status quo bias, loss  
aversion, endowment effect and so on. The main example I will appeal to in  this chapter, the 
“Asian flu” case, is usually thought of as falling into this category.3
Finally, in  goal framing,  an activity is either described in terms of either the advantages of 
undertaking it  or  the disadvantages of  not  undertaking it,  and agents  are reported to prefer 
engaging when the latter are emphasized. This effect has been empirically observed in decision 
making about  insurance  policies,  or  in  eliciting consensus  on  the criminalisation  of  certain 
1 Sher and McKenzie (2008), p. 1.
2 Ibidem, p. 2.
3 I do not necessarily  stand by this characterisation as,  arguably, the “Asian flu” case shares  some 
relevant properties with all of these three classes of framing effects. 
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health or safety measures, such as wearing seatbelts.
Framing effects, as this brief summary shows, seem to amount to prevalent phenomena in many 
choice situations. As Shafir and LeBoeuf (2002) argue, framing effects are also conceived, in 
the standard narrative, as threatening and challenging to the traditional “rational actor model” 
and, in general, to the adequacy, reliability and rationality of human cognitive processes. It is  
not my place here to engage in what Shafir and LeBoeuf define as the “rationality debate”, but I  
simply note that, as Kahneman and Tversky observe, these kinds of preference patterns and 
decision  behaviours  seemingly  violate  the  tenets  of  classical  expected  utility  theory. 
Specifically, Kahneman and Tversky argue that framing effects are particularly problematic for 
the  normative  condition  of  description  invariance,  which  requires  that  the  same  decision 
problem, in terms of expected utility, must be evaluated in the same way by any rational agent.  
Without dealing with further technical details, description invariance seems to have an intuitive 
appeal; arguably, there is something wrong with preferences being subject to framing effects, 
something  that  could  lead  us  to  question  the  adequacy  of  our  reasoning  processes,  and  to 
wonder whether they are reliable or rather in need of correction.
4.1.1 Framing doings and allowings
Let us now narrow the focus to the doing/allowing distinction. Cases of framing in this respect 
are the ones that involve moral evaluations of options, and where these moral evaluations seem 
to be affected by how a given conduct is described and presented to the agent. Specifically, I  
examine here the issue of whether framing effects can induce a different classification of the  
same action as an instance of doing rather than allowing, and different moral judgements of 
actions so perceived. If this were the case, we would then need to discuss the bearing of this 
phenomenon on the moral relevance of the doing/allowing distinction.  Indeed, in the present 
section, I discuss how framing effects would bear on the positive  versus the negative thesis, 
according  to  Horgan  and  Timmon's  model  of  moral  normativity  and  Sinnott-Armstrong's 
“master argument”. I also note, however, that supporters of the positive thesis could still argue 
that framing effects simply point to flaws in our moral reasoning.
Cases where our attributions of doing and allowing seem to be dependent on how the context is  
framed  have  been  discussed  by  advocates  of  the  negative  thesis,  such  as  Walter  Sinnott-
Armstrong and Shelly Kagan. Even without referring to framing effects in particular, Kagan 
(1989, p. 101) makes exactly this point when he asks the reader to compare the two following 
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examples:
My rival is going to win a prize, which would be automatically awarded to me if she  
were to die. Incidentally, my rival lies in a comatose state in the hospital, kept alive by a 
life-sustaining machine.  I  sneak  into  the  hospital  and  unplug the machine,  bringing 
about the death of my rival so as to win the prize. 
A doctor, after consulting with the parents and following the standard legal procedures,  
unplugs the machine that is keeping a comatose young boy alive. 
In  both  cases,  Kagan  argues,  the  conduct  is  exactly  the  same,  that  is,  unplugging  a  life-
sustaining machine; the outcome is also the same, the death of the patient, and the action is 
arguably performed so as to bring about the patient's death. Nonetheless, the different context  
our respective conducts  is  put  into induces a different description of my behaviour and the 
doctor's:  while  the  former  action  is  usually  described  as  “killing”  my  rival,  the  latter  is  
perceived as “letting the boy die”, and the latter is evaluated more favourably than the former. 
Another common example is the comparison between refusing to give money to a starving  
beggar  and  starving  one's  baby  to  death:  again,  while  the  two  actions  are  seemingly 
extensionally equivalent, most people tend to agree on the characterisation within the former 
frame as allowing a harm, but change their classification in the second frame, describing the 
conduct as “harming one's baby” (doing harm).
The significance of these examples of alleged framing effects, however, has been criticized by 
supporters of the positive thesis. Arguably, in Kagan's example, despite the conduct “unplugging 
the machine” being identical in both cases and amounting to the same way of bringing about a 
harm, the two scenarios seem to describe two different moral problems. Rather than a mere 
change of “frame”,  indeed,  we are confronted here with two vastly different  narratives and 
scenarios, and it is doubtful whether they could be effectively conceived of as “equivalent”. The 
background norms in this pair of cases are obviously different. The selected doing/allowing 
account I discuss in Chapter 2 thus equips us with adequate tools to explain why these two 
conducts amount to “doing” and “allowing” respectively. In this section, therefore, I sideline 
these cases where norms play an obvious role, and I focus on less “moralised” examples, which 
appear to be ultimately instances where the doing/allowing distinction is subject to framing.4
The more straightforward cases refer to experimental settings where agents are faced with the 
same decision problem ‒ in terms of outcomes and actions ‒ which is simply described using 
different words, or where the order of sentences is changed. Petrinovich and O'Neill (1995), for 
4 In Chapters  5  and 6 of  this  thesis,  I  will  argue  that  norms do,  in  fact,  play a  role,  even in  less 
“obviously”  moralised  cases.  In  the  present  chapter,  however,  I  strive  to  avoid  at  least  the  most  
straightforward examples in this respect.  
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instance, analysed people's responses to a trolley case where they are asked to identify with the  
bystander who could either let the trolley follow its track and run over five people or throw the  
switch so that the trolley goes to a side track, running over one person (that is, the problem 
described in  Bystander). Respondents were asked to evaluate the two conducts on a 6-point 
scale from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. In one group, the options in the trolley case 
were described using the word “kill”  ‒ throw the switch and kill one person or let the trolley 
stay on track and kill  five  ‒ while the second group worked with questionnaires where the 
options were described as “saving” ‒ turn the trolley and save five persons or do nothing and 
save  one.  Empirical  surveys  reported  that  agents  were  “likely  to  agree  more  strongly  with 
almost any statement worded as Save than one worded as Kill”.5 Specifically, people were more 
likely to agree, and agreed more strongly, that throwing the switch was permissible, and morally 
preferable, when this conduct was characterised as Saving. While people still judged that it was 
permissible to Switch, it seems that they felt more comfortable with and sure of their decisions 
when the wording was stated in terms of “allowing”.
Sinnott-Armstrong (2008) surveys other similar experimental settings; specifically, he argues 
that empirical data seems to show that moral judgements can also depend on other framing 
effects besides wording, such as the order in which the examples are presented to the reader. 6 In 
another questionnaire by Petrinovich and O'Neill, for instance, the Bystander case was put in a  
list together with two other examples, and the agents were again asked to evaluate these cases. 
The other examples are the following “scan case”:
The only way to save five dying persons is to scan the brain of a healthy individual, thus 
killing that innocent person.
And the “transplant case”:
The only way to save five people is to transplant organs from a healthy person, thus  
killing that innocent person. 
All of the options were always described using the “saving” wording this time (“save” five 
people by killing one), but were presented to different groups of participants in a different order.  
The authors reported that answers did change dramatically, and, specifically, for Switch in the 
trolley case, “people more strongly approved of action (throwing the switch) when it appeared 
last in the sequence than when it appeared first”.7 This conclusion seems to indicate that the 
comparison  with “similar”  but  morally  worse  scenarios  affects  how people  judge the same 
action “throwing the switch”. In particular, the transplant case and the scan case appear to be 
5 Petrinovich and O'Neill (1995), p. 149.
6 Ibidem, p. 152.
7 Ibidem, p. 155.
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more clear-cut  instances  of  doing harm,  and thus are  more likely to be considered morally  
impermissible, even compared with the possibility of saving lives. Switch tends to be seen in a 
less favourable “doing” light when evaluated independently of (before) the obviously worse 
doing cases,  and in a more favourable  “allowing” light  when evaluated after  the obviously 
worse doing cases.8  
4.1.2 Framing and the reliability of moral intuitions
The findings above seem to point to the fact that, when asked to morally evaluate conducts that 
are  apparently  equivalent,  both  our  characterisations  of  behaviours  as  doings  rather  than 
allowings and/or our judgements about  the relative  blameworthiness of  these cases  may be 
affected by framing effects, such as the use of specific words or the order in which cases are  
presented. But are framing effects problematic? Intuitively, it is quite discomforting to realize 
that our moral judgements depend on seemingly morally irrelevant features, such as the mere 
use  of  the  word  “killing”  rather  than  “saving”  or  of  equivalent,  but  differently  phrased, 
probabilistic  information.  As  Kahneman  and  Tversky  explain  for  non-moral  cases,  some 
normative feature  of  our  reasoning appears  to be violated  by the shift  in value judgements  
framing effects bring about; similarly, for moral cases, this violation seems to point to some 
inconsistency in our moral reasoning processes. 
Horgan and Timmons (2009), specifically, argue that framing effects threaten what they define 
as “moral normativity”, that is, 
“the  fact  that  the  principle  should  connect  descriptive  features  to  moral-normative 
features in such a way that for any potential circumstance C, all true moral-normative 
statements about C (e.g., statements about what would be morally just in C, what would 
be morally  obligatory in  C,  what  would be morally  wrong in C,  etc.)  are  logically  
entailed  by  a  conjunction  of  (i)  a  sufficiently  detailed  characterization  of  C  in 
descriptive, non-normative, terms and (ii) the sought-for principles”.9 
This requirement, which amounts to a specific kind of internal consistency, would seem to be 
openly  violated  when  framing  effects  are  at  work.  Two  extensionally  equivalent  decision 
problems can, indeed, be described as the same circumstance C, thus fixing (i). We then add to 
C all the morally relevant principles, thus fixing (ii). However, the result of this process is two 
8 This is not surprising in light of my discussion in Chapter 3: whether Switch in Bystander amount to 
doing or allowing seems at least controversial.
9 Horgan and Timmons (2009), p. 26.
79
different  moral  evaluations  of  C.  This  result  is,  clearly,  problematic  insofar  as  these 
moral/normative  statements  are  not  logically  entailed  by  the conjunction  of  the  descriptive 
features of the moral dilemma (i) and the exhaustive “set” of moral principles we employ (ii). 
Horgan  and  Timmons  thus  conclude  that  framing  effects  show  some  kind  of  flaw  or 
inconsistency  in  our  moral  reasoning.  The  subsequent  question  for  Horgan  and  Timmons 
concerns what kind of cognitive processes are at play when we make moral judgements, given 
that  the  straightforward  model  provided  above  fails  to  capture  the  connection  between 
descriptive features, fixed moral principles and resulting moral judgements.
In this chapter, I narrowly focus on whether and how framing effects could impact the negative 
and the positive theses regarding the moral significance of doing and allowing. At first sight, the 
pervasiveness  of  framing  effects  in  our  doing  and  allowing  characterisations  could  be 
interpreted as bad news for the positive thesis.10 After all, if the way we employ this distinction 
is unstable, and relies heavily on seemingly “irrelevant features”, which can be manipulated  
through framing, the claim that this dichotomy holds some intrinsic moral relevance appears to 
be seriously undermined, as per Horgan and Timmon's analysis. The positive thesis regarding 
the doing/allowing distinction, in fact, at least partially relies on intuitions about examples, and 
these intuitions are assumed to be reliable. Specifically, the positive thesis is grounded in the 
strong intuitive appeal of the principle “doing is worse than allowing”, and in the fact that we 
persistently  employ  it  in  real  life. Framing  effects,  as  Sinnott-Armstrong  (2005)  puts  it, 
nonetheless appear to question whether these moral intuitions are justifiable at all. 
Sinnott-Armstrong11 provides further details as to why framing effects undermine evidence from 
intuitions about both the doing/allowing distinction and its moral relevance. The general process 
we use to justify  a certain belief,  Sinnott-Armstrong claims,  is  in fact  a  kind of  inferential 
confirmation: in other words, we show the circumstances “whose denial undermines it”, and 
then show that the belief was not formed under such circumstances. Suppose, for example, that I 
believe my mother will arrive at Heathrow at 5pm, because she told me so yesterday. In this 
case, the justification for my belief appeals to the general reliability of the process of basing my 
credence on this empirical evidence. Imagine now that I realise that yesterday I took a potent 
hallucinogenic drug. These circumstances, of course, undermine my belief that my mother will 
arrive  at  Heathrow  at  5pm,  because  the  process  of  forming  beliefs  under  the  effect  of 
hallucinogenic drugs is not generally reliable; the evidence that I took the drug, therefore, stands 
10 Of  course,  this  investigation  is  meaningful  only  insofar  as  there  are  real  examples  where  our 
doing/allowing characterisations are subject to framing. The trolley example above seems to amount 
to a convincing example of frame-dependency. The most straightforward example in this respect,  
however, is arguably the “Asian flu” case, which I discuss later in this chapter. 
11 I refer here to Sinnott-Armstrong's discussion outlined in “Framing Moral Intuitions”, pp. 48‒58. 
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as a  defeater  for my belief. The fact that I took the drug, in other words, denies the general  
circumstances  under  which  my  belief  would  be  justified.  Certainly,  I  could  still  provide 
justification for my belief by appealing to other sources: I could call  my father, asking him 
whether my mother will arrive at  Heathrow, or I could go to the airport at  5pm and check 
whether my mother is there. The evidence that my beliefs are formed using unreliable processes, 
however,  requires  a  separate  justification  for  those  beliefs.  To  sum up,  Sinnott-Armstrong 
claims that an adequate justification for my belief amounts to showing that some circumstances 
that  would undermine it  do not  occur.  If,  on the other  hand,  the agent  is  aware that  these 
defeating  circumstances  are  in  place,  the  belief  needs  to  be  supported  by  additional 
justifications. 
Applying this  framework to  our  moral  intuitions,  Sinnott-Armstrong sets  out  the  following 
“master  argument”:  “if  our  moral  intuitions are  formed under  circumstances  which  are  not 
reliable (...), then our moral intuitions are not justified without further confirmation”.12 In the 
case of the doing/allowing distinction, the persistence of framing effects seems to show that our 
intuitive classifications and judgements are formed under unreliable circumstances, and that the 
general process we use to perform such judgements is thus itself unreliable. In the trolley case,  
for instance, evidence that changing the wording from “killing” to “saving” induces a shift in 
people's responses is a defeater for the moral intuitions serving as evidence one may have about 
either of the cases. This may seem to support the negative thesis ‒ that doing/allowing is not a 
morally relevant distinction, if a proper distinction at all.
This sceptical position, though reasonable, can still be challenged by supporters of the positive 
thesis.  While framing effects show that  our moral judgements and intuitions are not  always 
reliable  and consistent,  it  could  be argued that  there  is  still  a  fact  of  the  matter  whether  a 
conduct is an instance of doing rather than allowing, and that this characterisation of conduct is 
morally significant per se. Framing effects could just be evidence of the fact that our first-hand 
intuitions and moral evaluations are not (always) to be trusted, and that we should be more 
careful when appealing to them in our theoretical efforts to make sense of the doing/allowing 
distinction. Roughly, the fact that in some cases our moral reasoning can be swayed by framing  
does not prove that we could not build an adequate account of the doing/allowing distinction, 
relying on the “correct” kind of intuitions. Going back to Sinnott-Armstrong's master argument, 
supporters of the positive thesis could still argue that our intuition that “doing harm is worse  
than allowing it” could be backed up by other external justifications, such as some particularly 
trustworthy and strong intuitions, analogous to calling my dad in the Heathrow example.
12 Ibidem, p. 52.
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In the following sections, I examine the classic “Asian flu” case. As a convincing example of  
framing effects,  I  use  it  to  outline  different  hypotheses  and explanations  of  the  bearing  of 
framing  on  the  moral  significance  of  the  doing/allowing  distinction.  In  4.2,  I  show  how 
Kahneman and Tversky's experimental results are commonly described in terms of the so-called 
“loss/no gain effect”. I then examine how these results can be explained by both deflationist  
(4.3) and non-deflationist (4.4) hypotheses. The former accounts for evidence of framing effects 
in a way which is consistent with the negative thesis, while the latter does so in a way that is  
consistent with the positive thesis. I conclude that a hybrid hypothesis remains open (4.5).
4.2 The “Asian flu” case
In  their  1983  paper  “Choices,  Values  and  Frames”,  Daniel  Kahneman  and  Amos  Tversky 
introduce the concept of a decision frame and outline the tenets of Prospect Theory, which they 
regard as a model of how agents actually choose. By way of supporting their proposal, they 
report and analyse different empirical results, among which is the famous “Asian flu” case. This 
experimental setting divides the subjects into two groups; the first is faced with the following  
dilemma:
Your city is threatened by an “Asian flu” that is expected to kill 600 people, and you 
have to make a choice between these two alternative vaccination programs:
• If Program A is adopted, 200 out of the 600 people will be saved.
• If Program B is adopted, there is a 2/3 probability that no-one will be saved and 
1/3 probability that all 600 people will be saved. 
Which program would you choose?
The second group was faced with the very same scenario, but the choice was instead between C 
and D:
• If Program C is adopted, 400  out of the 600  people will die.
• If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that no one will die and a 2/3  
probability that 600 people will die.
A and C, like B and D, are clearly extensionally equivalent with respect to lives saved, and  
describe the same vaccination program: “200 people will be saved and 400 will die” (A and C)  
and “there  is  1/3 probability that  600 people  will  be  saved and no one will  die  and a  2/3  
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probability that no one will be saved and 600 people will die” (B and D). Therefore, we could 
reasonably expect that the percentage of people opting for A and C (or for B and D) would be  
similar in the first and second groups. Nonetheless, experimental findings showed that 72% of 
subjects in the first group chose Program A but, in the second group, 78% of subjects chose 
Program D.
Kahneman and Tversky use the Asian flu case, together with five other experimental settings, as  
representative examples of how decision frames affect agents' behaviours. By a decision frame, 
the authors mean “the decision-maker's  conception of the acts,  outcomes, and contingencies 
associated with a particular choice”13. As “the frame that a decision-maker adopts is controlled 
partly  by  the  formulation  of  the  problem  and  partly  by  the  norms,  habits,  and  personal 
characteristics  of  the  decision-maker”14,  the  same decision problem will  often  have several 
decision  frames,  even  for  the  same  decision  maker  (thus  holding  fixed  the  personal 
characteristics and changing only the formulation). In particular,  in the Asian flu case,  they 
argue that the two different decision frames do not involve different factual descriptions of the  
world, but rather assume a different reference point as the baseline.
By way of elaboration: according to standard expected utility theory, the change in a decision 
frame, or, more specifically, a change in the reference point, should be irrelevant to the choice  
of a course of action. Kahneman and Tversky, however, point out that agents do not seem to  
choose this way: specifically, they do change their behaviour depending on the decision frame,  
as the “Asian flu” case clearly illustrates. This violates consistency norms rational decisions 
should supposedly conform to, as the two frames are, with respect to standard decision theory, 
two descriptions of situations that are identical in all relevant aspects.
Let's now see in detail how reframing supposedly explains preference reversal in the “Asian flu” 
case. Kahneman and Tversky argue that 1) the reference point matters for choice behaviour and 
2) people are generally more risk seeking when it comes to avoiding sure losses from a given 
baseline, and more risk averse when it comes to pursuing gains from a given reference point.15 
In Kahneman and Tversky (1983) and in Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990), the difference 
in  risk attitudes  summarised in  2)  is  further  examined and associated with a  psychological 
mechanism known as  endowment effect.  With the support of further empirical evidence, the 
authors observe that agents prefer to avoid losses rather than to acquire equivalent gains, as they 
seem to value an object (or an amount of a given currency) more if they already “own” it or feel 
13 Kahneman and Tversky (1983), p. 455.
14 Ibidem.
15 Note that there is a further crucial element of Prospect Theory – an extra risk parameter that modifies 
the probability contribution to the evaluation of an option. This nonetheless amounts to a separable 
component of the theory that is not the focus here.
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somehow attached or entitled to it; this, arguably, makes it worse for them to lose it with respect  
to the enjoyment they would experience in gaining the same object (or amount of currency).16 
As a result, people are less prone to take the risk of improving from the baseline and more prone 
to take the same risk to avoid getting worse compared to the baseline. 
Cases of endowment effect are ubiquitous and already familiar from bargaining settings, with 
respect to agents'  willingness to pay  versus willingness to sell.  One famous example of the 
psychological  pull  of  the  endowment  effect,  for  instance,  is  the  so-called  Knee  example.17 
Kahneman and Tversky polled subjects to ask what amount of money they would demand a) in 
compensation for not getting a lost knee back and b) in exchange for losing a knee. The results 
show that agents demand more money ex ante (b), i.e., when they are faced with the possibility 
of losing their knee, than they demand ex post (a), i.e., when they are told they don't have a knee 
and could get it back. Apparently, this supports the conclusion that people value the knee they  
already have more than the knee they would get back, even assuming that the new knee would 
be equal to the old one in all respects.
Let's now take a closer look at how the endowment effect would work as an explanation of the 
“Asian flu” case.18 In the first decision problem (the choice between A and B), the use of the 
phrasing “saving” identifies the 200 lives as a gain, thus seemingly setting the reference point at 
“all 600 people die”. With respect to the baseline “everyone dies”, choosing program A would 
amount to a sure gain from the reference point. Plan B, on the other hand, characterises a “bet”, 
as it involves evaluating a risky prospect. Specifically, with respect to the baseline “everyone 
dies”,  Plan B could either deliver a bigger  gain (all  600 people  saved)  or  simply make no 
progress at all from the baseline (all 600 die). When it comes to gains, Kahneman and Tversky 
observe, decision makers tend to be risk averse, and, given the same expected lives saved in A 
and B, most opt for Plan A, which guarantees a sure gain. In the second decision problem, the 
different framing of the decision triggers a different evaluation of the vaccination plans. Plan C,  
indeed, apparently presents the option of 400 people dying as a loss, as it uses the phrasing 
“die”;  this  description  thus  sets  the  baseline  at  “all  600  people  live”.  With  respect  to  this  
reference point, Plan C therefore involves a sure loss. Plan D, again, amounts to a bet, where  
either losses with respect to the baseline are completely avoided (no one dies) or a bigger loss 
could occur (all 600 people die). While C and D are expected-lives-saved equivalent, decision 
makers mostly opt for D, being risk-loving with respect to losses.
16 Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990), p. 195.
17 Frances Kamm (2007), pp. 472–73, also compares the “Asian flu” case with the Knee case, as we will 
see later.
18 Kahneman  and  Tversky  do  not  discuss  this  interpretation  in  detail;  what  follows  is  thus  my re-
construction of the case.
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In conclusion, according to Kahneman and Tversky, different framings select different reference 
points as the relevant baseline, namely “everyone dies”  vs “everyone lives”, and this, in turn, 
induces  a  different  perception  of  the  options  as  gains  rather  than  losses.  Because  of  the 
endowment effect, agents would then tend to value the same numbers of lives more when they 
feel  they already “own” them (or they feel  they are already secured);  therefore,  people  are  
supposedly risk seeking when it comes to avoiding losing lives that are framed as losses with  
respect to the reference point “everyone lives”, and risk averse when it comes to saving lives  
that are framed as gains from the reference point “everyone dies”. Consistently, they tend to  
choose the course of action that involves a chance to completely avoid any loss (plan D over  
plan C), but are not as eager to take the same risk to save more lives (plan A over plan B).
Kahneman and Tversky's explanation of the peculiar behaviour observed in the Asian flu case, 
which has become the standard narrative in choice theory circles, thus amounts to a combination 
of different attitudes and features of human reasoning: baseline sensitivity, endowment effect  
and the related “loss/no gain” effect. By triggering and manipulating these features, shifts in  
framing cause the preference reversal. Kahneman and Tversky conclude that these preference 
reversals are, in fact, irrational, but argue that Prospect Theory can descriptively account for  
them.
4.3 The deflationist hypothesis
In their 1983 paper, Kahneman and Tversky do not talk about doing and allowing. Subsequent  
discussions of the Asian flu case in the moral and behavioural literature, however, have often 
related these experimental findings to the doing/allowing distinction. Specifically, this case is 
often  referred  to  as  a  straightforward  instance  of  framing  that  affects  doing/allowing 
classifications. The Asian flu case, in fact, describes a situation where a harm (death of innocent  
people) causally depends on the way the agent chooses between options, whether by doing the 
harm or allowing the harm to occur. It is reasonable, therefore, to think that agents could be  
discriminating the available options in terms of doing or allowing, and appealing to the idea that 
“doing is worse than allowing” when making evaluations. Preference reversal, in turn, would 
indicate that agents make different doing/allowing characterisations of apparently extensionally 
equivalent behaviours.
Note that different hypotheses can be put forward to account for the fact that, in the Asian flu 
case,  doing/allowing classifications are seemingly frame-dependent.  In the present  section, I  
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analyse what I call deflationist hypotheses, i.e., positions that, to some extent, argue that frame-
dependency undermines the moral relevance of the doing/allowing distinction.  In section 4.4, I 
survey Kamm's  non-deflationist hypothesis, which claims that framing effects do not threaten 
the normative significance of the distinction. In this sense, these hypotheses amount to different 
positions  on the import  of  evidence of  framing on the negative/positive theses.  Deflationist 
hypotheses, specifically, explain framing in a way that supports the negative thesis, while non-
deflationist ones provide an explanation of framing effects in a way that is consistent with the  
positive thesis. In 4.5, I turn to my interpretation of Kahneman and Tversky's results, which is  
that  the  doing/allowing  distinction  does  not  collapse  into  the  loss/no  gain  effect,  but  that 
doing/allowing classifications are sensitive to framing, and thus allow for ambiguity.
In the deflationist camp, Tamara Horowitz and Walter Sinnott-Armstrong argue that Kahneman 
and Tversky's explanation of preference reversal proves  that intuitions apparently concerning 
doing/allowing  turn  rather  into  reasoning  biases  such  as  the  loss/no  gain  effect  and  the 
endowment effect. Specifically, the way in which we use doing and allowing classifications may 
be expressed in terms of the cognitive attitudes we exhibit in dealing with gains versus losses. 
Horowitz, in particular, builds upon Kahneman and Tversky's explanation: whether an outcome 
is perceived as a loss or a no-gain depends on the perceived baseline, which itself depends on 
framing effects (wording); because of the endowment effect, agents place greater value on lives 
already secured; due to the loss/no gain effect, they are more risk seeking when it comes to 
avoiding losses and more risk averse when it comes to pursuing gains. At this point, Horowitz  
argues, a further element complicates the picture drawn by Kahneman and Tversky: in a morally 
sensitive  scenario,  such as the Asian flu  case,  agents  classify losses  from a given baseline,  
which causally depends on their behaviour, as doing harm, while they classify no-gains from a 
different baseline, which they otherwise brought about in the same way, as allowing harm. The 
different risk attitudes analysed by prospect theory then justify why agents tend to evaluate 
more favourably the same option when it is framed as a no-gain rather than a loss, which in turn 
explains, as a result or byproduct of these risk attitudes, why agents consider doing harm to be 
morally worse than allowing harm to occur.
This account explains the doing/allowing distinction in purely non-moral terms and, what is 
more, as the effect of psychological attitudes, idiosyncrasies and reasoning biases. Therefore, 
the positive thesis would be undermined, as we have a better explanation of the intuition that  
“doing is worse than allowing” (namely, that the “worseness” of doing is a by-product of risk  
attitudes).  Furthermore,  the  doing/allowing  distinction  would  build  on  our  flawed  moral 
reasoning skills.
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There are other interpretations of the Asian flu case in the literature that similarly seem to show  
that  the doing/allowing distinction can be explained as  a reasoning bias.  Christian List  and 
Nathalie Gold (2004), for instance, examine the Asian flu case in a “dynamic reasoning” model, 
which shows preference reversal to be the result of an effect which they call path-dependence.  
While List and Gold do not actually mention doing versus allowing, their model may provide 
yet another explanation for the fact that agents might evaluate the vaccination plans differently. 
In fact, one plan could be judged as morally worse than another simply because of the different 
order  (or,  to  use  their  terminology,  decision  path)  in  which  background  propositions  are 
arranged.19
This account, even if not explicitly “deflationist” like Horowitz's, may be used to argue in the 
direction that doing/allowing classifications allow for ambiguity, as both characterisations are 
tenable depending on which decision path is elicited. Arguably, if the selection of one path over 
another is induced by a change of words, which seems morally irrelevant, we could conclude  
that these classifications are also not morally significant, or at least that our intuitions regarding 
doing/allowing are not to be trusted.
4.4 Non-deflationist hypothesis: Kamm's proposal
In this section, I turn to Kamm's response to the deflationist challenge. As discussed above, 
deflationist  approaches seem to amount to bad news for the positive thesis,  as they seek to 
explain the doing/allowing distinction by referring to cognitive or behavioural features that do 
not  have  any  obvious  moral  relevance,  and  may  even  be  irrational  biases.  Among  others,  
Frances Kamm has famously argued against this conclusion, challenging Sinnott-Armstrong's 
and Horowitz's positions.  In what follows, I present in what I take to be the most favourable 
light  Kamm's  contribution  to  the  debate  as  outlined  in  her  1998  paper  “Moral  Intuitions, 
Cognitive Psychology, and the Harming-versus-Not-Aiding Distinction” and in Chapter 14 of 
“Intricate Ethics” (2007). This is not the most faithful representation of all the twists and turns 
in Kamm's analysis (although I will later note some of the more detailed points that Kamm 
makes that are difficult to square) but I think it is a charitable representation of Kamm's view.  
19 List and Gold (2005, p. 6) define background propositions as the decisional context of the agent, and, 
more precisely, as all the elements the agent considers when forming a judgement about a “target  
proposition” of the form “x is preferable to y”. These background propositions may be either factual or 
normative  propositions,  which  represent  moral  principles  such  as,  for  instance,  “do  not  kill  on 
purpose”. Background propositions, in short, are the propositions an agent refers to when motivating  
her decision on or evaluation of the target proposition. If agents do accept inconsistent background 
propositions, they could either accept or reject a target proposition, depending on which subset of 
background propositions the frame makes focal. 
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In short, Kamm argues that the impact of framing effects can be properly downplayed, and thus 
that  our  intuitions  can  serve  as  an  adequate  account  of  the  doing/allowing  distinction. 
Specifically,  I  take  her  argument  to  consist  of  two  main  claims:  (a)  the  doing/allowing 
distinction is different from the loss/no gain distinction, and thus the former cannot be reduced  
to  the  latter;  (b)  the doing/allowing distinction,  when correctly  characterised,  is  immune to  
framing effects.
Kamm begins her discussion by exposing a “hidden agenda” behind Kahneman and Tversky's 
loss/no gain interpretation of cases such as the Asian flu.20 This hidden agenda, as analysed by 
Kamm,  has  the  following  structure:  the  doing/allowing  distinction  is  largely  supported  by 
people's intuitions about cases;  in some instances, these intuitions seem to exhibit preference 
reversal, which seems to be convincingly explained by the loss/no gain effect; the loss/no gain 
effect has no obvious moral relevance, as it depends on apparently morally irrelevant features,  
such  as  the  choice  of  framing;  this  eventually  undermines  the  moral  relevance  of  the 
doing/allowing distinction. Note that, if this argument stands, we will have a compelling case in 
favour of the negative thesis. 
Kamm's first move in rejecting this argument is that our moral intuitions about cases cannot be 
adequately explained by the loss/no gain effect. As such, the doing/allowing distinction does not 
collapse  into  the  loss/no  gain  distinction  (a),  as  the  latter  cannot  fully  account  for  our  
discrimination  between  doing  versus allowing  cases.  As  a  preliminary  observation,  Kamm 
notices that while losses and gains are descriptions referring to end-states, doing and allowing  
have to do with the way in which an agent brings about these end-states. As such, “doing” and 
“allowing”  identify  the  connection  between  the  agent's  behaviour  and  the  outcome.  Most 
examples used to show that the loss/no gain and the doing/allowing distinctions are equivalent, 
Kamm argues,  overlook  this  aspect.  In  the  “Asian  flu”  case,  for  instance,  Kahneman  and 
Tversky's and Horowitz's analyses are misleading insofar as they simply refer to the vaccination 
plans in terms of gains and losses. 
To make this point, Kamm distinguishes between different ways in which losses and gains can 
occur,  by referring,  for instance,  to  unprevented losses21 and  denied gains.  I  do not  follow 
Kamm's discussion in detail  here, as it is not always clear into which category the different 
vaccination  plans  would  fall.  In  short,  Kamm  argues  that  Horowitz's  analysis  of  the 
doing/allowing  distinction  is  too  simplistic.  To  be  fair,  in  most  scenarios  doing  harm  is 
associated with cases we perceive as suffering losses and allowing harm with cases we perceive 
20 Note that  Kahneman and Tversky do not suggest  that the loss/no gain distinction undermines the 
doing/allowing distinction. 
21 Kamm defines unprevented losses as “losses which are happening independently of our intervention 
and which we fail to prevent” (1998, p. 475).
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as not achieving a gain. This is to say, the loss/no gain and the doing/allowing distinctions often  
match up. Nonetheless, this is not always the case, and we can think of ways to disentangle the 
two distinctions. By way of illustration:22 
Doing Harm Allowing Harm
Loss I roll your apple down 
the hill 
I don't stop your apple 
from rolling away
No-gain I divert an apple which 
was rolling towards you
There is an apple rolling 
past you, and I don't 
divert it towards you
Table 4.1
In other words, it is possible for a victim to suffer a loss as a result of someone's allowing harm 
(as per the top right entry of Table 4.1). I take this to be what Kamm means to capture by 
“unprevented  losses”.  Also,  it  is  possible  for  a  victim not  to  achieve a  gain  as  a  result  of 
someone's doing behaviour (as per the bottom left entry in Table 4.1); Kamm seems to call these 
cases “denied gains”.23
Now that it is clear that the two distinctions do not collapse into one another, but often match up 
in ordinary cases, Kamm turns to explain the preference reversal, that is, why “subjects think it 
is worse if two hundred people lose life than if they do not gain it and are more averse to a  
policy  in  which  people  lose  their  lives  than  in  which  the  same  number  are  not  saved.” 24 
According to Kamm, all the options involved in the Asian flu case amount to “allowing harm”:  
what is actually bringing about the deaths is the flu, which is a natural event we could not  
possibly prevent.  Different baselines induce a different perception of the same outcomes as 
gains or losses, and it is the loss/no gain effect that ultimately causes preference reversal. All  
cases are, nonetheless, still instances of allowing harm, and the doing/allowing distinction, if  
properly analysed, is immune to framing effects (b).
To illustrate this point, I reconstruct Kamm's analysis of the Asian flu case. 25 In this example, 
Kamm argues, confusion might arise because often the most natural and intuitive way to think 
about doing and allowing is to refer to human intervention, which in turn can be defined in 
comparison with a baseline, which sets what is going to happen absent the agent. In the Asian  
flu case, Programs A and C individuate different baselines, “everyone dies” vs “everyone lives”, 
22 Thanks to John Cusbert for this example to illustrate the taxonomy.
23 Note that, in a different passage, Kamm instead classifies “denied gains” as a case of allowing harm. 
24 Kamm (1998), p. 466.
25 Also note that Kamm's analysis of this example is not a unitary explanation. In this paragraph I thus  
put together the remarks that Kamm makes throughout her paper.
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and therefore the “absent the agent” situation is set differently in those cases. As such, Kamm 
argues, what we perceive as intervention might also appear different: in Program A, it looks like 
with our intervention 200 people could be saved from sure death; in Program C, it looks like 
with our  intervention,  400  people  will  die.  This  could  generate  the  confusion  that  our 
intervention amounts to a different thing or contribution to the outcome in Programs A and C 
respectively. Upon careful scrutiny, however, we can properly recognise that what does the trick 
here is just the loss/no gain effect. 
In the first decision problem agents are, in fact, confronted with a “near death state”,26 where 
“everyone  dies”.  The  resulting  lives  saved,  with  respect  to  this  reference  point,  are  thus 
perceived as gains, but of a specific kind that Kamm defines as “maintaining what one is close 
to los[ing]”.27 The 400 lives lost,  in this scenario, would then be no-gains of the form “not 
maintaining what one is close to lose”.28 I take this case to be in the bottom right entry in Table 
4.1. On the other hand, the second decision problem (C  vs D) sets the baseline at “everyone 
lives”. With respect to such a situation, the 400 lives lost are framed as losses, which Kamm  
defines as “losses which are happening independently of our intervention and which we fail to  
prevent”, i.e., unprevented losses. It is this different description of no-gains as opposed to losses 
that, ultimately, causes the different evaluation of decision problems, and could generate some 
confusion about the correct doing/allowing description. Nonetheless, Kamm concludes, this is 
just  the loss/no gain effect;  doing/allowing classifications would not actually be affected by 
framing (both these types of no-gains and losses are in the “allowing” camp).
Moreover,  upon  reflection,  Kamm argues  that  only  one  baseline  is  “correct”:  namely,  that  
“everyone dies”. When we correctly identify the baseline, we can completely “beat” framing 
effects. Nonetheless, on Kamm's account, different baselines do not change the classification of 
behaviours  as  doings  versus allowings.  To be  sure,  doing/allowing classification may  seem 
frame-dependent:  once  we  realise  our  error,  however,  we  will  see  that  doings  can  be 
distinguished from allowings in a reliable way by appealing to a single baseline that is not  
subject to change due to differences in wording, order, etc. The import of framing effects is thus 
downplayed to a masking or misleading impact on our initial classifications.
In conclusion, if Kamm is successful in refuting the “hidden agenda”, framing effects would not  
threaten the positive thesis regarding the moral relevance of the doing/allowing distinction. 
In  the  following section,  I  suggest  that,  while  I  agree  with  Kamm that  the  doing/allowing 
distinction does not collapse into the loss/no gain effect, we can still argue that doing/allowing 
26 Kamm (1998), p. 466. 
27 Ibidem, p. 475.
28 In a different passage, however, Kamm seems to define A vs B as a case of denied gains.
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classifications  are  frame-dependent,  and  two different  doing/allowing descriptions  might  be 
legitimate. My different interpretation builds on what I think is a gap in Kamm's analysis above.  
If  doing/allowing and  loss/no-gain  are  indeed different,  we  still  do  not  have  a  compelling 
explanation for why framing effects can also change the perception of how losses and gains are 
brought about by the agent, which would amount to the doing/allowing distinction.
4.5 The third path
The  comparison  between  deflationist  and  non-deflationist  proposals  seems  to  show  that  
framing effects do not provide a decisive test in favour of either the positive or the negative 
thesis.  Both  narratives  can,  in  fact,  arguably  account  for  the  empirical  data  on  preference 
reversals. In this section, I suggest a “third path”, with respect to both deflationist and non-
deflationist  hypotheses.  I  argue  that  this  third  interpretation  is  as  well  consistent  with  the 
empirical evidence; also, it may advance discussion and provide some explanatory advantages. 
On the downside, this interpretation seems to further challenge the feasibility of the project of  
fully isolating the doing/allowing distinction from all other descriptive and moral features of the 
decision context. 
Firstly,  contra  Horowitz,  I  agree with Kamm that  preference reversal  in  the Asian flu  case  
cannot be fully expressed as the result of the endowment effect and the loss/no gain effect. The 
Asian flu case is in some respects different from other examples surveyed by Kahneman and 
Tversky  (1979  and  1983),  such  as  decisions  about  lotteries  or  the  classic  Knee  case.  For 
instance, in the latter, which is crucial for introducing the endowment effect,  the knee is an 
object, or, more accurately, a possession, which agents may attain or be deprived of without any 
further specification of how the loss was/is brought about. In the Knee case, the agent thus has 
to choose between different outcomes that are only affecting her. The Asian flu case, on the 
other hand, also asks the agent to put herself in the hypothetical position of selecting between  
vaccination programs that will affect other people. I argue that, for this reason, the issue of how 
outcomes are brought about  becomes  more relevant.  The knee,  or  its  absence,  can thus  be 
described as a loss or a gain from a given baseline. When considering the number of lives lost or 
saved in the “Asian flu” example, instead, I think agents also focus on what kind of impact they  
had by bringing about the outcome. This aspect, I argue, may not be completely captured in  
loss/no gain terms. 
While  Kamm's  objection  (a)  to  Horowitz's  account  thus  appears  to  be  convincing,  it  is  
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nonetheless questionable whether she can prove decisively that the doing/allowing distinction is 
immune to framing effects (b).  Contra her conclusion, I argue that, in the Asian flu case, our 
perception of vaccination plans as instances of doing harm rather than allowing harm ultimately 
causes the preference reversal.  
First, Kamm's reconstruction of the Asian flu case does not successfully illustrate how changes 
in the baseline affect agents' relative evaluations of the vaccination plans. Recall that, according 
to  Kamm,  all  options  involved  in  the  case  would  be  instances  of  allowing  harm.  Agents'  
different  judgements  and  choices  would  be  motivated  by  psychological  biases  such  as  the 
loss/no gain effect. If the two dichotomies (loss/no gain and doing/allowing), however, amount  
to distinct things, it is not clear how, on Kamm's account, people could still classify the options 
differently in terms of doing/allowing: after all, individuals should only describe the options 
differently in terms of gains and losses, and not in terms of how these outcomes are brought  
about by the agent. In this respect, I argue that Kamm's proposal lacks explanatory power.29
To fill this gap, I thus provide an explanation of how different baselines may induce different 
descriptions of vaccination programs as doings or allowings. My interpretation shares the same 
structure as Kahneman and Tversky's, with respect to baseline sensitivity and risk attitudes, but I 
suggest that it is the principle “doing is worse than allowing”, rather than the endowment effect, 
that does the explanatory work. Specifically, the two different framings of the same decision 
problem induce a different perception of the same option as an instance of “doing harm” rather 
than “doing good while allowing some harm as a side effect”; as agents are influenced by this 
classification, and regard doing harm as morally worse than allowing it, they are risk seeking 
when it comes to avoiding doing harm (by causing a certain number of deaths), and risk-averse 
when it comes to doing more good, allowing harm as a side effect (by not saving the same 
number of lives). 
By way of elaboration, the explanation of preference reversal is as follows: for plans A and B, as 
already discussed, the appropriate baseline seems to amount to a situation where everyone dies; 
agents, as Kahneman and Tversky argue, tend to take such a baseline as the position they find 
29 To  be  clear,  there  are  no  empirical  surveys  that  specifically  show  how  people  change  their 
doing/allowing  classifications  in  the  Asian  flu  case.  We  could  thus  simply  conclude  that  the 
doing/allowing distinction has nothing to do with the Asian flu case. Nonetheless, there is evidence 
that  people  think about  these  options in  terms of  killing/letting die,  and  justify their  answers  by 
appealing to such descriptions. For instance, Jou, Shanteau and Harris (1996, p. 5) report individuals'  
motivations for choosing a specific option in the Asian flu case. These motivations seem to explicitly 
refer to these different ways of describing a conduct: e.g. “I wouldn't be able to live with myself 
knowing that I let 400 people die” (for an individual who chose Plan B over A) or “I would rather take 
a chance to save all of them than sending [my italics] 400 of them to death” (for choosing D over C). I 
thus  side  here  with  Horowitz  and  Kamm  that  the  Asian  flu  case  does  involve  doing/allowing 
descriptions of the vaccination programs. If this is the case, we do need to provide an explanation of 
how people could perceive these seemingly equivalent conducts differently (in doing/allowing terms).
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choosing plan A, therefore, arguably appears from the agent's perspective to actively save 200 
people, and  cause the fact that they will live. On the other hand, the fact that the other 400 
people will die is taken to be a side effect of the good action we are performing: in other words,  
it sounds more as if we are allowing 400 people to die (certainly, a harm), while causing 200 
people to live. Plan A, in short,  may be interpreted as “doing good and allowing harm (for 
sure)”. As for plan B, agents must take a gamble: they could do even more good, completely 
eliminating the chance of even allowing harm, or they can end up allowing more deaths to 
occur. While equivalent with respect to expected harm (lives lost), most agents stick to plan A, 
as they are risk-averse when it comes to doing good, while allowing harm to occur. This, I  
argue, happens because, in this specific choice problem, option A is framed as giving the agent  
the chance to do something good for sure, with respect to the reference point; the harm that will 
occur as a consequence of her choosing A is framed in a way that appeals to “allowing”, and 
thus to an occurrence of harm that is not as wrong as “doing”. On the other hand, B could offer  
the chance to do even more good, but at the risk of not doing any good at all. I suggest that I 
suggest that, when it comes to allowing harm, agents are risk-averse.
Turning to the choice between C and D, the implied baseline is now “everyone lives”. Plan C, a 
vaccination  plan  described  as  “killing” 400 individuals,  appears  in  that  respect  to  certainly 
cause the death of 400 individuals, thus actively harming them. In other words, I argue that the 
terms used in the description of Plan C are easily associated with a way of bringing about harm 
that is characterised as “doing”. D, again, describes a lottery where the agent could end up doing 
even more harm (600 people die), but also not harming anyone (600 people live). Plan D, in this 
sense, avoids “doing harm for sure”, which seems inevitable when Plan C is selected. Now, the 
framing of the decision problem suggests that the agents would do harm, which is more morally 
objectionable than merely allowing it.  This difference explains why, in this second decision 
problem, agents are risk-seekers, and more individuals take the chance to avoid doing any harm, 
even at the risk of doing much more harm.
While this proposal amounts to a compelling answer to deflationist accounts, I  still  have to 
defend it against Kamm's position, which argues that we can get rid of framing effects upon  
careful scrutiny. In short, Kamm could argue that agents might be sensitive to baseline shifts  
and loss/no gain characterisations,  and be affected by different  risk attitudes;  these features 
could,  arguably,  cloud  their  judgements  about  doing/allowing  classifications.  Nonetheless, 
Kamm argues,  “the  fact  that  lay  experimental  subjects  are  tricked  by  framing  effects  into 
identifying the baseline from which to judge losses and no-gains does not gainsay the possibility 
that  moral  theory could use the distinction in an unconfused way.”30 I  thus have to answer 
30 Kamm (2007), p. 432.
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Kamm's  objection that  doing/allowing classifications  are  not  ultimately affected by framing 
effects.
One's  response  to  the  above  claim  depends  on  the  role  one  assigns  to  intuitions  in  a 
doing/allowing distinction account. Kamm, as I explain in section 4.4, defines both decision 
problems in the Asian flu case as instances of “allowing harm”. Arguably, this conclusion relies 
on a prior definition of the distinction.  Specifically, what she seems to have in mind is her  
“imposing” intuition, which is that a conduct classifies as “doing harm” if it is intruding or 
imposing on another individual's body or possessions, while it is just an instance of “allowing” 
if  this  condition  does  not  hold  when  bringing  about  the  harm.  In  this  sense,  whichever 
vaccination plan we choose, we would not impose on these people and thus we would not be  
doing any harm. Note that, however, the first point in the “hidden agenda” was that people's 
doing/allowing classifications are largely motivated by their intuitions. Examples like the Asian 
flu amount to problematic cases only as long as  one thinks that these seemingly inconsistent 
intuitions have a direct bearing on the doing/allowing distinction.  Kamm's argument that our 
intuitions are mistaken,  on the other hand,  seems to adopt  a different  perspective on moral 
theorising, one that, in some sense, assigns a lesser role to our intuitions. 
To be fair, Kamm could answer this point by noting that she is not claiming that moral intuitions 
do  not  play  any role  whatsoever  in  building  an  adequate  account  of  the  doing/allowing 
distinction. In a few problematic cases, however,  at least some of our intuitions could be wrong, 
and not  particularly reliable to serve this task.  I concede this point to Kamm, even if I am 
worried that she is relying on a prior “correct” characterisation of doing and allowing so as to  
discriminate between more and less reliable moral intuitions.
Even  so,  Kamm's  proposal  downplays  the  import  of  preference  reversals  and  inconsistent 
intuitions  in  scenarios  affected  by  framing.  In  the  Asian  flu  example,  there  is  at  least 
disagreement over the classification of the second decision problem as “allowing”. To keep  
Kamm's framework, therefore, we would be forced to dismiss a lot of intuitions as wrong and 
misleading. Cases of framing effects, moreover, seem to be pervasive, showing a general lack of  
consensus and an instability in people's classifications, and it is up for debate whether they can 
actually be “overcome” by careful scrutiny. As persistent disagreement over the correct doing 
and  allowing  characterisations  seems  to  be  a  prominent  feature  of  many  cases  of  framing 
effects, we might be interested in an account of the doing/allowing distinction that explains the 
experimental findings, rather than one that solves the issue by claiming that one frame is more  
“correct” than the other. In this respect, my hypothesis has the advantage of tracking how the 
reframing of the decision problem affects the perception of the same behaviour as doing rather  
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than allowing.
To sum up, my position is consistent with Kamm's claim (a) that the doing/allowing distinction 
does not collapse into the loss/no gain distinction,  where the latter is seen as a cognitive bias. 
We both agree that there is more in the “Asian flu” case than a different perception of outcomes 
as losses or no gains, as the focus is also on the way the outcome is brought about. I do not  
think, however, that Kamm succeeds in proving (b), i.e., that the doing/allowing distinction is  
not subject to framing. The fact that the doing/allowing distinction is different from the loss/no 
gain distinction does not in itself rule out that the former could still be subject to framing. The  
latter hypothesis, I argue, is compatible with experimental findings and acknowledges for the 
instability  of  our  intuitions  and  the  persistency  of  preference  reversal  and  interpersonal 
disagreement. 
Arguably, evidence that the doing/allowing distinction depends on how the decision problem is 
framed does not rule out the possibility that, with these characterisations, we might be tracking 
something morally relevant and significant in the way agents bring about a harm. Nonetheless,  
these results also amount to evidence that the doing/allowing distinction seems to be ultimately 
tied with and dependent on other normative and descriptive features of the decision context. In 
this  sense,  the  whole  project  of  separating  the  descriptive  issue  of  distinguishing 
doing/allowings  from  the  normative  issue  of  investigating  the  moral  significance  of  this 
distinction might prove unfeasible. 
4.6 Conclusion
The pervasiveness  of  framing effects,  which  has  been widely  documented  in  the  empirical  
literature,  raises  some crucial  questions  about  the  moral  significance  of  the  doing/allowing 
distinction. Specifically, evidence of framing effects may seriously undermine the reliability of 
the insight that  “doing is  worse than allowing” and suggest  that our moral  intuitions about  
doing/allowing are seemingly flawed. This, in turn, would be bad news for the positive thesis.  
So  as  to  further  support  this  sceptical  conclusion,  it  has  been  argued  that,  indeed,  the 
doing/allowing distinction can be expressed in terms that are morally irrelevant, as the result of 
cognitive attitudes and reasoning biases, such as the loss/no gain effect.
This conclusion can, nonetheless, still  be challenged by advocates of the positive thesis,  by 
downplaying  the  confounding  impact  framing  effects  have  on  our  intuitions:  Kamm,  for 
instance, argues that the fact that our moral reasoning has some significant limitations does not 
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prove that the doing/allowing distinction is not tracking a morally relevant feature of human 
behaviour.  In  this  sense,  cases  like  the  Asian  flu  simply  amount  to  particularly  difficult 
examples where we would need to exercise our moral skills more carefully and put our first-
hand intuitions under careful scrutiny. To sum up, we can concede that framing effects do not 
alone provide a decisive argument in favour of or against the positive thesis.
My contention, however, is that at least some examples of moral framing, such as the Asian flu 
case, do suggest that our doing and allowing characterisations, and our moral evaluations of 
conducts so described, are affected by how the decision problem is described and presented to 
the  agent.  Consistent  with  my  discussion  in  Chapter  2,  I  conclude  that  doing/allowing 
classifications depend on framing because they depend on how one analyses the distinction in 
the first place. The project of pulling apart the descriptive issue of “where to draw the line” and 
the normative issue of whether the line tracks something morally relevant, therefore, does not 
look like a promising way of analysing our use of this distinction. In conclusion, both the failure 
of the strategy of fully-equalized cases and evidence of framing effects seem to show that we 
cannot disentangle doing and allowing from other descriptive and normative features of the 
decision context.
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5. The alternative thesis 
The difficulty in drawing and reaching agreement over fully-equalized cases, together with the 
doubts raised by the persistence of framing effects, gives us reasons to be sceptical about the  
positive  thesis  regarding  the  moral  significance  of  the  doing/allowing  distinction.  These 
considerations, nonetheless, do not seem to amount to enough evidence in favour of accepting 
the  negative  thesis  either,  that  is,  the  hypothesis  that  the  doing/allowing  distinction  is  not 
morally  relevant.  In  this  chapter,  I  argue that  neither  of  these positions  can be definitively 
defended against all objections, and they are ultimately underdetermined by our ordinary use of 
the doing/allowing distinction for moral purposes. In light of this, I suggest that an alternative 
explanation appears very attractive. Specifically, I claim that it could be the case that there  is 
something morally relevant to the doing/allowing distinction; at the same time, this distinction, 
despite its moral relevance,  remains subject to framing, thus allowing for disagreement and  
instability.  If  we  accept  my  proposed  interpretation,  it  follows  that  the  way  we  use  the 
doing/allowing distinction may be messier and more ambiguous than some would like. There is 
something  initially  uncomfortable  about  my  suggestion,  as  we  aim  to  structure  and  make 
coherent  our  moral  reality  through  moral  theorising.  At  the  same  time,  I  believe  that,  on 
reflection, our use of this distinction is complex and nuanced, and disagreement is persistent.  
My suggestion, therefore, may track our moral reality as it is, at least in this respect.
Throughout this chapter,  I defend this interpretation by comparing it to the positive and the 
negative theses, and at a finer level of detail, comparing it to the main categories of explanatory 
(or  what  I  call  reductionist)  accounts.  I  conclude  that  my alternative  thesis  provides  some 
explanatory advantages. In section 5.1, I argue that neither the positive nor the negative thesis 
emerges as a clear winner, and I give the first formulation of the alternative thesis. In section 
5.2, I examine how this proposal preserves some valuable intuitions from both positions. To do 
so, I describe more accurately my proposal with respect to the import of framing effects and to 
the understanding of “moral relevance” (5.2.1). I then compare the alternative thesis with three 
main families of  explanatory  accounts of the doing/allowing distinction,  and I  outline more 
systematically three desiderata for a convincing framework of this dichotomy (5.2.2). In section 
5.3,  I  elaborate  on  these desiderata.  I  show how Hitchcock's  self-contained  network  model 
seems to capture all these features, that is, causal structure (i), frame-dependency (ii), and moral  
relevance  (iii).  I  conclude  in  5.4  with  a  final  formulation  of  the  alternative  thesis  which 
incorporates Hitchcock's self-contained network account as a tool for distinguishing between 
“doing” and “allowing” behaviours. 
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5.1 The positive, the negative, and the alternative theses
Returning to the formulations of the negative and positive theses regarding the moral relevance 
of the doing/allowing distinction,  it  is important  at this  point to be more specific about the 
differences between the two positions.
Positive thesis: the doing/allowing distinction amounts to an unambiguous distinction, 
that is, there is a right (frame-independent) characterisation of actions as instances of 
doing or allowing respectively. This distinction is independent of framing and morally 
relevant.
Negative thesis: the doing/allowing distinction might be ambiguous or unambiguous, 
that is, there might or might not be a correct characterisation of actions. Whichever the 
case, this distinction is dependent on framing (in imperfect deliberators) and it is not 
morally relevant, even in its right characterisation (if it exists).
In Chapters 3 and 4, I examined two main arguments which are employed in the moral literature 
to  provide  an  answer  to  the  question  of  whether  the  doing/allowing  distinction  is  morally 
relevant, and, more generally, to support the positive or the negative thesis. Specifically, fully-
equalized cases are used as evidence for or against the positive thesis.  Evidence of framing 
effects, on the other hand, is mostly used by supporters of the negative thesis. These arguments, 
nonetheless, do not appear to be particularly striking or decisive. Regarding the attempt to come 
up with fully-equalized cases, and to isolate the contribution of the doing/allowing dichotomy to 
our  moral  evaluation  of  an  action,  I  show that  there  is  disagreement  over  allegedly  fully-
equalized cases. Furthermore, there are reasons to be sceptical over the feasibility of the strategy 
itself. Most examples, in fact, turn out to be convoluted, or to have  extreme features, such that 
there  is  reason  to  doubt  the  associated  moral  intuitions.  With  regard  to  the  persistence  of 
framing effects, the fact that doing/allowing classifications are influenced by apparently morally 
irrelevant aspects raises reasonable doubts over the moral significance of the distinction. 
Nonetheless, any amount of interpersonal disagreement, or evidence of “instability”, can be in 
principle  accommodated  within  a  positive  framework.  Ultimately,  advocates  of  the  positive 
thesis could argue that there is a fact of the matter whether an action is an instance of doing 
rather  than  allowing;  yet,  we  may  often  be  unsuccessful  in  recognizing  the  right  
characterisation, due to cognitive limitations and/or particularly intricate scenarios. Moreover, 
attempts to explain the doing/allowing distinction in purely non-moral terms (as, for instance, in 
Horowitz's account) would require us to dismiss as mistaken the moral intuitions we have when 
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comparing doings with allowings behaviours. As McMahan argues, challenging these positions:
“If  the  argument  is  correct,  how  can  we  account  for  the  fact  that  we  have  been 
systematically misled into believing that there is a moral asymmetry between making and 
allowing? The idea that there is such asymmetry is ubiquitous. To the best of my knowledge, 
there are no societies, no culture, past or present,  in which failing to prevent a harm is 
regarded as morally equivalent, other things being equal, to killing a person (...). How did 
they manage to be so obtuse?”1 
In summary, both the negative and the positive thesis appear to be underdetermined, insofar as 
all  counterexamples, evidence of disagreement, and appeal to intuitions could be potentially 
explained and justified by both these opposing positions regarding the moral relevance of the 
doing/allowing distinction. Also, as I will  explain in 5.2, both the positive and the negative 
theses seem to require us to sacrifice some of our immediate intuitions, and to recognize that our 
moral  reasoning  skills  are  significantly  flawed  in  many  circumstances.  Supporters  of  the 
positive  thesis  take  our  case-based  intuitions  about  the  asymmetry  of  the  distinction  more 
seriously.  Supporters  of  the  negative  thesis,  on  the  other  hand,  prize  more  coherence  in  
theorising.
The  state  of  the  literature  thus  gives  us  a  reasonable  justification  for  exploring  different  
interpretations and alternative ways of thinking about the doing/allowing debate. Specifically,  
rather than continuing to focus on how we can isolate and examine the moral relevance of the  
distinction, we may ask why this distinction seems to be particularity resistant to analysis, and 
ultimately embedded with other moral principles and classifications.
In  this  chapter,  I  start  outlining  such  an  alternative  thesis,  which  I  provisionally  define  as 
follows:
Alternative thesis: the doing/allowing distinction is inherently ambiguous, that is, there 
is not always a fact of the matter whether an action is an instance of doing rather than 
allowing;  classifications  of  the  same  action  as  the  former  or  the  latter  can  be 
descriptively adequate, depending on the specific framing. The fact that an action is 
described as doing rather than allowing is nonetheless morally relevant. 
Note that by moral relevance I do not mean here that all instances of doing harm are morally 
worse than all instances of allowing harm, nor that doing harm is always impermissible while 
allowing  harm is  always  permissible.  As  Woollard  (2015)  suggests,2 the  asymmetry  of  the 
doing/allowing distinction is better interpreted as a claim about justification:  all other things  
1 McMahan (1998), p. 397. 
2 Woollard (2015), pp. 8‒9.
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being equal, doing harm is harder to justify than allowing harm to occur.
In  defending  this  hypothesis,  I  will  move  away  from  constructing  cases  that  support  the 
negative, the positive, or the alternative thesis. I think that a way of arguing in favour of my 
proposal, which advances the discussion, is to focus on its explanatory merits. Specifically, in 
my view, disagreement between the positive and the negative thesis is so pervasive because they 
both  capture  aspects  of  the  doing/allowing  distinction  we  strongly  feel  are  right.  In  the 
following  section,  I  will  argue  that  the  alternative  thesis  in  fact  allows  us  to  keep  these  
compelling aspects of both the positive and the negative theses, and that this amounts to an 
attractive feature of this proposal. 
5.2 Defending the alternative thesis
 
We have seen that both the positive and negative thesis imply that there is something faulty 
about our moral intuitions: in the case of the former, it is the biases of framing, and in the case 
of the later, it is the mistake in taking a distinction to be morally relevant when it is not. This 
raises the question of how our moral reasoning should respond to intuitions.
My  contention  is  that  the  alternative  thesis  helps  us  out  of  this  impasse.  Specifically,  the 
alternative  thesis  preserves  two  important  aspects  of  both  theses:  the  intuition  that  the 
doing/allowing distinction is morally significant and the fact that it might be context-dependent. 
Note that,  while this project may seem doomed, an attempt to “square the circle”, it in fact  
exemplifies nuanced moral theorising in response to intuitions. We start with our intuitions over 
specific  examples,  try  to  make sense of  them and treat  them as  uncovering  the underlying 
principles explaining and justifying these intuitions. During this process of analysis, however, 
we might find out that different counterexamples and intuitions apparently contradict our first-
hand insights, and that our contradictory intuitions resist a coherent systematization. We must 
thus select which intuitions to keep and which to abandon as inconsistent and unsupported, and 
we strive to find a balance in such operation. As McMahan (2000) puts it, 
“One  of  the  aims  of  moral  theory  is  to  illuminate  the  considerations  that  underlie  our 
common  moral  intuitions.  Yet  it  may  happen  that  these  deeper  considerations,  when 
exposed, seem not to be especially cogent or compelling. When this happens, we face a 
choice between retaining intuitions that are apparently ungrounded and abandoning them. 
Yet the intuitions may be central to any morality that we could bring ourselves to accept- 
indeed any system of norms that we could genuinely recognize as morality at all. I think it is  
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possible that a dilemma of this sort arises with our intuitions about killing and letting die.”3
What  McMahan  describes  here  is  a  method  now  known  in  the  literature  as  reflective 
equilibrium, a term coined by Rawls in “A Theory of Justice”. While I do not aim specifically to 
replicate this argumentative strategy, my goal in presenting the alternative thesis is to find a 
“balance” with respect to  both the positive and the negative theses. 
In 5.2.1, I further elaborate on how the alternative thesis walks a desirable line between the  
negative and the positive thesis. In 5.2.2, I compare the alternative thesis with other explanatory 
accounts  of  the  doing/allowing distinction,  and outline  three  main  desiderata  for  a  suitable 
framework of this dichotomy.
5.2.1 The alternative thesis in the “space” of positions
In the discussion above, I argued that the alternative thesis may successfully account for the fact  
that the doing/allowing distinction is morally significant, and for the fact that two classifications 
of the same action as doing or else allowing can be legitimate, thus explaining disagreement and 
framing.  Prima facie,  these two aspects might look inconsistent.  To see how the alternative 
thesis can, in fact, accommodate both, it is useful to offer a more fine-grained taxonomy of the 
positions one could take with respect to the moral relevance of the doing/allowing distinction. 
Note that, when we talk about the moral relevance of the doing/allowing distinction, there are at  
least  two  different  issues  under  investigation,  which  can  be  summarized  as  two  separate 
questions. In this sense, the “space” of the discussion can be arranged along two axes, which  
appeal to these two different questions about moral relevance. Opposite answers to these two 
questions determine different positions. The first question addresses the stance towards moral 
framing:
1) Do framing effects obstruct moral truth? 
In other words, this question asks whether what is morally relevant can include aspects which  
are associated with frames, or whether frame-dependency rules out moral significance. 
Note that, with frame-dependency, I mean here “genuine” frame-dependency rather than frame-
dependency that is obviously due to mere cognitive mistakes.
The second question, on the other hand, appeals to the conditions for determining whether the 
doing/allowing distinction is morally relevant:
3 McMahan (2000), p. 110.
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2) Is the doing/allowing distinction morally relevant per se?
This second question, which I will examine in more detail in 5.2.2, considers the issue whether 
the doing/allowing distinction can be successfully reduced to other features or principles, or 
rather amounts to an independent characteristic of actions. 
Now, defenders of the positive thesis would answer “yes” to both questions: framing effects 
obstruct  moral  truth,  are  misleading,  and  need  to  be  corrected  when  examining  the 
doing/allowing distinction (as they are simply cases of bad human reasoning); moreover, the 
moral  significance of the distinction cannot be further reduced to independent  principles or  
characterisations. What about the negative thesis? To be sure, the answer to the first question 
will still be “yes”: some supporters of the negative thesis would argue that the doing/allowing 
distinction is,  in fact,  ultimately subject to framing,  and thus cannot be morally significant.  
Regarding the second question, remember that the negative thesis, as first formulated in Chapter 
3,  p.  55,  only  argues  that  the  doing/allowing distinction  is  not  morally  relevant  per se.  In 
general,  all  proposals  which  could  be  classified  in  the  negative  thesis  field  claim that  the 
doing/allowing  distinction  ultimately  tracks  other  features  or  principles.  Deflationist 
interpretations  further argue that  these other  features  are morally  irrelevant,  while  what  we 
might dub the “moderate negative thesis” seems to allow for the possibility that these separate 
principles are morally significant. So, for the negative thesis, the answer to the second question 
is “no”, but on some accounts the doing/allowing distinction nonetheless maps onto  morally 
relevant classifications, and thus retains moral significance, in spite of framing effects.
I  can now also define my proposal  more accurately.  First,  the alternative thesis argues that  
frame-dependency does not rule out moral significance,  so the answer to the first question is 
“no”, unlike both positive and negative theses.  That is,  there could be no fact of the matter 
whether an action is an instance of doing rather than allowing, as these classifications can be 
context- and agent-dependent. Second, the alternative thesis merely states that doing/allowing 
characterisations should be relevant to the moral evaluation of cases, without further arguing 
whether  it  is  morally  relevant  per se or  rather  tracks  other  morally  relevant  principles  and 
features. In 5.3 and in Chapter 6, I will elaborate on this point, arguing that doing/allowing  
classifications  might  not  be  morally  significant  per  se,  but  the  way  we  make  these 
classifications incorporates morally relevant aspects. These moral features, I will argue, cannot, 
however, be easily systematized with a unitary explanation, that is, one which identifies a fixed 
set of principles or characteristics that the doing/allowing distinction univocally maps onto. In 
this  sense,  the  answer  to  this  second  question  might  be  ambiguous.  On  the one  hand,  the 
doing/allowing distinction is morally relevant  because it  incorporates other morally relevant 
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features, so, in this respect, it is not morally significant per se. On the other, the distinction is 
not identical to (it does not univocally map onto) any other independent moral categorisation. I  
note that this might be a merely terminological issue, and one I will not explore here. I will thus 
leave it open to one's account of what counts as “morally relevant per se”.
To sum up, the above discussion can be summarized in Table 5.1 as follows:               
The doing/allowing distinction is morally relevant 
per se
Yes No
Framing effects 
undermine moral 
relevance
Yes Positive thesis Negative thesis
No
Table 5.1
Bearing these classifications in mind, we can further proceed in refining the alternative thesis,  
and in examining its explanatory merits. To do so, I discuss this position with respect to three  
main families of explanatory accounts. I argue that these approaches draw attention to some 
crucial aspects of the doing/allowing distinction, which I use to outline three desiderata for a  
convincing account of the doing/allowing distinction. Specifically, apart from moral relevance 
and frame-dependency, I argue that we should also account for the intuition that the distinction 
tracks an agent's causal contribution to an outcome.
5.2.2 The alternative thesis, explanatory proposals, and three desiderata
This section sets out to examine in a more systematic way the explanatory advantages of the 
alternative thesis. To do so, I first define the alternative thesis as a  reductionist account. This 
conclusion,  I  suggest,  is  justified  by  the  difficulties  surveyed  in  Chapters  3  and  4  in 
disentangling  the  doing/allowing  distinction  from  any  other  feature  of  the  context.  I  then 
compare  my  proposal  with  other  reductionist/explanatory  accounts  of  the  doing/allowing 
distinction. My aim is to argue that, while these different families of frameworks seem each to 
fit particularly well with one specific aspect of the doing/allowing distinction, none of them 
accounts for all these features together. Specifically I identify three main desiderata, which the 
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alternative thesis satisfies at the same time.
In the section above, I have been talking about accounts which argue that the doing/allowing 
distinction can be expressed by other principles and features in a fairly informal way. One way 
to define such accounts might be the label “reductionist”. Simply put, I distinguish between 
reductionist  and  non-reductionist accounts of the doing/allowing distinction by appealing to 
how they answer to the following question:  is the doing/allowing distinction a fundamental 
one, or can it be expressed by other principles or features?  
I define as  reductionist all accounts which claim that the doing/allowing distinction is  not a 
fundamental one. Which position should the alternative thesis take? As I concluded in 4.6, the 
failure of the strategy of fully-equalized cases, and the import of framing effects, seem to show 
that the doing/allowing distinction cannot be easily disentangled from normative and descriptive 
features  of  cases.  For  this  reason,  I  think  the  doing/allowing  distinction  might  be  most  
promisingly cashed out in a way which incorporates other principles and features.
I now discuss which “features or principles” seem to be on the table, and could suitably serve a  
reductionist.  To do so, I attempt a taxonomy of reductionist accounts of the doing/allowing 
distinction. This task will help in singling out some key aspects of the distinction, each captured 
by  one  of  these  reductionist  proposals.  Two of  these  features  (moral  relevance  and frame-
dependency/ disagreement) have already emerged in the comparison between the positive and 
the negative thesis; one additional feature will define a list of three desiderata. As it will become 
clear from my discussion, I do think that most of the accounts of the doing/allowing distinction  
are, in fact, reductionist. In this sense, this survey is crucial for understanding in which way the 
alternative thesis is reductionist. 
A first class of reductionist models aims to express the doing/allowing distinction in terms of  
features which are not, at least  prima facie, morally relevant. These kinds of accounts can be 
further  divided  into  cognitive and  descriptive interpretations.  The  former  argue  that  the 
doing/allowing distinction can be fully explained as the result  of  cognitive biases,  or,  more 
charitably, of the characteristic way our moral reasoning works. These models, like Horowitz's 
or Sinnott-Armstrong's  accounts,  have the merit  of allowing for framing effects,  and, at the 
same time, of explaining why the doing/allowing distinction amounts to a strong and persistent 
intuition, as it is the product of the exercise of our (flawed) reasoning skills. Descriptive models 
like Bennett's account, on the other hand, explain the doing/allowing distinction as capturing 
some factual  characteristic of  actions,  such as being positively or negatively relevant  to an 
upshot or, more generally, as being relevant to an outcome in a specific way. After identifying 
such features, they usually deny that they are morally relevant. 
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This class of causal frameworks seems to adequately identify one aspect which is crucial for our 
doing/allowing attributions, that is, the fact that an agent has a specific type of causal relation 
with the outcome. Purely causal accounts, nonetheless, appear at least incomplete, as causes are 
always defined against a set of background conditions, such as what the natural course of nature 
is, or what the best or standard explanation for an outcome is. As I argued in Chapter 2, these 
models  thus  rely  on  prior  evaluations  and  expectations  about  the  context,  and  should  be 
supplemented with a precise interpretation of how this background process works. In this sense, 
these accounts are somehow naïve in expecting that causal facts are “out there”, independently 
of our interpretation of the situation. 
Both the cognitive and descriptive models, in summary, reduce the doing/allowing distinction to 
seemingly non-moral features of actions: the idiosyncrasies and bugs of human cognition, or 
some merely descriptive facts about  an action,  which do not  apparently amount  to morally 
relevant characteristics. The result of these efforts, as Bennett and other reductionists argue, thus 
forces us to question and possibly abandon a particularly strong and long-standing intuition, and 
to  accept  that  we  are  mistaken  in  attaching  moral  significance  to  doing/allowing 
characterisations.  To  be  clear,  causal  accounts  do  not  necessarily  need  to  deny  that  the 
doing/allowing distinction is morally relevant. Some of the “sequence” accounts I surveyed in 
Chapter 1expemplify this possibility. What I mean here is that causal facts are not  obviously 
morally relevant.
Reductionist proposals, nonetheless, do not necessarily need to look like Horowitz's or Bennett's 
account.  There  are  proposals  that  may  be  classed  as  versions  of  what  I  have  called  “the 
moderate negative thesis”, that is, accounts which argue that the doing/allowing distinction is 
not morally relevant per se, but cannot be fully expressed in terms that are morally irrelevant. 
Specifically, one can argue that the doing/allowing distinction is not a fundamental one, but  
rather it tracks a separate set of moral principles or categorisations. One example of this strategy 
is Quinn's account, which defines doing and allowing as negative and positive rights violations.  
Another reductionist approach that belongs to this class is Kagan's  norm-violation proposal, 
which identifies doing actions as violating a rule of behaviour. As I argued in Chapter 2, these 
accounts  often  fall  short  in  accounting  for  all  our  use  of  doing/allowing  classifications,  
especially in less “moralised” examples.
Note that,  at this point, one might argue that all explanatory accounts of the doing/allowing 
distinction  could  be  defined  as  reductionist,  insofar  as  they  provide  an  explanation  of  this 
dichotomy referring to something else. In this sense, most frameworks in the “positive thesis” 
field would also fall into the third reductionism category, insofar as they refer to other moral  
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principles,  like  Foot's  self-ownership  framework.  Clearly,  this  would  mean  that  the  term 
“reductionist” is redundant, as I would label as such any explanatory attempt. Only frameworks 
which argue that the difference in moral worth of doing and allowing actions is somehow “self-
evident”,  and  does  not  require  further  justifications,  would  indeed  truly  characterise  this 
dichotomy  as  a  fundamental  one.4 While  this  aspect  of  my  classification  might  appear 
problematic, I see it as the result of the difficulties illustrated in the opening of this chapter,  
which any doing/allowing account must confront. The problems raised by our intuitive use of  
the doing/allowing distinction do, arguably, require a kind of analysis which cannot be easily 
dismissed  within  a  “self-evident”  framework.  For  taxonomy purposes,  however,  it  is  more 
natural to define as “explanatory accounts” all frameworks which provide a complex and not  
self-evident  model  of  the  distinction.  Within  this  broad  category,  we  can  keep  the  label 
“reductionist accounts” to refer to deflationist frameworks, like Horowitz's or Bennett's, which 
deny  the  moral  relevance  of  the  distinction.  Note  also  that,  in  this  respect,  what  is  more 
informative is not whether an account is explanatory/reductionist, but rather in which way it is 
reductionist. In the remaining of this thesis, and in 5.5 more specifically, I will try to answer this 
question regarding the alternative thesis.
In  summary,  we  can  identify  three  main  explanatory  accounts,  which  amount  to  human 
cognition  models  (reductionists),  descriptive/causal  models  (reductionists),  and  models 
appealing to other moral features (non reductionist in the narrow sense). All these proposals, I  
have argued, seem to fit particularly well with a key feature of the doing/allowing distinction,  
but also fall short in accounting for other fundamental aspects. Specifically, I think that each of  
these three families of accounts identifies a crucial characteristic of this classification: (i) the  
fact  that  doing/allowing  classifications  track  whether  an  agent  is  causally  relevant  to  the 
outcome  in  a  certain  way,  (ii)  the  fact  that  doing/allowing  classifications  can  be  frame-
dependent,  and  (iii)  the  intuition  that  the  doing/allowing  distinction  is  obviously  morally 
relevant.  Table  5.2  summarizes  the  discussion  above,  showing  which  explanatory  account 
4 One may argue that, after all, moral principles do not always require an external justification, in terms 
of independent considerations or rules: it  is  sound, for example, to think that there is no need to 
motivate a moral proposition like “stealing is bad” or “being loyal is good”. Frameworks appealing to 
ethical intuitionism, for example, typically argue that such basic moral propositions are intrinsically  
incapable of proof. The doing/allowing distinction, in this sense, could simply amount to one of these 
basic  principles,  and  the  insight  that  “doing  is  worse  than  allowing”  would  not  call  for  more  
discussion,  as  all  moral  agents  would  simply  be  able  to  recognize  and  employ it  in  appropriate 
contexts. I also note that it is not only intuitionists in the Moorean sense who can see the dichotomy as 
fundamental. Jeff McMahan's and Frances Kamm's accounts might be “fundamentalists” too, in the 
sense that they would define the distinction, and then, through the use of many cases, show that it  
matters  to  our  intuitive  judgments,  and  that  it  coheres  well  with  other  judgments  we make.  The 
relevance of the distinction for such accounts is not self-evident; it is justified through a reflective 
equilibrium process, but there is no “explanation” as to why it matters that could be characterised as  
reductionist. 
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matches each of the three aspects of the doing/allowing distinction:
Tracking that doing 
and allowing are 
“causing” in a 
specific way
Allowing framing 
effects
Obvious moral 
relevance
Human cognition models ü
Descriptive models ü
“Other  moral  principles” 
models  
ü
Table 5.2
I  think that  i),  ii)  and iii)  amount to three reasonable  desiderata for  a suitable  explanatory 
account  of the doing/allowing distinction.  My contention is  that  the  alternative thesis,  with 
respect  to  the  three models  above,  accounts  for all  these  features.  In the remainder of  this  
chapter, I justify this claim.
In  section  5.3,  I  argue  specifically  that  the  alternative  thesis  may  be  most  promisingly 
formulated  using  the  self-contained  network  account.  This  formulation  can  conveniently 
captures (i), (ii) and (iii).
5.3 The self-contained network account and the alternative thesis
In Chapter 2, I argued that “mixed” accounts seem particularly well-equipped to track our use of 
the doing/allowing distinction, and I examined how we can employ Hitchcock's self-contained 
network framework to justify most of the ordinary doing/allowing attributions. In this section, I 
show how this model also allows for doing/allowing attributions to be frame-dependent, thus 
incorporating  framing  effects  in  this  account.  Arguably,  this  solution accounts  for  all  three  
desiderata, as we would have a reliable descriptive model which is causal in nature (i), explains 
framing effects (ii), and grounds doing/allowing attributions in morally relevant aspects, thus 
capturing the moral significance we attach to this distinction (iii).  I  therefore suggest that a 
formulation  of  the  alternative  thesis  which  incorporates  this  model  will  nicely  retain these 
explanatory merits.
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As I argued in Chapter 1, the key “gap” of causal accounts of the doing/allowing distinction is  
the assumption of which course of events, or “sequence”, is considered to be natural or relevant. 
The issue of the dependence on the “normal course of events” is involved in distinguishing  
“true” causes  from background conditions and in  distinguishing acts  from causally  relevant 
omissions.  While  discussing  Hitchcock's  self-contained  networks proposal,  I  suggested  that 
normative considerations could help us fill this gap. Expectations over which behaviours are 
standard, which duties are morally required, and which norms should not be violated define 
which kind of causal relations are relevant and salient to us. Just like the presence of oxygen is a 
standard background condition, and thus it is the lighting of the match which causes the fire, so 
feeding one's baby is a moral requirement for all parents, and therefore failure to fulfil this duty 
is the salient cause of the death of the baby. Within Hitchcock's model, this substantive work is  
done at the level of setting the default and deviant value of variables. To be sure, the core of this  
model still captures “causal facts”, that is, the “child” variables in the model counterfactually 
depend on  the “parent”  variables.  Whether  an action  counts  as  doing rather  than  allowing, 
however, depends on whether the causal network is self-contained, a parameter which is settled  
by the assignment of deviant and default values to variables. 
In 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, I show in detail how this model allows for shifts in frames to change the 
characterisation of actions as doings rather than allowings. Also, this account makes clear that 
attributions of doing and allowing capture and express morally significant considerations, as 
doing/allowing attributions are built upon a normative background. I will examine this second 
aspect in 5.3.3 and in greater detail in Chapter 6.
5.3.1 Incorporating framing effects
Consider  again  one  of  the  most  paradigmatic  cases  of  framing  effects,  the  “Asian  flu” 
experiment analysed in Chapter 4. I have previously suggested, when discussing Kahneman and 
Tversky's interpretation, that the use of specific phrasing like “200 people will be saved” rather 
than “400 people will die” could induce a different perception of the same vaccination plan as 
an instance of doing harm rather than allowing harm to occur. But how does this work in more 
detail?  In  Chapter  4,  my observations  were  limited  to  the  fact  that  setting  the  baseline  at 
“everyone  lives”  rather  than  “everyone  dies”  does  the  trick.  I  now  suggest  that  we  can  
convincingly cash out this idea at the level of default value assignments to variables.
Recall that, in the “Asian flu” case, agents are faced with the threat of an “Asian flu” which is  
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expected to kill 600 people, and can choose between two alternative vaccination programs:
• If Program A is adopted, 200 people out of the 600 will be saved.
• If Program B is adopted, there is 2/3 probability that no-one will be saved, and 1/3 
probability that all 600 people will be saved. 
Alternatively, in the second experimental setting, agents are asked to choose between C and D:
• If Program C is adopted, 400 people out of the 600 will die.
• If  Program  D  is  adopted,  there  is  1/3  probability  that  no-one  will  die,  and  2/3 
probability that 600 people will die.
In Chapter 4, I argued that preference reversal in this case can be explained by the fact that,  
while choosing Program A is characterised as allowing harm, choosing Plan C is characterised 
as doing harm, despite these two programs being equivalent in terms of expected lives saved (or 
lost). In this sense, the shift in the classification of the same action as an instance of doing or  
allowing is a straightforward example of a framing effect,  as it  is merely motivated by the 
choice of specific words, a seemingly irrelevant modification. 
Hitchcock's causal model allows,  in this case,  for a consistent reconstruction of the shift  in 
classification. Recall now the main definitions of the Hitchcock framework: a causal model is 
an ordered pair <V, E>, where V is a set of variables and E is a set of equations among these  
variables. In my simplified interpretation, variable can take two different values, where each 
value represents the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of some event. By considering Plan A and 
Plan C in isolation, without referring to the comparison with the risky options (Plan C and Plan 
D respectively), we can thus define the following variables:
A = 1 if the agent selects plan A, A = 0 if she doesn't;
C = 1 if the agent selects plan C, C = 0 if she doesn't.
In terms of the outcomes, the more “natural” interpretation would be to set O (the outcome) as  
200 lives saved and 400 lives lost. Nonetheless, as we are focusing here on the “harm” the 
programs bring about, I narrow my analysis to the 400 lives lost, and on which type of causal  
connection the agent has with these 400 lives lost. Therefore, O = 400 lives lost.
The equations representing the counterfactuals we use for describing the model, are:
A = 1, then O = A (if Program A is selected,  400 lives will be lost);
C = 1, then O = C (if Program C is selected,  400 lives will be lost).
Hitchcock's notion of counterfactual dependence can be represented, with respect to the Asian  
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flu case, by the following graphs:
A                          O
C                          O
Figure 5.1: Asian flu
Where A is a parent of O in the first causal model and C is a parent of O in the second model.5 
In both cases, O counterfactually depends on A or C (respectively), as the counterfactuals “if 
Program A had been selected, there would have been 400 lives lost” and “if Program C had been 
selected, there would have been 400 lives lost” are both true. The “negative” counterfactuals are 
also true: “if A had not been selected, there would not have been 400 lives lost”; “if C had not  
been selected, there would not have been 400 lives lost”.6
Let's now consider whether A and C count as doings rather than allowings. As per my discussion 
of Hitchcock's model, this depends on whether the causal networks {A, O} and {C, O} are self-
contained. According to Hitchcock, if <V, E> is a causal model,  X, Y ∈ V, and N ⊆ V is the 
causal network connecting X to Y in <V, E>, then the causal network N is self-contained if and 
only if for all Z in N, if Z has parents in N, then Z takes a default value when all of its parents in  
N do (and its parents in V\N take their actual values). Conversely, a causal network is non-self-
contained if it is possible for Z to take its deviant value while all its parents take their default 
ones. Following this distinction, I further defined cases of doing as instances where the outcome 
counterfactually depends on the action, and the network is self-contained. On the other hand, I  
defined  cases  of  allowing as  instances  where  the  outcome  counterfactually  depends  on  the 
action, and the causal network is non-self-contained.7
What we need to find out, therefore, is whether O takes a default or deviant value when its 
parents A and C take their default value. To settle this point, I suggest that we should consider 
that agents' expectations about which is the default value of O might be affected by the change 
in the baseline. For this reason, I define O* as the outcome in the first decision problem, and O' 
as the outcome in the second decision problem.
For the first decision problem, recall that the framing in terms of “saving” seems to imply that 
5 I am ignoring here the causal contribution of the flu.
6 To see why the negative counterfactuals are also true, we may think that, if Programs A or C are not  
selected (and, consequently, B and D are selected) these 400 people would instead have a 2/3 chance 
of dying, which is arguably a different outcome.
7 I also argue, following Hitchcock, that “real” instances of allowing will be the ones where the variable  
is not a mere background condition, and thus takes its deviant value. I do not dwell on this further 
condition  here,  as  I  focus  narrowly  on  distinguishing  doing  from  allowings,  rather  than  “real”  
allowings from background conditions.
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without the intervention of the agent everyone will die. Therefore: 
O* = 1 if 400 lives are not lost, O* = 0 if 400 lives are lost,
where Def(O*) = 0.
Note that I set here the default value of O* as 0 because, if the natural course of events seems to  
be that everyone will die, the expectation is that these 400 people will die anyway. Following 
Hitchcock's suggestion,8 I also set Def(A) and Def(C) = 0. In this case, it is possible for, O* to 
take its deviant value of 1 when A takes its default one of 1, that is, 400 lives are saved when the 
agent does not select Program A. This happens exactly when Program B is selected, and nobody 
dies. The causal network {A, O*} can be thus defined as non-self-contained. This represents 
how Program A is characterised as allowing harm to 400 people.
As I argue in Chapter 4, the use of the phrase “saving” is what induces agents to think at the 
baseline, and thus set the default of O* as “everyone dies”. But what about Program C? In the  
second decision problem, the baseline is set at “everyone lives”. We can thus define:
O' = 1  if 400 lives are not lost, O' = 0 if 400 lives are lost,
where Def(O') = 1.
Note that I set here the Def(O') as 1: if the “normal course of events” is perceived as everyone  
lives, the expectation is that the 400 lives will not be lost. Again, the default value for C is set at  
0. In this case, it is not possible for O' to take its deviant value (that is, that not everybody lives)  
when C takes its default one, that is, if Program C is selected.9 The causal network {C, O'} is 
therefore self-contained, and this would explain the characterisation of the choice of Program C 
as doing harm. 
To  refer  to  Hitchcock's  understanding  of  self-contained  networks,  I  suggest  that  the  first  
decision  problem stresses  the  role  of  the  flu,  and  thus  makes  us  perceive  the  selection  of 
Program A as an incomplete  explanation of the outcome. On the other hand,  in the second 
decision problem, the import of the flu is concealed, and thus the selection of Program C is 
perceived as a complete explanation of the outcome.
The setting of default and deviant variables can thus potentially explain why the same action ‒ 
in terms of expected lives lost  ‒ can be classified as doing rather than allowing depending on 
how the  description  of  the  problem influences  the  choice  of  default/deviant.  Similarly,  the 
8 Hitchcock (2007, p. 507) argues that “In the case of human actions, we tend to think of those states 
requiring voluntary bodily motion as deviants and those compatible with lack of motion as defaults.” 
9 More precisely, it is only possible for O' to take its default value of 1 if Program C is not selected, and  
thus takes its default value as well: this would be the case where Program D is selected instead, and  
everyone lives.
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model can also explain why agents may disagree about such classifications. Some readers, for 
instance,  might not be persuaded by the reconstruction above,  and argue that,  in the causal 
model {C, O'}, the default  value of O' should be still put at 0. For these agents, opting for 
Program C would still be characterised as allowing harm. 
Of course, this conclusion, which can be generalised for most cases of frame-dependency and 
disagreement, is not particularly comforting in the light of our aspiration to reach agreement and 
be  consistent.  Nonetheless,  as  I  will  argue  later  in  this  section,  not  all doing/allowing 
characterisations are subject to such ambiguity and, more significantly, in less controversial and 
complex cases, agents will be less justified in setting alternative default values. That is to say,  
sometimes there will be a “correct”, or at least robust, characterisation of actions as doings or 
else allowing. In examples characterised by persistent interpersonal disagreement, however, two 
different value assignments to a variable seem plausible. In such circumstances, shifts in frames 
will give agents additional reasons for setting the default value in one way rather than the other. 
5.3.2 Framing: empirical and normative expectations
In my formulation  of  the  alternative  thesis,  I  rejected  the position  that  there  is  a  “correct”  
characterisation  of  actions.  In  the  Asian  flu  case,  we  can  thus  argue  that,  both  the  “A” 
characterisation  as  allowing  and  the  “C”  characterisation  as  doing  are  tenable.  One  thing, 
however, is to represent how different doing/allowing classifications can be brought about by 
different  framings;  another  is  to  argue  that  different  framings  give  rise  to  different  moral 
contexts in which we intuitively apply different moral rules. In this respect, the self-contained 
network model only shows that two alternative classifications are formally possible, but cannot  
provide an account of what is going on in cases of frame-dependency, and, more importantly,  
how this impacts the moral significance of the doing/allowing distinction.  
I  think  that  there  are  two  routes  through  which  framing  effects  can  induce  two  different 
doing/allowing classifications, which map onto two ways of setting the default/deviant value, 
and which amount to different ways of specifying which is the normal course of events.10 First, 
the “normal” course of events can be interpreted in an empirical or statistical sense, and tracks  
what an agent thinks is natural or more likely to happen. Different agents might have different 
expectations about which course of events is more standard or normal. Moreover, in addition to 
interpersonal  disagreement,  some  examples  of  framing  effects  point  to  intrapersonal 
10 These two different interpretations of “normal” have also been suggested by Kagan (1998),  when 
discussing his “norm-violation” account.
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disagreement,  thus  implying  that  different  different  frames  may  suggest  different  empirical  
expectations in the same agent. As I argued in the previous chapter, I do not think we have  
enough empirical evidence to provide a detailed explanation of this phenomenon whereby the 
wording of a case leads to different empirical inferences. My intuition is that, especially in the 
case of intrapersonal disagreement, this issue should be investigated in cognitive sciences or 
behavioural  psychology  settings.  What  I  am more  interested  in  here  is  the  bearing  of  this 
mechanism  on  the  significance  of  the  doing/allowing  distinction.  When  doing/allowing 
attributions depend on empirical expectations about which course of events is natural, or which 
outcome is more likely to occur, we might conclude that they capture the specific way the agent  
brought about the outcome. My account would thus be a purely causal one. These different ways 
of  causing  a  harm might  still  amount  to  a  morally  relevant  distinction,  yet  are  ultimately 
ambiguous. As the self-contained network model captures, different empirical expectations can 
isolate an action as a cause or else regard it as a background condition.11
Second, the “natural” course of events may also refer to social rules and societal expectations.  
In this sense, which course of events is standard tracks agents' different expectations about what 
is  required,  or  which moral  rules  should  be relevant  or  more  important  for  the case  under 
scrutiny. In this case, disagreement can track the fact that different agents perceive different 
norms as salient, which may again be dependent on cognitive features. Alternatively, different 
default values can reflect actual moral disagreement. In this case, the doing/allowing distinction 
would not be morally relevant per se, as it captures these independent normative features, and is 
ultimately ambiguous. I will examine this second route in more detail in the next section, and 
carry on this task in Chapter 6.
Note  that,  while these two different  routes  for setting the default  variable  are,  in principle,  
distinguishable,  in  most  cases  they  overlap.  Specifically,  while  we  can  talk  about  the 
doing/allowing distinction as an empirical matter, as in my analysis in Chapters 1 and 2 we 
usually think about  these classifications for moral  purposes.  In practical  instances  of moral 
11 In  this  thesis,  I  do  not  take  any  specific  stance  with  respect  to  the  position  that  when  the  
doing/allowing distinction only captures the way an agent may be causally relevant to an outcome, it 
still  amounts to  a  morally relevant feature.  This  agnostic  position, however,  does not  have  much 
impact on my subsequent discussion of moral relevance. I think, indeed, that in the vast majority of 
cases in which we use the doing/allowing harm distinction, we do so in a “moralised” way, that is, in 
ethically  sensitive contexts  or  when we want to  convey moral  considerations.  For this  reason,  in 
practice,  doing/allowing classifications usually  incorporate normative features.  Nonetheless,  in the 
remainder of this study I will often use the expression “obvious” moral relevance to refer to these  
normative considerations, as opposed to merely “causal” considerations.
Note  too  that  this  purely  empirical  doing/allowing  classification  might  capture  the  intuitive 
act/omission distinction. I do not elaborate here on this suggestion; if this were the case, however, we 
could  conclude  that  the  doing/allowing  distinction  incorporates,  but  expands,  the  act/omission 
distinction, in a way which is particularly evident in moral cases.
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reasoning, our expectations about what is likely to happen are at least partially affected by what 
we think should happen, and what rules we hold each other to. Therefore, I am doubtful that 
there will be many cases of purely factual disagreement, in which agents' different expectations 
about the normal course of events will be solely dependent on different empirical expectations  
about which course of events is more likely to happen. The Asian flu case, in this respect, seems 
to be an example in which disagreement is mostly factual,  and seemingly affected by some 
cognitive features which involve perceiving different reference points as salient.12 Even in this 
case, the setting of default values may also be affected by what agents think is required from 
them in such ethically sensitive decisions: for instance, that they should try to avoid a situation 
in which someone dies for sure, or that they should not “gamble” with people's lives.
As  the  discussion  above  shows,  we  can  account  for  instability  and  disagreement  in 
doing/allowing classifications by appeal to the fact that there are two plausible and reasonable 
attributions of default values to a variable which serves as parent, and thus defines which course 
of events is considered “normal”, both in an empirical and normative sense. This explanation 
gives  us  further  elements  to examine  disagreement  over  doing and allowing attributions.  It 
seems that many experimental results reporting instability and disagreement, and most standard 
cases  of  framing  effects,  refer  to  cases  where  the  situation  is  under-described.  In  these 
circumstances, the fact that some details of the situations are missing could induce different 
agents to appeal to different normative expectations or descriptions of events, filling the picture  
with their intuitions about what is familiar, common and standard. Many artificial case-studies,  
such as the trolley case or the Asian flu case, are under-described in some respect, and people's 
intuition  is  that  they  “would  like  to  know  more”  about  these  scenarios  so  as  to  make  a 
competent evaluation. 
When eliciting responses over the Asian flu case, and asking for motivations in favour of one 
program rather than the other,  subjects often enquire about  aspects of  the decision problem 
which are not made explicit, such as “how will the 200 individuals die?”, “can some of the  
people who get the flu survive?”, “how old are these people?”, “am I the person in charge?” and  
so on.13 I think all the information that people want to know about by way of “setting the scene” 
contributes to defining which course of events is perceived as more natural or standard, and the 
more vague or  ambiguous the description of  scenarios  is,  the  greater  the case  for multiple  
12 Specifically, as I will show in the following paragraphs, this example is significantly under-described: 
therefore,  agents have no choice but to infer from clues in the wording what is the normal course of 
events.
13 I am grateful to my audience in King's College, Porto, Sheffield and Utrecht, as well as to Choice 
Group fellows, for raising and discussing these questions. I am also grateful to my PH222 students  
and  PhD colleagues.  My anecdotal  evidence  on  the  Asian  flu  case  builds  upon  these  insightful 
contributions.
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default variables being justified. 
This hypothesis, moreover, seems to be supported by some experimental surveys, like the ones 
conducted by Jou, Shanteau and Harris (1996). The authors argue that “people have prototypical 
knowledge about certain types of events and comprehend the relationship between events by 
referring to such general knowledge structures known as  schemata.  When encountered events 
cannot be fit into a schema, the relationship between the events will not be understood”.14 To 
test  for  this  interpretation,  which  is  consistent  with  my  discussion  of  framing  effects  in 
doing/allowing classifications, Jou, Shanteau and Harris designed some case-studies which are 
identical to standard examples in the experimental literature, like the Asian flu case, but contain 
what  the  authors  define  as  a  rationale,  or  causal  schema.  According  to  their  hypothesis, 
providing this schema should help subjects to recognize the equivalence relationship between, 
say, 200 lives saved and 400 lives lost. So, for the Asian flu case, the following background 
story was provided before the evaluation of the standard options:
“Imagine  that  the  US   has  been  attacked  by  an  unusual  and  deadly  disease.  Without 
treatment,  a person who has contracted the disease will  die in  a few days.  Six hundred 
people have been diagnosed as having contracted the disease. Some substance, extracted 
from  living  human  organs  and  extremely  difficult  to  obtain,  can  cure  the  disease. 
Unfortunately, there is only enough of this substance for 200 people. No additional source of 
this substance will become available for at least 18 months, and no other cure or treatment 
will be found in at least the next two decades. If the patient receives an insufficient dose,  
there is a chance that the patient may live or may die. Two alternatives are proposed.”15
The results  showed  that  preference  reversal  was  significantly  reduced  when this  story  was 
provided.16 I  do  not  focus  here  specifically  on  Jou,  Shanteau  and Harris's  causal  schemata 
proposal; what is interesting about their experiment is that the story describes in more detail the 
Asian flu case, and answers some of the questions discussed above which people often ask 
when confronted with the case.  These results,  in fact,  seem to back up my hypothesis that  
different doing/allowing classifications are more likely to occur when cases are unfamiliar and  
significantly under-described, especially with respect to the underlying causal process.
Following the above discussion, we can thus expect that, as framing effects control the values 
assigned to variables, our doing/allowing classifications would be less dependent on framing in 
cases where the attribution of a specific default value is particularly robust. Arguably, this will 
happen when the scenario is very familiar to the agent making the evaluation, and/or when this  
14 Jou, Shanteau and Harris (1996), p. 2.
15 Ibidem, p. 13.
16 Ibidem,  pp.  4‒5.  Specifically,  the  authors  report  that  the  results  are  statistically  significant;  the 
percentage of risk-averse responses decrease when the rationale is provided. 
115
is made explicit in the description of the case. For instance, for those who are convinced by 
Kamm's  reconstruction  of  the  Asian  flu  case,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  “allowing  harm” 
description is more reasonable and natural. While it will always be possible, in principle, to 
explain  different  doing/allowing  attributions  using  the  default/deviant  variables  model,  the 
justifications for setting an alternative default  value will look more and more tenuous when 
cases are very familiar and detailed. Of course, framing effects might not be the only source of 
disagreement and instability in doing/allowing classifications; substantial moral disagreement 
may occur as well. The deviant/default variables model, I argue, also explains this phenomenon, 
through what I call here the “second route”.
5.3.3 Normative considerations
So far, I have mostly been referring to how different empirical expectations can set different  
default values, like perceiving one reference point to be more natural than another in evaluating 
outcomes. Expectations, however, also refer to normative rather than merely descriptive features 
of scenarios, such as agents' intuitions about which rules of behaviour are salient, or which is  
the appropriate moral principle for the decision problem at issue. In these circumstances, the  
description of an action as an instance of doing rather than allowing incorporates normative 
considerations and moral intuitions, and the persistence of interpersonal disagreement can here 
reflect  substantive  moral  disagreement.  A  straightforward  example  in  this  sense,  is  the 
controversial  issue  of  the  moral  legitimacy  of  euthanasia.  Let's  take  the  case  of  active  
euthanasia, in which the doctor voluntarily administers a lethal drug to a terminally ill patient. I  
will not engage here in the broader discussion of whether this action is morally permissible or  
impermissible,  but  I focus on the limited question of whether administering the lethal  drug 
amounts to an instance of doing harm rather than allowing harm to occur. 
Within the self-contained network model, we can define the variables as follows:
A = 1 if the doctor administers the drug, A = 0 if she doesn't;
B = 1 if the patient dies, B = 0 if she doesn't.
Where B counterfactually depends on A, and A is thus the parent of B (if the doctor doesn't  
administer the drug, the patient doesn't die, or at least does not die at t1).
Arguably,  agents  who  would  tend  to  classify  this  action  as  a  case  of  doing  harm,  will 
characterise as “standard” a specific conduct for doctors, namely, that they should cure diseases 
and only intervene so as to improve patients' health conditions. In this case, recognizing this 
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duty as the salient moral aspect of this scenario would set Def(A) = 0. On the other hand, the  
most natural interpretation of Def(B) is 0, at least for the death of the patient at the specific time 
t1 immediately following the lethal injection. Therefore, when A takes its deviant value, and thus 
the doctor administers the drug, B takes its deviant value as well; if the doctor's action follows 
the default, and she does not administer the lethal drug, the patient does not die at time t1; thus B 
takes the default value as well. We are then justified in characterising the doctor's action as an 
instance of doing harm, as the causal network {A, B} is self-contained.
On the other hand, agents who would tend to define active euthanasia as a case of allowing 
harm, would probably perceive other principles or rules of conduct, such as that the primary  
duty of a doctor is to act accordingly to the patient's will as more morally stringent. Therefore, 
Def(A) will be set at 1 when the patient asks for active euthanasia; this means that when A takes  
its default value, B takes its deviant one. A is then classified as allowing harm, as the causal  
network {A, B} is not self-contained.
In this case, the use of the self-contained network approach makes explicit that doing/allowing 
characterisations  are  obviously morally  significant:  they  incorporate  the  fact  that  an  agent 
perceives one duty/rule as more morally relevant or stringent than another. This kind of analysis 
thus  equips  us  with  the  necessary  tools  for  explaining  the  moral  significance  of  such 
characterisations. Similarly to framing effects, it is reasonable to expect that, while we could, in 
principle, explain moral disagreement over any instance of doing/allowing classification, there 
will  be  particularly  robust  and  straightforward cases  in  which  appealing  to  different  moral 
principles would be less justifiable. To see this point, let us take a case which is problematic for  
purely counterfactual models, like Starving one's baby. In this example, we could argue that 
general agreement over the classification of this conduct as doing harm reflects the fact that the  
norm “take care of your child” is much less controversial than the one describing the content 
and  boundaries  of  a  doctor's  duties.  For  this  example,  the  self-contained  network  model 
successfully explains why an action which could be defined as omission in some causal models  
counts for most agents as doing harm. 
5.3.4 Summary
In 5.3, I have argued that Hitchcock's self-contained network model can account for three key 
features  of  the  doing/allowing  distinction.  Specifically,  this  model  relies  on  the  notion  of 
counterfactual dependence, thus accounting for the fact that doing and allowing amounts to two 
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different ways of causing (i). Second, whether a causal network is self-contained depends on the 
assignment of default values to all the variables in the causal network. I showed above how 
different empirical and normative expectations about the “natural course of events” can bring  
about different value assignments and, in turn, deliver different classifications in terms of doing 
or allowing. As these different expectations may depend on which description of the case is 
selected, we may account for the fact that framing affects our doing/allowing attributions (ii).  
Finally, the self-contained network model can explain why the doing/allowing distinction strikes 
us as morally relevant; that is, all other things being equal, doing is worse than allowing (iii).
This last  desideratum, arguably, requires more elaboration. Specifically,  I have not  provided 
here  a systematic account of how empirical  and normative expectations  interact  in order to 
select one value assignment. I give some further indications of this interaction in 5.5. Also, I did 
not  elaborate  on which moral  features  and normative expectations can be incorporated into  
doing/allowing classifications, and thus imbue this distinction with moral relevance. In Chapter 
6,  I  will  argue that  those features  with obvious and indisputable  moral  value amount to a) 
whether an agent had the intention of causing harm and b) whether an agent acted against some  
salient moral duty or norm.
In the following section,  I  will  provide a  final  formulation  of  the  alternative thesis,  which 
incorporates  the  self-contained  network  account  as  a  tool  for  making  doing/allowing 
classifications.
5.4 Final formulation 
We can conclude this survey of different theoretical proposals, and their relative merits, with the 
following formulation of the alternative thesis:
An action amounts to doing harm if the harmful outcome counterfactually depends on 
the action, within a self-contained network account; an action amounts to allowing harm 
if  the  harmful  outcome  counterfactually  depends  on  the  action,  within  a  non-self-
contained network account.17 Whether a causal account is self-contained depends on the 
value-assignment to variables and, more specifically, on what is set as the “default”  
value for each variable in the network. An assignment of default value reflects empirical 
expectations about which course of events is more natural and likely to occur, as well as 
normative expectations about which moral rules and conventions are appropriate in a 
17 Again, I do not refer here to Hitchcock's further condition for discriminating between real allowings 
and background conditions.
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given context.
This account tracks the fact that, with doing/allowing considerations, we are interested in the  
specific way the agent brought about the outcome. Given that different attributions of default  
value may be reasonable and legitimate in some contexts, the alternative thesis also accounts for 
the  fact  that  this  distinction  may  be  ambiguous,  that  is,  there  could  be  no  univocal 
characterisation  in  terms  of  doing  or  else  allowing.  As  such,  this  proposal  allows  for 
disagreement and framing effects.  Finally, while the doing/allowing distinction might not be 
morally relevant per se, it incorporates normative features of the context, and it is thus morally  
significant. 
5.5 Conclusion
I conclude this section with some final remarks about the rationale of reductionist projects. As I 
argued above, I define the alternative thesis as an reductionist account, insofar as it argues that 
the doing/allowing distinction is not a fundamental one, but rather tracks other empirical and 
normative features of the case at issue. While some reductionist accounts of the doing/allowing 
distinction  amount  to  influential  frameworks,  like  Bennett's,  there  are  also  reasons  to  be 
sceptical about the feasibility of the reductionist task. As my discussion in Chapter 2 showed, it  
is often the case that reducing all doing/allowing classifications to another dichotomy or moral  
principle fails to account for at least some of the ways we use this distinction in everyday life. In 
this sense, the distinction seems to be much more nuanced and complex than what a “simple”  
reductionist model would allow for. Table 5.2 also seems to confirm these concerns: when we  
strive to reduce the doing/allowing distinction to (i) causal relations, (ii) cognitive features, or 
(iii)  other  moral  principles,  it  looks  like  we  inevitably  leave  some  other  aspects  of  this  
dichotomy out of the picture. 
McMahan (1998), in his discussion of Bennett's account, expresses the same concerns about the 
feasibility  of  a  reductionist  project.  Despite  the  merits  of  Bennett's  analysis  and  its 
unquestionable clarification results, McMahan is doubtful that this (simple) reductionist account 
successfully explains the complexities of our use of the doing/allowing distinction:
“Bennett is undoubtedly right that, in the broad range of cases in which we detect a moral  
asymmetry between making and allowing, we cannot be confident that we are responding to 
a single factor that in present and operative in them all. In part this is because, in some of 
these cases, our intuitions are being aroused and prodded by something quite different (...) 
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but another part of the explanation may be that the difference between doing and allowing is 
not reducible to a single factor (...) It might instead be that, while we are indeed responding 
to somewhat different factors in different cases, we are also right in detecting an asymmetry 
between doing and allowing; for the distinction between making and allowing might be 
internally complex, compounded from various factors that engage our intuitions.”18
I agree with McMahan that there are reasons to doubt that a reductionist task can be performed 
in  a  simple  and  systematic  way.  The  doing/allowing  distinction  while  clearly  tracking 
something, does not seem to simply map onto one single moral principle, but rather captures 
what is salient for a specific agent on a case-by-case basis. I do not think, therefore, that we can 
identify a “small” and fixed set of principles or features, or isolate a set of moral principles or  
categorisations which neatly govern the way we use this distinction in everyday life. 
The way the alternative thesis is formulated, however, allows for a more nuanced interpretation 
of the reductionist rationale. Using the self-contained network account, we can explain on a 
case-by-case  basis  which  empirical  or  normative  features  are  incorporated  into  our 
doing/allowing classifications. Furthermore, the final doing/allowing attribution can often be 
better  understood  as  a  “summary”  or  composite  judgement  of  a  number  of  different 
considerations and expectations, both descriptive and normative. This composite judgement will  
reflect  the fact  that  we think that  the way an agent  brought about  the outcome matters  for 
doing/allowing attributions, but also that we can have specific moral expectations about how the 
agent should behave, and these considerations also affect these characterisations. 
To be sure, not all moral considerations will be incorporated into doing/allowing classifications 
at all  times. This explains why, in some cases, we may think that allowing harm is morally 
impermissible  (walking past  someone who is drowning),  or doing harm is permissible  (like 
turning the trolley to save five), seemingly appealing to further rules and principles besides the 
doing/allowing distinction. Arguably, in a  reflective equilibrium-style explanation, this  might 
happen when the scenario we are confronted with is resistant  to such summary judgements 
because it pitches against one another different values or considerations in a fairly extreme way. 
For instance, a behaviour can count,  with respect to the agent's causal contribution, (i) as a  
straightforward instance of allowing, yet is also clearly violating a moral norm (walking past 
someone who is drowning), or (ii) as a straightforward instance of doing harm, yet it seems the 
preferable option, if we are forced to choose something (turning the trolley). In such cases, we  
might not find “a right balance”, and thus conclude that the behaviour amounts to doing harm, 
but it is still permissible, or allowing harm, yet impermissible, and so on, as a way to preserve 
both intuitions. In other cases, however, when the causal contribution or the norm violation is 
18 McMahan (1998), p. 402.
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more nuanced, this summary judgement can deliver a truly “all- things-considered” verdict. In 
the case of active euthanasia,  for  instance,  agents  might  balance the fact  that  the doctor  is  
administering the drug, yet the patient is terminally ill, and the belief that doctors should aim at  
healing, but also respect patients'  wishes. In this example, as we can see from the different  
positions in the debate, it looks like individuals who think that active euthanasia is permissible 
would tend to define it as allowing harm, while individuals who think that this is impermissible 
tend to define it as doing harm. Osman's (2005) and Sinnott-Armstrong, Mallon, McCoy and 
Hull's (2008) experimental results also indicate that people's moral reasoning seems to reflect 
this reflective equilibrium approach, and to adjust different principles and values to deliver a 
“all-things-considered” judgement.19
In conclusion, the alternative thesis is characterised as a reductionist proposal insofar as the  
doing/allowing distinction incorporates other normative and empirical considerations.  In this 
sense, the doing/allowing distinction might not be morally relevant  per se, as it tracks some 
causal facts about behaviours, which might not seem of obvious moral relevance, and some 
separate rules of conduct. Nonetheless, the doing/allowing distinction is still genuinely morally 
relevant as it  delivers these “composite” judgements, which can account for different moral  
principles or normative expectations depending on the case at issue. Frame-dependency, in this 
respect, does not undermine moral relevance, but rather explains how different features, whether 
descriptive, cognitive or normative, could contribute to the final doing/allowing classifications. 
In the next chapter, I will elaborate on this proposal, focusing on two main normative features  
which may contribute to such “composite” judgements: whether an agent intended an outcome, 
and whether the agent openly violated a moral norm. 
19 Specifically, these experimental surveys show how moral reasoning is “dynamic”, in the sense that 
individuals tend to adjust their moral judgements as the result of exposure to further information about 
cases, in a way that strives to balance and retain different intuitions and principles.
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6. Intentions, Norms, and Difficult Cases
6.1 Introduction
The alternative  thesis  argues  that  the  doing/allowing  distinction  tracks  whether  an  agent  is 
causally  relevant  to an outcome in a specific  way,  which is  captured by the self-contained 
network  account.  Whether  the causal  network  connecting the agent  to the  outcome is  self-
contained, however, depends on the value assignments to variables within the model, and, in 
particular, on which value is set as the default for all variables. These preliminary assignments  
incorporate agents' expectations and judgements of descriptive and normative features of the 
context: which course of events is natural, which behaviours are standard, and which actions are 
morally  required.  In  this  way,  doing/allowing  classifications  are  based  on  other  moral 
convictions  and  the  agent’s  framing  of  the  choice  situation;  they  reflect  a  “composite” 
judgement that incorporates separate moral as well as empirical expectations and the fact that an 
agent  is  relevant  in  a  certain  way  to  the  outcome.  If  this  is  correct, the  doing/allowing 
distinction  is  morally  significant  as  it  (also)  captures  moral  considerations,  but  cannot  be 
ultimately  reduced to  a  single  moral  principle  that  consistently  explains  all  doing/allowing 
attributions. The aim of this chapter is to further support the attractiveness of this thesis.
In  sections  6.2  and  6.3,  I  examine  in  more  detail  which  morally  relevant  features  can  be 
incorporated into the value assignment to variables.  I  argue that  doing/allowing attributions 
usually track, in particular, a) agents' intentions and b) which norms and rules of behaviours are 
salient for the case at issue. In this sense, doing/allowing attributions usually match, in familiar 
and straightforward examples, a) the fact that an agent intentionally caused harm and b) the fact 
that an agent was violating standard moral duties. Doing actions thus track intended harm, or 
harm that violates standard norms, and are suitably harder to justify, whereas allowing actions 
track  unintentional  harm,  or  harm  that  does  not  violate  any  uncontroversial  norms.  This 
hypothesis  also  explains  why,  in  contexts  where  norms are  uncontested  and judgements  of 
intentions are clear-cut, agents agree upon doing/allowing characterisations, and their relative 
moral value. On the other hand, the more cases are under-described, intricate or unfamiliar, in 
such a way that we are unsure about agents' intentions, or that the normative expectations are 
contested or controversial,  the more agents can reasonably disagree over a) and b), as well as 
over factual features of the case, thus justifying different doing/allowing attributions. When this 
is the case, doing/allowing classifications tend  to hide the source of moral disagreement, or the 
fact that agents could “fill in the gaps” in different ways. 
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In  particular,  in  6.2  I  attempt  to  analyse  the  relation  between  the  doing/allowing  and  the 
intending/foreseeing distinctions. I show how these two distinctions do not overlap, but they 
might  both  refer  to  the  same  background  expectations  about  what  is  “normal”  or 
“conventional”.  To do  so,  I  describe  William Fitzpatrick's  (2006)  account  of  intentionality, 
which  uses  a  so-called  “constitutive  relation”  to  discriminate  between  outcomes  that  are 
intended and outcomes that are foreseen. This relation can be further cashed out in natural or 
conventional terms. I argue that this appeal to “natural” and “conventional” may capture the 
same expectations about the salient norm/natural course of events that can be used to make  
doing/allowing considerations. As such, doing/allowing and intending/foreseeing might pick up, 
in specific conditions, the same features about human agency.
In 6.3, I briefly come back to how norms produce expectations about which course of events 
should happen, and, in turn, impact doing/allowing classifications. When an agent violated a  
perceived salient norm, in fact, the associated causal network is often self-contained (that is, the  
deviant behaviour amounts to a complete explanation of the occurrence of the deviant outcome). 
I comment on how norm-violation and judgements about intentionality can pick up different  
expectations, thus delivering different judgements. I conclude discussing disagreement. 
The  alternative  thesis  thus  matches  our  strong  intuition,  in  both  everyday  life  and  moral 
theorising, that doing behaviours are harder to justify than allowing behaviours:  in clear-cut and 
transparent  cases,  doing  behaviours  consistently  map  situations  where  an  agent  is  causally 
relevant to a harmful outcome, can be described as intending a harm, openly ignores a moral 
duty or violates a salient rule of behaviour. Allowing behaviours, on the other hand, usually map 
situations where an agent is causally relevant to a harmful outcome, but the harm does not seem 
to be intended and the behaviour does not openly violate standard rules.1 In most examples, 
arguably, the doing/allowing distinction tracks these aspects so straightforwardly that we do not 
need to work out which moral principles or normal course of events we are referring to. At the 
same time, persistence of interpersonal disagreement and evidence of framing effects point to 
the fact  that  this  categorisation may be ultimately ambiguous in more “difficult” scenarios.  
When this happens, we should abandon disagreement over doing/allowing classifications and 
strive to explain and justify our moral  judgements  at  a more fundamental  level,  and check 
whether they rely on different empirical and normative expectations.
In Section 6.4, specifically, I use the self-contained network model to discuss some problematic  
cases, and I show how disagreement can be accounted for within this framework. While I do not  
conclude that my model accommodates all difficulties, I argue that it provides a useful tool for  
1 More precisely, the allowing behaviour might still be violating a norm, but the agent's norm violation 
is not perceived as a sufficient explanation for the occurrence of the harm.
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explaining disagreement on a case-by-case basis.
6.2 Doing/allowing and intending/foreseeing
The present section, together with 6.3, sets out to examine which morally relevant features can 
be incorporated into the doing/allowing classification by way of setting the default values of 
variables.  While I have already discussed,  in general,  how normative considerations can be 
incorporated  in  these  value  assignments,  my  aim  here  is  to  provide  a  more  systematic 
explanation  to  this  end.  Specifically,  in  this  section  I  will  argue  that  the  doing/allowing 
distinction often matches the fact that an agent intended a harmful outcome, and did not merely 
foresee it.  My contention is that both distinctions, in standard cases,  may rely on the same  
expectations about  what  is the “normal course” of events,  thus delivering the same verdict. 
Incidentally,  this  observation  also  explains  why controlling  for intentions  in  fully-equalized 
cases might prove difficult.  First, however, in 6.2.1, I clear the air by showing that the two 
distinctions do not simply collapse into one another.
6.2.1 Two separate distinctions
In chapter 3, I relied on an intuitive idea of what counts for an agent to intend an outcome, as  
opposed to merely foreseeing it, for my discussion of  intentions. In the moral literature, the 
notion of intention has often been used to explain our intuition that intending a harm is morally 
worse than foreseeing it, which seems to be at play in this famous pair of cases by Jonathan  
Bennett:2
Strategic Bomber. A bomber drops a bomb on an enemy munitions factory, intending 
to destroy the factory and thereby damage the enemy’s fighting ability, foreseeing that 
the fallout from the resulting explosion will cause the death of a number of innocent  
civilians living near the factory, but not intending these deaths. 
Terror Bomber. A bomber drops a bomb on an enemy munitions factory, intending the 
resulting explosion-fallout-caused deaths of a number of innocent civilians living near 
the factory, as a means of terrorizing the rest of the enemy population into giving up the 
war effort. 
2 Bennett (1980), “Tanner Lectures on Human Values”, p. 95. This pair of examples has been further 
discussed in Bennett (1995), p. 201, as well as in the subsequent literature on the DDE (to cite a  
couple, McMahan 1993, Bratman 1987). This formulation is from Nelkin and Rickless (2015), p. 378.
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Intuitively,  the  behaviour  in  Terror  Bomber  seems  harder  to  justify  than  the  behaviour  in 
Strategic Bomber. This distinction appears to be captured by the fact that, in Strategic Bomber,  
the bomber merely foresees the death of the civilians, without intending it,  while in Terror  
Bomber the bomber  intends the death of  the civilians.  Here,  I  attempt to analyse how this  
distinction relates to doing/allowing, by appealing to a specific account of intentionality, namely 
William Fitzpatrick's (2006). Before turning to Fitzpatrick's model, I briefly discuss how the 
two distinctions are in fact separate.
In  the  discussion  of  the  doing/allowing  distinction,  the  difference  between  intending  and 
foreseeing  has  often  been  perceived  as  overlapping  with  the  difference  between doing and 
allowing. The concept of intentionality, prima facie, could convincingly account for the way we 
use  doing  and  allowing  labels,  and,  more  importantly,  explain  why  doing  is  worse  than 
allowing. If doing harm mapped cases where individuals intend the harm, and allowing harm 
mapped cases where an individual merely foresees it, we would have a reasonable justification 
for our intuition that doing harm is worse than allowing harm to occur, all else being equal. This 
apparently  straightforward  explanation  seems  to  work  well  for  some  cases,  like  the  pond 
example. Not aiding a person drowning, which amounts to an allowing-action, might have the 
same consequence of drowning a person, which amounts to a doing-action, but while in the 
former instance we merely foresee the harm our action brings about, in the latter we intend this  
harm directly.3  
While  reducing  doing  and allowing  characterisations  to  the  intending/foreseeing  distinction 
sounds promising, this simple strategy does not successfully account for all cases. As Kagan 
(1989) notices, indeed, these two dichotomies are not always equivalent. The case of euthanasia, 
for example, is often employed to illustrate this point: the discrimination between active and 
passive  euthanasia  (killing/letting  die),  which  is  often  regarded  as  morally  relevant,  is  not 
captured  by  the  intending/foreseeing  dichotomy;  in  this  context,  the  actions  described  as 
“killing” and “letting die”, respectively, are equivalent with respect to intentions. In both cases, 
indeed, the intentions of the doctor who administers a lethal drug or unplugs a life-sustaining 
machine seem to be to bring about the death of the patient, as a means of alleviating suffering 
that cannot otherwise be alleviated. The characterisation of one action as killing and the other as 
letting  die,  Kagan  concludes,  thus  refers  to  a  different  feature  of  actions  that  the 
intending/foreseeing  distinction  does  not  seem  to  fully  capture.  Rachels,  famously,  further 
3 In this discussion, I assume that intentions amount to a morally relevant feature of actions, and thus,  
all  things  being  equal,  intending  harm is  harder  to  justify  than  merely  foreseeing  it.  While  this 
assumption seems intuitive, and has been variously defended (most recently in Nelkin and Rickless 
(2015) and Victor Tadros (2015)), there are some critical voices,  and why and how intentions are 
morally relevant is contested even among deontologists. Nonetheless, I will set this controversy aside 
here, and assume that the intending/foreseeing distinction is morally relevant.
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argues that we can disentangle the doing/allowing distinction from intentions, using the fully-
equalized cases of Smith and Jones. In his example, we have two actions that can be apparently  
characterised as doing and allowing respectively, despite the fact that we know that both Jones  
and  Smith  intended  the  death  of  the  cousin  for  the  sake  of  his  inheritance. 4 Similarly,  in 
Bystander, where the bystander can choose to turn the trolley, Switch amounts to doing harm to 
one person; nonetheless, we can reasonably argue that the intention of the agents are to save five 
people, while she merely foresees the death of the one as an unfortunate side-effect.
In  the  following section I  argue  that,  while  the  doing/allowing distinction  does  not  simply 
overlap  with  the  intending/foreseeing  distinction,  in  many  cases  our  judgements  about 
intentionality rely on the same expectations about which actions and outcomes are appropriate 
or more likely to happen in the given situation. By way of setting the default value of variables, 
considerations about  intentionality therefore match the classification of actions as doings or 
allowings in such cases. When this happens, we might conclude that the two distinction capture 
the same feature of human behaviour.
6.2.2 Intentions and expectations 
To justify this position, we need to examine more precisely to the concept of “intention” and to 
how it has been theorised in moral philosophy. I do not attempt here a thorough survey of 
accounts of intentionality; to navigate my way through the literature, I will draw on a problem 
for  all  moral  principles  that  focus  on  intending  harm.5 This  difficulty  was  first  raised  by 
Jonathan Bennett (1995,  194‒225);  following Nelkin and Rickless  (2015) and others in the 
literature, I call this the problem of closeness. 
6.2.2.1 The closeness problem and Bennett's solutions
The problem, roughly, amounts to the fact that, for any instance of “intending”, it is possible to 
re-describe the situation so that the agent did not intend the harm, but rather “ intended some 
other state of affairs that is causally responsible for (or otherwise connected by some relation 
4 Rachels, specifically, argues that the example shows that there is no moral difference between the two  
cases, and therefore between actions characterised as doings and actions characterised as allowings. 
Nonetheless, this pair of cases pulls apart the doing/allowing and intending/foreseeing distinctions,  
whether or not we think the former is morally significant.
5 See, among others, Foot (1978). 
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other than identity to) harm”.6 To illustrate this point, Nelkin and Rickless design the following 
example:
Sophisticated Terror Bomber. A bomber drops a bomb on an enemy munitions factory, 
intending only that civilians'  bodies should be in a state that would cause a general 
belief that they were dead, this lasting long enough to shorten the war: nothing in that  
scheme requires that the dismaying condition of the bodies be permanent; so nothing in 
it requires that the civilians become downright dead rather than merely seemingly dead 
for a year or two.7
In  some  sense,  the  Sophisticated  Terror  Bomber  can  amount  to  a  more  “fine-grained” 
description of Terror Bomber, where the agent cannot be described as intending the death of the 
civilians. In the active/passive euthanasia example, we can similarly give a more fine-grained 
description of the actions of the doctor who unplugs the machine, arguing the she did not intend 
to harm or kill the patient,  but merely to stop the pain by stopping the patient’s brain from 
working, foreseeing that this would kill the patient. In Bystander, we seem to already be using a 
fine-grained description in order to identify the intentions in Switch as “saving five” rather than 
“killing one”.  But which of these re-descriptions  is  reasonable  or  legitimate,  if  we want to  
account for our intuitions that intending harm is worse than merely foreseeing it? To be sure, not 
all these ways of explaining an agent's behaviour could be acceptable if we want to conclude 
that, at least in some cases, an agent did intend to harm. In short: arguably, a harm hardly ever 
seems to be the final or “desired” goal. Hence we can always re-describe a case, arguing that 
only the final goal was intended, and the harm only foreseen. Clearly,  however,  as Bennett 
argues, we also need to “draw a line”: sometimes this re-description is legitimate, but at other  
times it is not. 
This question is by no means an easy one to answer. Bennett (1995, pp. 205‒210), for instance, 
attempts different strategies to solve the closeness problem. One involves checking whether two 
descriptions are actually descriptions of the same event. If this is the case, we cannot reasonably 
argue that the agent intended the harm in the one description but did not intend it in the other. 8 
Note that,  however,  if  we concede that  events  are individuated at  least  partially by time of 
occurrence, then, in the euthanasia example, “stopping the pain” or even “administering a lethal  
6 Nelkin and Rickless (2015), p. 380.
7 Nelkin and Rickless (2015), p. 380. The formulation of this case draws on Bennett's (1995) discussion 
of similar examples (p. 202‒208). Bennett (p. 204) also illustrates the problem of closeness using the 
following child case:
“A nearly born child is blocked; its mother is near to death, and her heart cannot stand a Caesarian 
delivery; to extract the child, the surgeon crushes its head, thereby killing it. Did the child's dying lie  
within the scope of what the surgeon intended, or did he intend only to change the shape of its head,  
its death being a foreseen but unintended by‐product?” 
8 Bennett (1995), p. 206.
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drug” can legitimately be considered as separate events with respect to “killing the patient”, as  
they do not occur at the same time.9 This conclusion seems to be inconsistent with our intuitive 
judgement that, by administering the drug, the doctor intended the death of the patient, and that 
the re-description is not “legitimate”. 
Other proposals draw on the concept of causal necessity. As Bennett further argues (p. 209),  
maybe it is the case that two states of affairs amount to two separate events. But if one state of 
affairs “causally necessitates the other (in the sense that the first makes the second inevitable), it  
is impossible to intend the first without intending the second”.10 This proposal, nonetheless, also 
seems to fail in capturing our intuitions about cases. In Bystander, for instance, the way the 
example is described, it is contingently impossible to save five people without inevitably killing 
one. The bystander cannot thus be described as merely foreseeing the death of the one person;  
this  arguably  challenges  our  common  and  more  natural  intuitions.11 After  exploring  and 
abandoning other possible proposals,  Bennett concludes his investigation by arguing for the 
following “loose” solution to the closeness problem: 
“The best  I  can find is  rather  loose,  but  it  may be the whole truth about our intended/ 
foreseen distinction. Not only is there no chance of (…) crushing the baby’s head without  
killing it [or to bombing the civilians without killing them] – these things are what the plain 
man would call inconceivable.”12
6.2.2.2  Fitzpatrick's  constitutive  relation  and  the  appeal  to  background 
expectations 
William  Fitzpatrick's  (2006)  proposal  draws  on,  but  strives  to  elucidate,  this  concept  of  
“inconceivability”. Fitzpatrick  argues that: 
“if  the  relation  between  two  states  of  affairs  is  known  to  the  agent,  natural  and 
constitutive rather  than merely causal,  then we cannot  properly speak  of an agent's 
intending the one while merely foreseeing but not intending the other”.13 
I focus here on Fitzpatrick's account of this constitutive relation. According to Fitzpatrick, this 
9 Or, as Bennett puts it with respect to the  child case (footnote 7), “the collapse of the head and the 
death of the [fetus] (...)  occur a second apart”. 
10 Nelkin and Rickless (2015), p. 383.
11 In the child case, “when a hysterectomy is performed early in pregnancy, (...) it is causally inevitable 
that the [fetus] will die.” (Bennett, p. 209).
12 Ibidem, p. 213.
13 Fitzpatrick (2006), p. 603.
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relation  is  different  from  identity,  logical  entailment  or  causal  necessity,  and  defines  a 
connection  between states  of  affairs  that  can  be  naturally or  conventionally determined.  A 
constitutive relation is naturally determined when it is “simply a matter of natural fact”14: for 
instance, he argues, being blown to bits constitutes being killed; nonetheless, being blown to 
bits is not equal to being killed‒ neither does it logically entail being killed. Also, a constitutive 
relation  can  be  “determined by  merely  conventional  arrangements  involving  the agency  of 
others”.15 An illustration of  this  is  the following example:  a school's  conventions  and rules 
stipulate that if a student fails an exam she is kicked out of the programme; failing an exam thus  
constitutes being kicked out. Fitzpatrick's solution seems to account for our intuitions in most 
familiar examples: administering a lethal drug naturally constitutes killing a man, while turning 
the trolley does  not  constitute  killing a  man,  neither  naturally  nor  conventionally;  this  also 
matches our common attributions of intentions in the two cases.16 This account, I suggest, is 
onto  something  promising,  and  can  serve  us  in  “drawing  a  line”  between  harms  that  are 
intended and harms that can be described as foreseen: an agent can be said to intend harm if the  
state of affairs that is a result of her actions constitutes harm. 
This framework, besides providing a suitable solution to the problem of closeness, also helps us 
establish a connection between intentions and doing/allowing classifications by appealing to 
background expectations. Note that the constitutive relation relies on what is natural, common 
and expected in a given situation, so as to determine whether a state of affairs conventionally 
constitutes another. The self-contained network model, which I use here as a tool for tracking 
doing/allowing classifications, similarly relies on the prior definition of what is “standard” or 
“normal” within a specific context.  These background expectations that determine judgements 
of intentions could thus plausibly  amount to the same empirical and normative features that “set 
the scene” in the self-contained network model by way of setting the default value of variables. 
I  then  suggest  that  the  doing/allowing  distinction  and  the  intending/foreseeing  distinction 
overlap  exactly  in  those  cases  where they  rely  on  the  same judgements  about  what  is  the 
“normal  course  of  events”.  In  these situations,  the  two distinctions  track  the same morally 
relevant fact that intending a harm is worse than not intending it. 
I now discuss this hypothesis in more detail. Fitzpatrick's account of intentionality argues that, 
for an agent to intend an outcome S2, it is not sufficient that she intended S1, and that S1 
14 Ibidem.
15 Ibidem.
16 Nelkin and Rickless (2015, p. 391) argue that this solution faces some difficulties as well, especially 
because the constitutive relation is never defined by Fitzpatrick but only illustrated with the help of 
some paradigmatic cases. Nonetheless, I think that this account captures some important intuitions,  
and thus assume that problems with this framework could be fixed, by way of defining the constitutive 
relation more systematically.
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constitutes  S2;  the  agent  also  has  to  know that  S1  constitutes  S2.17 I  am  not  specifically 
interested  here in how Fitzpatrick uses this knowledge condition, but rather in the underlying 
intuition: to make judgements about intentionality, we have to know something about the agent's 
mental  states,  beliefs  and  desires.  Maybe the professor  does  not  know that  if  she  fails  the 
student she will be kicked out, and she merely wants to be fair; maybe the doctor does not know 
that injecting a lethal drug will inevitably kill the patient. In these cases, we might be ready to  
concede that the professor and the doctor did not intend to kick out the student and kill the  
patient, respectively. What happens, however, when we do not have direct access to the agent's 
mental states? Arguably, to infer agents' intentions, we can only look at actions, and how these 
actions are related to the outcome. If what an action brings about naturally or conventionally  
constitutes S2, we might thus conclude that the agent intended S2. On the other hand, if the 
outcome of an action does not naturally, usually or conventionally constitute S2, we might infer 
that the agent did not intend S2. 
I suggest that we can cash out Fitzpatrick's definition of the constitutive relation, generalizing it 
for cases where we lack direct access to an agent's mental states, as follows:
X constitutes Y if, absent other information, it is widely recognized that X is one of the 
ways in which Y can be reliably realized.
By way of elaboration: if an action is the most natural, standard or conventional way to realize 
an outcome, we might conclude that the agent intended such an outcome, especially if we have 
no access to the agent's mental states. Injecting a lethal drug, arguably, amounts to one of the 
most natural ways of bringing about death, and thus we will conclude that the doctor intended to 
kill the patient, relying on what we think most doctors would and should know in this context.  
The  case  of  the  professor,  as  Fitzpatrick  concedes,  is  much  trickier:  if  we  judge  that  the 
convention is strong enough, and that most professors who want to kick a student out usually 
fail them, we will conclude that the professor intended to kick the student out. On the other  
hand, we could also reach a different conclusion, depending on how closely associated we think 
failing is with being kicked out. To be sure, these inferences about intentionality only amount to 
our “best guess” in this respect, absent more detailed information about the agent's motives in 
performing an action.
17 Fitzpatrick (2006), p. 595.
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6.2.2.3 Intentions and causal networks
Let's  now see how these thoughts  translate in the assignment  of default  values  in the self-
contained network model,  and, in some practical cases, how doing/allowing attributions and 
judgements about intentionality can track the same expectations about what is normal or natural.
In the pond examples, for instance, the intending/foreseeing distinction and the doing/allowing 
distinction overlap. Within the self-contained network model, for drowning the person to count 
as doing, we would need the outcome “death” to take a default value when its parent “push the 
person under the water” takes its default value as well. For the failure to rescue to count as  
allowing, on the other hand, we would need the outcome “death” to take its deviant value while 
its parent “do not rescue” takes its default one. In Drowning we have:
D = death of the person by drowning, where D = 1 if the person drowns and D = 0 if the person 
does not drown, and Def(D) = 0.
This attribution can be justified by referring  to what is “normal” or expected in a natural or 
statistical sense. As for O's parent,
P= pushing someone underwater, where P = 1 if I push the person underwater and P = 0 if I do  
not push the person, and Def(P) = 0.
Clearly, pushing someone underwater amounts to “deviant” conduct, and this explains why the 
default is set at 0. The causal network {P, D} is self-contained, as the outcome takes its default  
value when P does. The evaluation of the agent's intentions in this case, arguably, relies on the 
same judgements and expectations. With no direct access to the agent's mental states, all we can 
observe is that the agent performs a “deviant” action that brings about the deviant outcome “the 
victim drowned”. On Fitzpatrick's definition, being drowned naturally constitutes being killed; 
thus we recognize that drowning a man amounts to a natural and fairly efficient way to kill  
someone: hence the inference that the agent intended to kill the man. This conclusion matches 
the classification of this action as “doing harm”.
In the failure to rescue case, we have the same value assignment for D, while its parent J =  
continue jogging takes the value 1 if I continue jogging and 0 if I stop jogging and rescue the 
person, and Def(J) = 1. Here, again, the assignment of the default values can be justified by  
referring to  what  is  normal or  standard.  In  the self-contained network  model,  the action is 
classified as allowing, since the outcome can take its deviant value when its parent takes its 
default one. When inferring the agent's intentions in this second case, what we will see is an 
action, jogging, and a resulting state of affairs, which is that the agent continues her workout. 
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This state of affairs does not constitute killing a man, neither naturally nor conventionally; in 
most situations, indeed, these two outcomes are not even related. Usually, working out does not 
amount to the most natural or efficient way to kill someone. This explains why the agent might 
be  described  as  merely  foreseeing  the  outcome.  Again,  this  conclusion  matches  here  the 
“allowing harm” classification.
In many familiar and clear-cut scenarios, arguably, the self-contained network model delivers 
classifications of doing and allowing that are often consistent with the intuition that an agent 
does harm if she intentionally performs an action that results in a harmful upshot. When we are 
asked to evaluate another agent's behaviour, and we do not have direct access to her motives and 
desires,  doing/allowing  classifications  are  thus  usually  a  reliable  proxy  for  tracking  our 
judgement of  whether  the  agent  acted  intentionally,  which  I  assume  amounts  to  a  morally 
relevant feature of actions. I suggest that, in the case under scrutiny, both distinctions rely in fact 
on a prior judgement about which course of events is more natural or normal. In many simple 
scenarios,  doing  harm describes  a  situation  where  an  agent  performs  a  specific  action  that 
usually brings about the harmful upshot, and in most cases does so by “deviating” from the 
normal course of nature. In these examples, we can reasonably and legitimately infer that the 
agent had the intention to harm. Many allowing cases, on the other hand, amount to situations 
where the agent performs an action that does not bring about a state of affairs that constitutes 
harm: in most  failure to rescue cases,  for instance,  the outcome of the action is simply the 
continuation of one's activities, and does not deviate from the standard course of events.18 In 
those situations, our best guess – absent direct access – is that the agent did not intend to harm. 
In such contexts,  the self-contained network model  can,  in conclusion,  explain the intimate 
connection between intending and doing, if we accept Fitzpatrick's analysis of what it means to 
intend  harm.  Note  that  this  also  explains  the  difficulty  in  controlling  for  intentions  when 
comparing fully-equalized cases. 
To be sure, there will be cases where these two distinctions do not match, and it is thus possible,  
for instance, to do harm without intending it, as in Bystander,19 or to allow harm while intending 
18 Note that doing behaviours will usually equate to the variable taking its deviant value. It might thus 
seem counterintuitive that, for an action to count as “doing”, it has to be the case that the outcome 
takes its  default value when its  parent takes  its  default  one.  This condition, however,  determines 
whether the causal network connecting the agent to the upshot is self-contained, i.e., the explanation 
for the outcome occurring strikes us as “complete” without referring to other “parents”. In this sense, 
it is reasonable to think that I “do harm” when I perform a deviant action, and this is sufficient to  
explain  why the  outcome takes  its  deviant  value.  On the  other  hand,  for  my action  to  count  as 
allowing, it has to be the case that the outcome can take its default value when its parent takes its  
deviant one. One possible configuration of allowing behaviours is thus that I perform a default action,  
and the outcome is deviant (and therefore my action does not look like a sufficient explanation for the 
outcome occurring). 
19 At least according to Thomson's interpretation.
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it, as in Jones's example. I will discuss these two cases in detail in section 6.4. For the moment, 
however,  note  that  doing/allowing  classifications  might  not  always  track  intentions  simply 
because  intentions  are  not  all  that  matters  in  justifying  and  explaining  the  doing/allowing 
distinction. Firstly, as discussed in 6.2.1, intending harm is not equal to doing harm, and thus the 
doing/allowing distinction also captures a descriptive fact about the agent's causal contribution 
to an outcome:  whether  the outcome occurred or  not  and how the agent  contributed to the 
outcome.  Secondly,  the  explanation  above  mostly  works  for  cases  where  we  have  to  infer 
intentions  from  actions,  and  thus  our  judgements  about  intentionality  rest  on  background 
expectations  and draw on similar  cases  and presuppositions about  what  is  “normal”.  These 
judgements,  however,  are not  particularly robust,  and can be reversed if we gain additional 
information  about  the  agents'  motives  and  beliefs.  Moreover,  doing/allowing classifications 
might  track  other  normative  considerations  as  well,  which  can  also  determine  the  value 
assignment to variables. Specifically, I argue that a given variable might take a deviant value if 
it  openly  violates  a  rule  of  conduct  or  salient  norm.  In  6.3,  I  move  on  to  consider  how 
doing/allowing classification can be sensitive to norm-violation as well. 
6.3 Salient Norms
In this section I examine in more detail the connection between the doing/allowing distinction 
and norm-violation. I argue that doing/allowing classifications may also track how an agent's 
behaviour fits in with moral and social principles, rules and expectations. The self-contained  
network model allows us to explain how these considerations may ultimately determine whether 
an action is perceived as an instance of doing or allowing by way of setting the default value of  
variables. As norm-violation arguably amounts to a morally relevant feature, my account thus 
shows that the doing/allowing distinction is morally relevant.  At the same time, as different 
individuals can perceive different norms as salient,  or disagree about the import of different 
moral principles, this model also accounts for the fact that doing/allowing classification might  
be ambiguous, i.e., agent-, context- or frame-dependent.
My general hypothesis is that a norm creates an expectation that people should act on it. This  
expectation, in turn, determines the default value attached to the variables. Usually, if an agent's 
behaviour violates a norm and a harmful outcome occurs, the causal network connecting the 
agent and the outcome will  be self-contained,  as norm-violation (deviant)  is perceived as a 
sufficient explanation for the variable taking its deviant value. On the other hand, the fact that a 
harmful upshot counterfactually depended on the agent, but the agent did not seemingly violate 
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a  norm,  often  results  in  a  non-self-contained  causal  network:  the  action  (default)  is  not  
perceived as a complete explanation for the occurrence of the harm (deviant).20
In section 5.3.2, I discussed the case of active euthanasia along these lines. Another interesting 
example of “doing as norm violation” could be Starving one's baby. Here, upon counterfactual 
analysis,  “not feeding” could amount to  allowing, thus sharing the same causal structure as 
those  instances  Hitchcock  identifies  as  omissions  (see  Figure  2.3).  Nonetheless,  the 
interpretation that I “did harm” my baby seems reasonable and tenable as well: in this specific 
context, the fact that parents should care for their children amounts to a particularly stringent 
social norm. As such, we might expect that the parents should feed their baby, and that a baby 
should not “naturally die”, like the flowers my neighbour forgets to water. When we set these  
different default values, the parents' behaviour takes the “doing” classification.
I do not offer here a more systematic account of which specific norms can be incorporated into 
doing/allowing classifications. My contention is that almost any morally significant expectation 
could do the job. Arguably, the more a moral norm is agreed-upon or stringent, the more likely it 
is  that  our  final  doing/allowing classifications  will  track  this  norm.  Also,  the  less  “morally 
sensitive” a case is, the more even trivial expectations about standard behaviours could inform 
the value assignments to variables; these cases, however, are also likely to be less agreed upon 
with respect to doing/allowing characterisations. In short, when it comes to setting the default 
value of actions, we refer to what  the “normal” course of events is,  and determining what  
counts as  “normal”  comes  down  to  our  empirical  expectations  about  what  will  or  should 
happen.  The  presence  of  strong  moral  or  other  social  norms  can  mean  that  our  empirical 
predictions or expectations are more precise and agreed upon.
In the remainder of this section, I briefly discuss how norm-violation can be based on different  
background  expectations  with  respect  to  those  used  to  make  judgements  about  intentions 
(6.3.2),  and  what  the  appeal  to  norms can  tell  us  about  disagreement  over  doing/allowing 
classifications (6.3.3). 
20 In Chapter 2, I suggested that allowing harm might be characterised as well by norm violation, but  
within  a  non-self-contained  causal  network.  These  two  possibilities  amount  to  two  different 
configurations of “allowing harm”: the behaviour takes its default value and the outcome takes its  
deviant one; or the behaviour takes its deviant value and the outcome takes its default one. The first  
case is the one I am focusing on here: a harm occurs, which is causally dependent on the agent, but the  
agent is not perceived as violating a norm. The second case captures situations where the agent might  
be violating a norm, but this norm violation on the agent's part is not a “sufficient” explanation for the 
harm occurring. My intuition is that the more a norm is perceived as stringent or “important”, the  
more its violation would be perceived as a sufficient explanation for the harm, thus setting different  
default values to variables.
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6.3.1 Norms and intentions
Concluding  my  discussion  of  intentions,  I  argued  that,  in  some  cases,  judgements  of 
intentionality  and  the  doing/allowing  distinction  pull  apart.  In  most  examples,  the  easiest  
explanation for this fact is that we get more information about an agent's desires and beliefs, and 
thus we do not need to “guess” her intentions: if I step on your foot, and I say “sorry‒ I did not 
mean  to!”,  I  obviously  “did  harm”,  but  the  harm is  also  unintended.  Some more  nuanced 
examples could be cases where an agent so openly violates a specific social norm or rule of 
conduct that her action is characterised as doing harm, even if the harm was unintended. One  
possible  illustration is,  again,  Starving  one's  baby.  In this  example,  relying  on Fitzpatrick's 
analysis above, we might argue that “not feeding a baby” does not  constitute the death of the 
baby. Consistently, the action of starving one's baby can be described as not intentional, yet  
“doing harm”.
Note that this interpretation seems to be consistent with the idea that, for someone to count as 
doing harm, we do not necessarily require that one is motivated by particularly “evil” intentions. 
While the fact that intentions are not all that matters in our comprehensive moral judgements is  
not surprising, this observation has some particularly interesting implications for the case of 
bringing about harm. As Philip Pettit (2015) notices, doing good seems to require us to fulfil  
some specific and fairly demanding set of norms and expectations; doing harm, however, is not  
symmetrical with doing good in this respect. For someone to count as doing harm, indeed, we 
do not require her to meet specific standards or rules, but it is often sufficient to show that she  
failed to comply with what was asked of her to “be good”. In this sense, Pettit observes, an 
agent often counts as doing good, or helping, only if she is doing good “for good's sake”, or if  
she is specifically fulfilling a moral duty.21 On the other hand, for an agent to count as doing 
harm, we do not require her to be doing evil “for evil's sake”, or to have a particularly callous  
motivation: it can simply be the case that, for her own interest, laziness, or other trivial reasons, 
she is not complying with what it is expected of her. Relying on the model of intentionality  
discussed in the previous section, it can thus be the case that an agent does not intend to harm, 
because  her  actions,  as  in Starving one's  baby,  bring about  a  state  of  affairs  that  does  not 
constitute harm. On the other hand, the agent might not be complying with what is required of  
her, and this could be sufficient reason for her “doing harm”. 
21 Pettit (2015), pp. 172‒195.
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6.3.2 Norms and Disagreement
In  this  final  section,  I  explore  the  fact  that  different  individuals  might  disagree  about 
doing/allowing classifications because of normative features of the context. When this is the 
case, different classifications track different expectations about what  should happen. I suggest 
that  disagreement  here  is  most  promisingly  investigated  at  the  more  fundamental  level  of 
normative expectations.
Note that disagreement about which default values are appropriate can have two main sources. 
First,  different individuals can perceive different norms (or no norms at all) as salient.  This  
phenomenon  could  depend  on  a  variety  of  factors:  cognitive  biases,  idiosyncrasies,  past 
experiences, or social or cultural background. The fact that one specific rule of behaviour rather  
than another is used to set our expectations in a given scenario, at the end of the day, appears to 
be  ultimately  an  empirical  matter,  which  should  be  investigated  accordingly.  Lacking  the 
empirical data in favour of or against any of the above hypotheses, I do not favour one or the  
other. I suggest that, following my discussion of framing effects, there are reasons to suspect 
that  people  would  converge  on  the  salience  of  norms  when  cases  are  more  familiar, 
straightforward  and  detailed.  Secondly,  disagreement  might  also  be  substantive:  different 
individuals can have different moral convictions, and this ultimately determines whether they 
think a specific rule should be followed, a specific obligation fulfilled and so on. Agents might  
also agree that a set of principles or rules is relevant, but “balance” them differently. In this 
second  case,  different  doing/allowing  classifications  may  incorporate  and  reflect  different  
ethical perspectives. 
Whatever  the  source of  disagreement,  focusing on the doing/allowing distinction  might  not 
advance  the  discussion.  Moreover,  we  should  also  be  more  circumspect  in  using  these 
classifications to make comparative moral judgements. To be sure, these classifications  capture 
something morally significant, but investigating the underlying norms and values could be a 
more promising way of dealing with disagreement. 
In the final section of this chapter, I attempt such an analysis of some of these difficult cases. 
6.4 Difficult cases and the alternative thesis
Throughout this work, I have often referred to controversial examples, where our descriptions of 
doing and allowing are  not  consistent  intrapersonally  ‒ i.e.,  they are  frame-dependent  ‒ or 
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interpersonally‒there is disagreement about the correct doing/allowing classification. Moreover, 
in some instances, there is also disagreement about whether a doing action is morally worse, 
harder to justify, or different from an allowing action, all other things being seemingly equal.  
My account of the doing/allowing distinction provides a specific explanation for this persistent 
“instability”:  given  that  doing  and allowing  classifications  rely  on  expectations  about  what 
counts  as  the  standard  course  of  events,  agents  may  reasonably  disagree  about  what  the 
“normal” state of affairs is. Disagreement can involve both descriptive features of the context 
and normative aspects, such as which moral norm is more relevant for evaluating the case at 
issue. 
Nonetheless, in familiar and straightforward cases, we will likely observe more stability and 
agreement in expectations about what will or should happen. As a result, these cases will be less 
controversial in terms of doing and allowing classifications, and this categorisation will easily  
match other morally relevant considerations, such as intentionality or norm violations. On the 
other  hand,  when agents  are  asked  to  evaluate  examples  which  are  unfamiliar,  extreme  or 
artificial  and,  in  general,  far  from the ordinary,  there  will  be  substantial  disagreement  over 
which course of events is to be expected. Difficult cases can also amount to scenarios that are  
significantly under-described: in these situations, different agents can pick up different cues and 
“fill in the gaps” in different ways. Leaving aside the case of moral disagreement, arguably, the  
“difficulty” of cases could be a matter of degree: the more unfamiliar or under-described a case 
is, the more room there will be for alternative interpretations and reconstructions, and the more 
tenuous our intuitions about doing and allowing classifications will become. 
I  examine  here  some paradigmatic  examples,  showing how these  different  explanations  for 
disagreement and instability can be appropriate, on a case-by-case basis. 
6.4.1 The Smith/Jones case
When discussing fully-equalized cases, I argued that Jones's story strikes us as “weird” and 
artificial.  I  think that  now we have more elements  to explain the difficulties and persistent  
disagreement in evaluating this example. The Smith/Jones case seems particularly problematic 
with respect to Fitzpatrick's account of when an agent intends an outcome. According to the  
framework outlined above, an agent cannot merely foresee and not intend harm if the outcome 
that is a result of her action constitutes harm. When we have no access to an individual's mental 
states and beliefs, I further argued that we will generally infer her intentions from the fact that 
the actions she performs naturally or conventionally bring about a harmful upshot. 
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When examining Smith's conduct, this standard way of reconstructing intentionality matches the 
background story of Smith's desires and beliefs. In this first case, the attribution of evil intention 
to Smith also tracks the fact that the upshot takes its default value (i.e., the cousin does not die)  
only  when  the  action  it  counterfactually  depends  on  does  (i.e.,  Smith  does  not  drown the 
cousin), and thus the action is classified as doing. What about Jones's conduct? Here, the action 
performed by Jones is classified as allowing, since the upshot takes its default value when the  
action takes its deviant one (i.e., Jones saves the cousin, while the “default” would be doing  
nothing). Note that, if we had no access to Jones's mental states, and we would have to infer his  
intentions from his behaviour, we might conclude that he did not intend to kill his cousin: after  
all,  the  outcome  of  the  behaviour  “do  nothing”  does  not  constitute,  neither  naturally  nor 
conventionally, someone's death by drowning. In this second case, however, this reconstruction 
does not match the background story and the information we have about Jones's mental states.  
Of course, when we have such “direct” information, we do not need to infer intentions from 
actions, and therefore we can simply conclude that Jones intended to kill his cousin. 
This discrepancy is, arguably, due to the fact that there is a particularly lucky coincidence here‒ 
for Jones at least: the cousin is already dying. This “twist” in the story makes Jones's case quite 
different  from  most  familiar  and  straightforward  examples.  Therefore,  judgements  about 
intentionality do not match doing/allowing classifications, as the former do not rely here on the 
same expectations of what is “standard” or “normal”, but rather on the more direct information 
we draw from the background story. Agents might then disagree about whether Smith's conduct 
is worse than Jones's, because both the doing and the allowing actions are intended. When asked 
to make a moral evaluation, we could thus appeal to two alternative features that often come 
together in familiar cases: whether someone intended to harm and whether she contributed to 
the outcome in a specific way, which is captured here by the doing/allowing distinction. 
In  conclusion,  I  do  not  think  that  the  Smith/Jones  case  is  problematic  for  doing/allowing 
classifications, or that it undermines the moral relevance of the distinction. This example rather 
shows that  allowing behaviours do not  necessarily  amount  to  cases  where  the  harm is  not 
intended, even if, when we do not have access to agents' mental states and background stories,  
this is usually a good approximation. 
6.4.2 Trolley cases 
Trolley cases amount to another class of examples used in the moral literature to argue in favour 
of or against the moral significance of the doing/allowing distinction. Specifically, at least in  
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Thomson's interpretation, people seem to disagree on whether doing is worse than allowing. I  
claim here that these cases are not problematic for my account, which can also explain why 
these scenarios seem particularly difficult.
Recall Bystander: a bystander has to choose between letting the trolley run over five innocent 
people (Don't Switch) or turn the trolley so that it runs over over one innocent person (Switch).  
Thomson defines Switch as doing harm, and Don't Switch as allowing harm. The self-contained 
network model accounts for this classification: the most natural course of events is let to the 
trolley continue on its track; the default values assigned to the variables, however, reflect the 
common expectations that five people are not run over and the bystander does not interfere by 
switching. The causal network describing this scenario is non-self-contained: it is possible for 
the outcome to take its deviant value (five people die), while its parent takes its default one (the  
bystander does not intervene by switching). Don't Switch, therefore, is characterised as allowing 
harm, since the causal network is non-self-contained. On the other hand, the default value of  
diverting the trolley is intuitively set at 0 (i.e., the action is not performed), and the death of the  
person on the other track takes its default value at 0 as well (i.e., this person does not die). The 
causal  network relating the death  of one person to Switch are  thus self-contained,  and this 
conduct is characterised as doing harm.
To be clear, I think that the self-contained network would also account for a classification of 
Switch as allowing harm: intuitively, throwing the switch does not seem a sufficient explanation 
for the death one one person. Therefore, we can work out value assignments to variables which  
will capture this insight. In what follows, however, I assume that Thomson's analysis is correct,  
and  challenge  her  claim that  these cases  are  problematic  for  the  moral  significance  of  the 
doing/allowing distinction. My discussion here mostly relies on my observations in 3.3.2, and 
just supplements these observations with the conclusion that the self-contained network model 
can account for different doing/allowing classifications, and it is not undermined by Thomson's 
argument.
Recall that Bystander, according to Thomson, will elicit different judgements of permissibility 
of the doing harm conduct with respect to Fat Man. Specifically, while it is impermissible to  
Push in Fat Man, it is permissible to Switch in Bystander, and this would undermine the claim 
that  people  appeal  to  the  doing/allowing  distinction  when  making  moral  judgements.  My 
objection to Thomson is  that  doing/allowing distinctions  do not  necessarily deliver  an “all-
things-considered” judgement, which balances all morally relevant features of behaviours. In 
this sense, it is possible for an action to be characterised as doing harm, while at the same time 
other considerations make this conduct look permissible. 
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As I argued before, one way to explain the difference between Switch and Push is to appeal to 
the fact that it is more difficult to argue, in Fat Man, that the bystander did not intend to kill the  
man when she pushed him onto the track. Being pushed in front of a trolley in motion, indeed, 
naturally constitutes being killed, and it is what we should naturally expect when performing 
such an action. We could conclude, following Fitzpatrick's analysis of the closeness problem, 
that it is not possible for an agent to intend to stop the trolley without intending to kill the man.  
In this case, therefore, the fact that the action amounts to doing harm and can be described as 
intentional tips the scale in favour of moral impermissibility.
To be fair, different accounts of intentionality and solutions to the closeness problem would 
allow us to characterise Push in Fat Man as merely foreseeing the death of the man. Other 
interpretations of what makes Switch and Push morally different have thus been attempted in 
the literature. Whatever the case, I do not think that trolley problems threatens my account of 
the doing/allowing distinction and, more generally, any account that claims that this distinction 
is morally significant. The mere fact that a doing action (Switch) can be considered permissible,  
or the fact that one doing action (Push) is worse than another doing action (Switch) does not 
disprove the more specific claim that, all other things being equal, doing is morally worse than 
allowing. While the comparison between Push and Switch might seem problematic, we could 
argue  that  pushing  the bystander  is  worse than  turning the trolley  because of  some further  
distinction  the doing/allowing distinction  alone does  not  capture.  For  this  reason,  when we 
compare these two doing actions with the chance of saving five people, the fact that the former 
is worse than the latter might influence our final judgements about permissibility 
Arguably, trolley cases are particularly unfamiliar, difficult and extreme, and none of the actions 
described  seem to  be  clearly  morally  permissible  or  morally  required.  It  is  not  surprising, 
therefore,  that  people  lack  strong  intuitions  about  the  degree  of  moral  wrongness  of  these 
behaviours. Nonetheless, trolley cases help clarify that morality is a very complex matter, and 
the doing/allowing distinction is only part of a much more comprehensive picture.
6.4.3 Preemptions 
In chapters 1 and 2, I discussed some problematic cases for all difference-making accounts of 
the  doing/allowing  distinction,  which  are  referred  to  in  the  literature  as  instances  of 
“preemption”.  The simplest  example of  this  class  is the  Backup  case,  where  we apparently 
cannot  classify  Alice's  behaviour  as  doing  harm,  since  the  outcome  would  have  occurred 
anyway due to Backup. Settling for the self-contained network account, I argued that we just  
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had to bite the bullet,  and allow preemption to be an exception in an otherwise convincing 
explanatory  account.  A partial  answer  to  this  difficulty  is  that  preemption  cases  do  not  
seemingly  amount  to  familiar  and common situations,  but  rather  to  the  class  of   “cleverly 
devised”  scenarios,22 which  rely  on  the  presence  of  weird  coincidences  that  are  extremely 
unlikely to verify in ordinary circumstances.  Nonetheless,  the self-contained network model 
does not successfully account for our intuition that Alice is doing harm, unless we use some 
further refinements such as the “freezing” strategy.
6.4.4 Borderline cases
In this section, I discuss what  I call “borderline cases”, i.e.,  particularly controversial cases  
where people's intuitions, and positions in the moral literature, disagree on the classification of 
an action as  doing or allowing.  I  do not  survey all  these  cases  here,  but  I  focus on a few  
paradigmatic examples.
Let's first take this case from McMahan (1993):23
Impoverished Village: Having given one’s accountant full power of attorney one learns 
that because of a misunderstanding he is preparing to sign away 10% of one’s income to 
save the lives of people in a remote impoverished village. One phones to instruct him 
not to do it.
This example from Rickless (2011) also seems to involve something like “withdrawing aid”:24
Hospital: A doctor has just plugged one person into a respirator. If the patient is moved 
or unplugged from the respirator, he will die. Five more patients arrive and will die 
unless plugged into the respirator. The doctor unplugs the first patient in order to save 
the five.
The two following examples are from Barry and Øverland (2017):25 
Interpose: A cart filled with water is rolling downhill. Bill, who is sitting at the bottom 
of the hill, will survive if the cart reaches him. Sue interposes a rock; the cart stops and 
Bill dies of thirst. 
Remove: A cart is rolling towards a point where there is a rock that would bring it to a 
halt. Sue removes the rock; the cart rolls down the hill and injures Bill, who is sitting  
22 Sunstein (2003), p. 10.
23 I take this specific formulation of the Impoverished Village example from Woollard (2015), p. 9.
24 Rickless (2011), p. 68.
25 Barry and Øverland (2017), p. 85.
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there.26
Arguably, most people agree with the classification of Impoverished Village as an instance of 
allowing harm. The consequently listed examples, however, seemingly describe (increasingly) 
more morally wrong behaviours, which are nevertheless not clear-cut instances of doing harm. 
In short, doing and allowing classifications require us to make a sharp distinction between these 
actions; upon careful analysis, however, these scenarios only differ in small details or nuances. 
We are thus in the position, wherever we decide to draw the line, to justify  the fact that almost 
identical  actions  belong  to  two  separate  categories.  The  four  examples  above,  indeed,  all 
describe  a  situation  where  the  agent,  at  least  according  to  our  immediate  reactions,  does 
something, as she seems to perform an action or to intervene, and does not merely observe the  
“course of nature” (like, on the contrary, Jones's behaviour in the pair of fully-equalized cases). 
With respect to borderline cases, different proposals in the moral literature draw different lines 
between doings and allowings. Quinn and Bennett, for instance, could argue that Remove and 
Interpose  are  instances  of  doing,  as  in  both cases  the upshot  occurs  because  the agent  did 
something.  Our  different  intuitions  about Impoverished  Village and  Hospital‒ which  are 
seemingly less morally objectionable‒ could be explained, within Bennett's account, by pointing 
to the fact that the outcome would not have occurred in the first place without the agent (as the 
sum of money would not have been given to charity or the respirator plugged into the first  
patient). Foot, on the contrary, argues that we can discriminate between these cases by relying 
on the difference between initiating, sustaining, enabling and forbearing-to-prevent a harmful 
sequence: while initiating and sustaining would describe cases of doing harm, enabling and 
forbearing-to-prevent would be cases of allowing. All four cases described above, within this  
framework, could be instances of allowing, as a harmful sequence is seemingly not initiated or 
sustained by the agent. In Impoverished Village and Hospital, indeed, the agent stops an aiding 
sequence she herself initiated, while in Remove the harmful sequence is already in place, and in  
Interpose the agent stops an aiding sequence.27 
More recently, Woollard (2015) has argued that: 
“An agent counts as doing harm if and only if some fact about the agent’s behaviour is 
part of the sequence leading to harm; the agent counts as merely allowing harm if and 
only if a fact about the agent’s behaviour is relevant to, but not part of, this harmful 
26 Barry and Øverland (2017) define both Remove and Interpose as instances of enabling harm, which 
they conceive as an intermediate category between doing and allowing.
27 I do not argue, in this section, that these classifications in terms of doing or allowing are the ones the  
authors I refer to would give for these specific cases. My aim is rather to show how different accounts  
can deliver different classifications of these borderline cases.
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sequence.”28 
Recall  that Woollard further distinguishes between  substantial and  non-substantial  facts:  the 
former are intuitively perceived as more “natural” parts of a sequence, while the latter usually 
amount to background conditions. Specifically, a fact counts as substantial if it is either positive 
or contradicts normal presuppositions. She then claims that, if an agent is relevant to a harm 
through a non-substantial fact about her body, then her actions are merely a condition for, rather 
than part of, the harmful sequence, and this would count as allowing harm. On the other hand, if 
there is a complete sequence of substantial facts leading from the agent to a harmful effect, the 
agent's action would count as doing. Let's see how this account could classify the examples 
above. In Impoverished Village, the fact that the agent does not sign her money away seemingly 
amounts  to  a  non-substantial  fact,  so  we  can  classify  her  action  as  allowing.  These  cases,  
however, could be also explained as “removing barriers” examples, which Woollard discusses as 
a separate category. In the Hospital case, the respirator might be perceived as a barrier, which  
does not belong to the patient, nor to the doctor specifically. In some sense, however, if we think 
at the doctor as a part of the hospital, then the respirator/barrier  “requires the continued use of  
resources  belonging  to  the  agent”.29 When  this  is  the  case,  following  Woollard,  we  could 
conclude that “the removal of the barrier counts as merely allowing harm. The agent simply 
refuses to let  his or  her resources be used to protect  the victim.”30 I  note,  however,  that  in 
Hospital the removal of the respirator could also be perceived as a positive fact, or a fact which 
contradicts our normal presuppositions, a condition that, according to Woollard, would make the 
fact  substantial  and, in turn,  the action “doing harm”.31 What about  Remove and Interpose? 
Arguably, in Remove the action of the agent is characterised as a substantial fact in the sequence 
leading to the harmful upshot, and not as mere background conditions: the action thus amounts  
to a case of doing harm. Interpose, again, may be a case of removing barriers: the barrier here  
does not belong to the agent nor to the victim, and was not put in place by a third party in order  
to prevent harm. On Woollard's account, we may argue that the victim has here a stronger non-
need claim on the barrier, and thus the action is classified as doing harm.
The  main  difference  between  my account  and  the  ones  outlined  above  is  that  I  allow for 
different  reasonable  and  legitimate  expectations  and  presuppositions,  thus  accounting  for 
disagreement in these borderline cases. I accept that this account might feel  uncomfortable in 
this respect, as it suggests that, in borderline case, there is no definitive or correct classification 
28 Woollard (2015), p. 23. I also discuss this account in Chapter 1.
29 Ibidem, p. 79.
30 Ibidem.
31 We could also argue that the barrier/respirator does belong to a third party which put the barrier in 
place in order to prevent harm. Therefore, the removal of the respirator would count again as  doing 
harm.
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of actions as doings or else allowings, but different classifications can be tenable depending on 
our empirical expectations or moral convictions.
Let's start our analysis with Impoverished Village. This case could  appear problematic for the 
self-contained network account, as it looks like the agent, making the phone call, is deviating 
from what was happening without her intervention, which is thus “more natural” or likely to 
occur based on the current situation. Nonetheless, following Bennett's intuition, we can argue 
that the “normal” course of events should be fixed further back in time, before the accountant's 
unauthorised move. I think that, in this case, the fact that the story begins with what is explicitly  
defined as a “mistake” explains why most people would fix the normal course of events before 
the mistake was made. Now, we can define the following variables:
D = death of the people in the impoverished village, where Def(D) = 1, since this is what is 
reasonable to expect if the accountant does not set up the donation;
A = the accountant arranges to make the donation, where Def(A) = 0, since she was neither 
instructed nor expected to do so;
P = the agent makes the phone call, where Def(P) = 0;
S = the donation is set up, where Def(S) = 0;
These variables can be arranged in a causal graph as follows:
A                           S                       D
                                
                 
                              P                             
Figure 6.1: Impoverished Village                 
(the relevant counterfactuals are: D = not-S; S = A & not-P, not-P = not-A).32
This interpretation delivers the more reasonable classification in terms of allowing harm, as D 
can take its deviant value only when A takes its default one, and thus the causal network is not  
self-contained.  
The  next  three  cases,  arguably,  are  more  controversial  as  different  expectations  about  and 
32 These counterfactuals read as: the people in the village would have died if the donation had not been 
set up; the donation would have been set up if the accountant had arranged for it and the client had not  
made the phone call; the client wouldn't have made the phone call had the accountant not arranged the  
donation.
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interpretations of what counts as the normal course of events are seemingly more reasonable. In 
Hospital, the action counts as allowing if we stick again to Bennett's intuition that the normal 
course of events should be fixed before the doctor's intervention. In this case, 
D = death of the patient = 1 if the patient dies, D = 0 if the patient does not die, where Def(D) =  
1, as the patient is clearly and immediately going to die unless the respirator is plugged.
We can thus individuate, as parents of D:
P = the respirator is plugged into the patient, where Def(P) = 1, as this amounts to a routine  
intervention within the duties of a doctor; 
K = the respirator is kept plugged in, where Def(K) = 1.
We can then draw the following causal graph:
P   
                            D
K  
Figure 6.2: Hospital
(the relevant counterfactual is D = P & K).33
In this situation, the outcome only takes its default value if P takes its deviant one; the causal  
network is thus not self-contained and K = 0, the removal of the respirator, counts as allowing  
harm.  Nonetheless,  it  is  not  unreasonable  for  agents  to  take the scenario  after the  doctor's 
intervention as the reference point, which will lead to a different causal network with different 
variables and assignments of default values:
Def(D) = 0, as the respirator is already plugged in and we thus have no reason to expect the 
patient to die soon.
R = removal of the respirator, the parent of D, would thus take its default value at 0, as this is  
not standard or expected conduct on the part of the doctor. 
In this second causal network, D takes its default value when its parent does; the causal network  
is thus self-contained and the doctor's action counts as doing harm.
Both Remove and Interpose, arguably, share a similar structure: these actions will be classified 
as allowings if the normal course of events is set sufficiently far back in the past such that Bill is 
dying of thirst (Interpose) and Bill is going to be crushed by the cart (Remove). On the other  
33 The patient would have died if the doctor had not plugged the respirator in and kept it plugged in. 
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hand, if the reference point for what counts as the natural course of events is set when the cart 
full of water is rolling downhill (Interpose) and the rock is stopping the cart (Remove), these  
actions would count as doings. Specifically, for the Interpose case, in the allowing interpretation 
we will set:
D = death by thirst, where Def(D) = 1;
C = a cart full of water rolls towards the victim, where Def(C) = 0, as this is not what we should 
reasonably expect under normal circumstances;
I = the agent interposes a rock, where Def(I) = 0;
A = a cart full of water reaches the victim,where Def(A) = 0.
These four variables can be arranged in the following graph:
 C                        A                        D
                               
                                                         
                            I
Figure 6.3: Interpose
(A = C & not-I, D = not-A, not-I = not-C).34
Here, the causal network is not self-contained, as D can take its deviant value when all its parent 
takes its default one (the cart does not roll towards the victim, and does not reach the victim; the 
agent does not interpose anything). I = 1 is thus characterised as allowing harm.
On the other hand, in the doing interpretation, we have:
Def(D) = 0, as the cart full of water is already rolling downhill;
Def(I) = 0.
The causal network is now self-contained and the action counts as doing harm.
The Remove case can be analysed analogously, leaving room for both interpretations depending 
on where the reference point for the natural course of events is set.
In conclusion, while for the Smith/Jones example and trolley cases the self-contained network 
account delivers a “correct” classification in terms of doing rather than allowing, borderline 
34 The cart would have arrived if it had been rolling downhill and the agent had not interposed a rock;  
the victim would have died if the cart had not arrived.
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cases  are  characterised  by  an  inherent  ambiguity,  which  makes  different  characterisations  
legitimate.  The  ambiguity  here  appears  to  be  located  at  the  level  of  selecting  from which 
vantage point we consider the question of what flow of events from now on counts as natural or 
normal.  This selection might  amount  to an empirical  matter,  and,  in borderline  cases,  both 
courses of events can reasonably be seen as natural depending on which point in time we fix as 
the relevant reference point. Plausibly, some  reference points will be less natural than others; in 
Interpose and Remove, for instance, we could question whether, in allowing interpretations, this 
is set too far back in the past. Again, the more agents converge on a specific interpretation of the 
course of events, the less we will observe disagreement in doing and allowing attributions.
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Conclusion
This  thesis  has  examined  the  doing/allowing  distinction  trying  to  account  for  two  main 
judgments most of us intuitively endorse when we think about doing versus allowing harm. The 
first is that doing and allowing amount to two distinct ways in which an agent can be causally  
relevant to a harm. The second is that, all other things being equal, doing harm is harder to  
justify  than  allowing  harm  to  occur.  Upon  closer  analysis,  however,  doing/allowing 
classifications are frequently contested, and there is persistent disagreement on whether doing is 
worse than allowing  even in cases where making the distinction is uncontroversial.  Beyond 
preserving the two main intuitions, I have thus also suggested that we should strive to explain  
and account for disagreement and ambiguity.
My proposed account of the doing/allowing distinction is a causal model which relies on a 
preliminary value assignment to the variables in order to identify which kind of impact an agent 
has on an outcome. Setting the “default” value for each variable ultimately depends on what we  
perceive as the “normal course of events”. I have argued that “normal” can be interpreted in 
both an empirical  and a normative sense:  what  we expect will  happen and what we expect  
should  happen.  So,  doing/allowing  classifications  incorporate  descriptive  and  normative 
features of cases. In particular,  doing/allowing classifications may capture whether an agent 
violated a standard norm or rule of behaviour, or her conduct was somehow “deviant”. This 
aspect,  I  suggested,  explains  why  doing/allowing  classifications  often  match  up  with  other 
morally relevant considerations, and they are therefore morally significant. Nonetheless, which 
course  of events  is  perceived as natural  is  ultimately an empirical  matter.  Agents  can have 
different  expectations  about  what  is  more  likely  to  happen,  about  which  norms  we should 
conform to,  and disagree on how to weigh different  principles.  As a  result,  doing/allowing 
classifications can be context-sensitive and controversial. In “borderline” cases, I claimed that  
different doing/allowing classifications might be (more or less) reasonable. 
This feature of my model could appear unattractive to some. People who argue that our intuitive 
case  judgements  on doing/allowing should  be  taken seriously  might  indeed worry that  this 
conclusion undermines such intuitions. However, in spite of some ultimately ambiguous cases, 
our  everyday  use  of  the  doing/allowing distinction  as  a  guide  to  moral  judgements  is  still  
preserved. In most familiar situations, doing/allowing classifications may provide a “composite 
judgement” which accounts for different features which matters to moral evaluation. Regarding 
controversial  examples,  my  model  may  help  locating  underlying  disagreement,  and  thus 
hopefully advances discussion. 
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My proposal also challenges the idea that, because disagreement and framing effects are real,  
our moral intuitions are never to be trusted. The fact that doing/allowing classifications might be 
ambiguous does not mean that we should not investigate whether they can nonetheless capture 
morally relevant  features.  While consistency in moral theorising is worth pursuing, we may 
accept  that  our  use  of  the  doing/allowing  distinction  is  complex  and  nuanced.  Therefore, 
evidence  of  instability  and  controversy,  especially  in  under-described  and  contrived  cases, 
should not rule out the possibility that doing is worse than allowing in familiar cases. My model 
may thus help in explaining to the sceptic why most cases are, in fact, agreed-upon. 
My proposal, finally, still leaves some gaps, and it is not systematic as one might hope. My 
explanation  of  disagreement  and,  more  generally,  of  controversial  doing/allowing 
classifications,  relies  on  a  case-by-case  analysis.  I  have  suggested  that  our  doing/allowing 
classifications depend on what agents consider to be the “normal course of events”, but I have 
not  offered  a  detailed  account  of  how this  normal  course  of  events  should  be  determined.  
Specifically, I explained how both empirical and normative expectations may set the default 
value, but not how the two reconcile in practice. It might be the case that where moral norms are 
pertinent, these “trump”, but if no moral norm is particularly pertinent, we may revert to mere 
empirical expectations. Further work, however, should be done so as to illuminate on this. 
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Woollard, Fiona, 2008, “Doing and Allowing, Threats and Sequences”, Pacific Philosophical  
Quarterly, 89: 261–277.
Woollard,  Fiona,  2013,  “If this  is  My  Body...:  a  Defence  of  the  Doctrine  of  Doing  and 
Allowing”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 94: 315–341.
Woollard, Fiona, 2015, Doing and Allowing Harm, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
156
